# WHY EAST ASIANS REACT DIFFERENTLY TO DEMOCRATIC REGIME CHANGE: DISCERNING THEIR ROUTES TO BECOMING AUTHENTIC DEMOCRATS

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> Human beings individually and collecti-
> vely do not react to an 'objective' situation
> in the same way as one chemical reacts
> to another when they are put together in a
> test tube.
>
> Barrington MOORE, Jr., 1966, 485

The current wave of democratization began to spread from Southern Eu-
rope more than three decades ago. Since then, this wave has washed the
shores of every region around the globe, and more than 80 countries have
made significant progress toward democracy by holding free and competitive
elections and expanding political competition among multiple political par-
ties (Marshall and Gurr 2005; Shin 2007; UNDP 2002). These institutions
alone, however, do not constitute a fully functioning democratic political sys-
tem. As Rose and his associates (1998, 8) aptly point out, these institutions
constitute nothing more than "the hardware" of representative democracy.

To operate this institutional hardware, a democratic political system re-
quires the "software" that is congruent with the various hardware compo-
nents (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton and Shin 2006). Both the scholarly

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community and policy circles widely recognize that what ordinary citizens think about democracy and its institutions is a key component of such software. Many scholars and policymakers, therefore, increasingly recognize that the consolidation of nascent democratic rule cannot be achieved unless an overwhelming majority of the mass citizenry embraces it as "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996; see also Diamond 1999; Rose and Shin 2001).

Despite such growing recognition that ordinary citizens play a crucial role in the process of democratization, how they react to this process and what forces generate the distinct patterns of their reactions still remains a subject of considerable uncertainty. In what different ways do citizens orient themselves toward democratization, once the process gets underway? Why do some citizens commit themselves to it unconditionally, while many more citizens remain superficially attached to democracy without being dissociated from authoritarianism even after a substantial period of democratic rule? What motivates citizens to remain committed or uncommitted to the process of consolidating nascent democratic rule? Does the improved quality of regime performance or some other set of concerns shape their reactions to the process?

Our study attempts to address these questions in the context of East Asia. This is the region where Confucian values are often viewed as a powerful deterrent to democratization because those values are not compatible with the values and norms of liberal democracy (Huntington 1991; Hu 1997; Pye 1985). This is also the region that resisted the powerful wave of global democratization despite three decades of rapid and sustained economic growth and social modernization (Chang, Chu, and Park 2007; Dalton and Shin 2007). Of the more than two dozen independent states and autonomous territories in the region, only six countries are currently called electoral democracies, and five of them meet the criteria for liberal democracy as set by Freedom House. There is little doubt that East Asia is a laggard in the current, third wave of global democratization still in progress.

Specifically, our research seeks to identify the distinct patterns in which East Asians react to democracy and its alternative regimes, and ascertain the forces that shape each of these patterns most powerfully. To explore these patterns and sources, this paper uses data culled from the second round of the East Asia Barometer (EAB) survey project. These multi-national public opinion data, gathered in 2006 and 2007, consist of responses collected through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected voters in nine countries, including Japan (N=1,067), South Korea (N=1,212), Mongolia (N=1,211), the Philippines (N=1,200), Taiwan (N=1,587), Thailand (N=1,546), Indonesia (1,598), Singapore (1,012), and Vietnam (1,200).

We present our study in eight parts. In the section that follows immediately, we offer a critical review of public opinion research on third-wave democracies. Based on this review, we develop a conceptual framework for understanding how and why citizens react to democratization. The second section explicates the notion of citizen reactions to democratic regime change, one form of subjective democratization, and also ascertains four types of their reactions. The third section discusses seven theoretical models each of which constitutes an alternative explanation of these reactions. The fourth section discusses how we determined the four patterns of citizen reactions to democratic regime change, and measured the key variables underlying each of the seven theoretical models that are chosen as independent variables. The fifth section examines how East Asians understand democracy and highlights national and demographic differences in their conceptions of democracy. The sixth section compares the patterns in which East Asians react to democratic regime change, and highlights national and demographic differences in these patterns. The seventh section analyzes the factors that contribute most to each of these patterns, and compares these factors across the patterns. The final, eighth section summarizes key findings, and discusses their implications for further democratization in East Asia.

## I. Prior research

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there has been a significant growth in public opinion research on popular support for democracy in new democracies. Among the best-known projects are the New Democracies Barometer, the New Europe Barometer, the Latinobarometer, and the Afrobarometer (for a review of these studies, see Diamond 2001; Heath, Fisher, and Smith 2005; Norris 2004). These barometers and many other national and international surveys have generated a great deal of valuable information about the various roles the citizenry plays in the process of democratic transition and consolidation. Undoubtedly, we now know a lot more than before about citizen support for democracy, and its sources and dynamics across countries, regions, and even continents (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Diamond 2001; Rose 1999; Shin 2007). The existing body of survey-based studies, instructive and informative as it is, suffers from a number of serious deficiencies, when culled for our purposes.

Geographically, most of these studies are based on the national and cross-national surveys conducted in the regions outside East Asia. Consequently, many key survey findings from democratizing countries in Africa,

Europe, and Latin America are yet to be confirmed in the context of East Asia, which is distinctively different from any other region in terms of cultural values and socio-economic modernization. Imbued with Confucian cultural values and "blessed" with economic prosperity under authoritarian rule, East Asians are not likely to react to the process of democratization in the same way their peers in other regions do. How differently or similarly East Asians react to this process is yet to be investigated systematically.

Conceptually, previous research endeavors have often failed to consider together the ways in which citizens react to democracy and its alternatives. Some of these endeavors have focused merely on their reactions to democracy, exclusive of those of non-democratic regimes. Even in ascertaining their democratic reactions, others have focused on the ideals of democracy, exclusive of its practices (Gibson 2006; Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992). Having failed to consider anti-authoritarian and/or practical democratic orientations, many previous survey-based studies offer only partial or segmented accounts of the multi-dimensional process of subjective democratization that takes place in the minds of ordinary citizens.

In examining their reactions to democracy-in-practice, moreover, some studies uncritically assumed that all citizens endorse the existing regime as a democracy. Regardless of whether or not they recognize it as a democracy, therefore, their favorable or unfavorable reactions to the current regime are mistakenly considered indicative of their support for or opposition to democracy (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). In the real world of democratizing countries, however, a substantial minority refuses to recognize their current regime as a democracy. Substantively, therefore, a serious question can be raised about the validity of these studies that equate orientations toward the existing regime with those toward democracy itself.

Analytically, previous studies with few exceptions (McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez-Pina 1998; Shin and Wells 2005) are concerned exclusively with the *level* or *quantity* of pro-democratic or anti-authoritarian regime orientations. Computing the percentages accepting of democracy and rejecting of its alternatives, and comparing those percentages on a separate basis have been one popular mode of analysis. Another equally popular mode is to construct a composite index of democratic support or authoritarian opposition, and compare its mean scores across time and space. With these percentages and means alone, we are not able to ascertain the *qualitatively different patterns* in which people react to democratic regime change. In other words, those statistics are not suitable for unraveling how democratic orientations interact with authoritarian orientations in the minds of ordinary citizens. Failing to capture the patterns of these interactions, previous re-

search tends to provide a static rather than dynamic account of subjective democratization taking place among individual citizens.

Theoretically, the extant survey-based studies as a whole tend to offer less than a full account of why citizens react to democratization in the way they do. Over the past two decades, an increasing number of theoretical models have been advanced to determine the powerful forces shaping mass political orientations (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Newton 2005; Mishler and Rose 2005). In analyzing the etiology of citizen reactions to democratic change, however, much of previous research has tested these models on a highly selective basis. As a result, the existing literature as a whole offers much less than a complete account of those reactions.

In an attempt to overcome these deficiencies in the literature, this study analyzes both pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian regime orientations, and identifies the four distinct patterns of their interactions among the mass publics of East Asia. It also compares the patterns of the interactions in which the various demographic groups of those publics engage in the greatest proportion. Finally, it determines the theoretical models that offer fuller accounts of each pattern, and compares those models across the four patterns.

## II. CONCEPTUALIZATION

The central concept of our inquiry is citizen reactions to the democratization of authoritarian rule. This is a compound concept referring to the change taking place at the micro-level of individual citizens in the wake of the change taking place at the macro-level of a political system and its institutions. To explicate this concept, therefore, we first need to identify what each of the two dynamic phenomena refers to, and then specify the exact nature of their interaction.

What constitutes the democratization of an authoritarian political system and its institutions? Institutionally, it involves a transition from authoritarian rule to a political system that allows ordinary citizens to participate on a regular basis and compete in the election of political leaders. Substantively, it also involves a process in which electoral and other institutions of representative democracy consolidate, and become increasingly responsive to the preferences of the citizenry. Of these two types —institutional and substantive— of democratic changes in the political environment in which people live, our study focuses on the former dealing exclusively with democratic regime change.

How do people react to the transformation of an authoritarian regime into a democracy? To this process, they can react psychologically as well as

behaviorally. Behaviorally, they can take part, either actively or passively, in the anti-authoritarian movement to dismiss authoritarian leaders and end authoritarian rule. They can also participate in the pro-democratic movement to formulate a new democratic constitution and hold founding elections. Psychologically, on the other hand, they can react to such democratic regime change by accepting or rejecting it in varying degrees. Since all the countries under our investigation have already completed the process of democratic regime change, our study focuses on psychological reactions, which are still unfolding. In our study, therefore, citizen reactions to democratic regime change refer to a subjective state of mind in which democratic and non-democratic regimes compete against each other to become the preferred regime. These reactions, therefore, constitute the subjective dimension of democratization among individual citizens.

How do democracies and its alternatives interact with each other in the subjective world of democratization? To address this question systematically, we assume that citizens of emerging democracies have little experience and theoretical knowledge about democratic politics, and thus find neither democracy nor dictatorship as a fully satisfying solution to the many problems facing their societies. Under such uncertainty, many of these democratic novices, more often than not, do embrace both democratic and authoritarian political propensies concurrently (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). A growth in their pro-democratic orientations, moreover, does not necessarily bring about a corresponding decline in their anti-authoritarian orientations and vice versa.

In the minds of citizens, democratic and non-democratic regimes can interact in four distinct patterns. These patterns are: (1) neither embracing democracy fully nor rejecting authoritarian rule fully; (2) rejecting authoritarianism fully before embracing democracy fully; (3) embracing democracy fully before rejecting authoritarianism fully; and (4) embracing democracy fully and rejecting authoritarian rule fully at the same time. Of these four types of citizens, the fourth type represents the unconditionally committed to democratic regime change. The larger the proportion of these democrats, the broader and deeper is the scope of subjective democratization among the mass citizenry.

## III. Theories of subjective democratization

Why do citizens react differently to democratization? Why do some citizens remain hybrids while others become authentic democrats? What motivates citizens to become proto-democrats rather than anti-authoritarians?

The extant literature does not provide a fully satisfactory answer to any of these questions. To date, most of the scholarly efforts have focused primarily on the question of why some people support democracy and oppose authoritarianism more or less than others. As a result, relatively little is known about why many citizens of emerging democracies remain attached to authoritarian rule more than a decade after its demise. Much less is known about the ways in which they react to democratic regime change in different patterns. Yet the literature provides a number of complementary theoretical perspectives on the potential sources of those patterns.

### 1. *Socialization and Cultural Values*

Why do so many citizens of third-wave democracies remain attached to the political values and practices of the authoritarian past even after a substantial period of democratic rule? This theory emphasizes the cumulative effect of decades of socialization to non-democratic values, including the Communist, Confucian, and Islamic values of collectivism, egalitarianism, elitism, and hierarchism (Dahrendorf, 1990; Eckstein et al. 1998; Hahn, 1991; Jowitt, 1992; Sztompka, 1991). In this approach, adherence to such pre-democratic values makes it difficult for citizens to reorient themselves, especially toward the values of liberalism and pluralism that figure significantly in the new democratic political order. If citizens of former Communist states, for example, feel that the principles and norms of their new democratic regime run counter to the pre-democratic values in which they were socialized for all or most of their lives, citizens become reluctant to commit themselves to democracy. The more people adhere to the collectivistic or hierarchical values of the pre-democratic period, the more cautious they are about embracing democracy as the preferred form of government.

### 2. *Democratic Political Learning*

This theory, often called *the learning model*, is the reverse version of socialization theory. While the latter emphasizes changes in political attitudes and values, the former emphasizes their continuity. Specifically, the learning model emphasizes "an informal process by which individuals acquire their beliefs through interactions with their political environments" (McClosky and Zaller 1984, 12). Through repeated involvement in the political process over time, people become familiar with and integrated into changes in the political system in which they live. Familiarity with the new democratic pro-

cess, therefore, breeds contentment or satisfaction with it, and encourages people to endorse the view that democracy is superior to its alternatives. Proponents of this political learning and re-socialization attribute upward shifts in democratic support to longer or positive experiences with the functioning of democratic institutions (Converse 1969; Dahl 1989; Fuchs 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Weil 1994).

## 3. *Modernization and Cognitive Competence*

People are not equally involved in the new democratic political process; nor does everyone involved in the process learn the virtues of a new democratic regime. Naturally the question arises as to which segments of the mass citizenry are likely to engage in democratic political learning and why they do so. The exiting literature offers two related perspectives on this question.

One perspective, often called *modernization* or *neo-modernization theory*, emphasizes the role of socioeconomic development in generating democratic political orientations, which Inglehart and Welzel (2005) characterize as "[s]elf-expression values." Economic development enables an increasing number of people to satisfy their basic needs, and acquire new knowledge and skills through formal education. Through this process of socio-economic development, they also become exposed to the new values of post-materialism and the virtues of democracy. Of those exposed to these values, however, only a minority initially embraces new democratic political ideas and demand the democratization of authoritarian rule. Another perspective, therefore, emphasizes the cognitive capacity of the citizenry to deal with the complexity of political life and influence its process.

## 4. *Regime Performance*

This theory emphasizes the *performance* of the democratic regime under which citizens currently live (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Hoefferbert and Klingemann 1999; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998; Shin, 1999; Shin and McDonough, 1999). Specifically, it contends that citizens shift their support for democratic regime change based on how they judge the degree to which such change serves various functions or interests to which they give priority (Gastil 1992; see also Schwartz 1987). If they feel that democratization promotes those goals, citizens become more supportive of the process; if they feel that it hinders them, they become less supportive.

Though broadly similar, the performance model differs from the learning model in stressing a range of socioeconomic influences on democratic commitment; the latter emphasis focuses on citizen understanding of democracy and experience with its practice (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Shin and McDonough 1999). In the former, therefore, dissatisfaction with economic performance is often viewed as a major, direct deterrent to the legitimation of new democracies (Przeworski 1991). In the latter, growing satisfaction with their performance is widely recognized as a powerful influence promoting support for democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2006; Chang and Chu 2007).

In the empirical literature, however, there is a general agreement that subjective evaluations of political performance matter more than those of economic performance. In their research on post-Communist countries, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998), for example, found that people are more supportive of the current democratic regime when they are satisfied with its political performance, rather than when they are satisfied with its economic performance. In a similar study on post-Communist Europe, Evans and Whitefield (1995) also found that political performance is more important than economic performance in generating democratic support among its mass citizenry. In Africa as well, the government's capacity at delivering political goods rather than economic ones was found to be more important for approval of democracy (Mattes and Bratton 2007).

## 5. *Social Capital*

Alexis de Tocqueville and his followers have long argued that a viable democracy requires a vibrant and robust civil society. Specifically, they emphasized the importance of citizen involvement in the social networks of associations and groups in fostering the norms of reciprocity and trust among the mass public life (Diamond 1999; Edwards and Foley 2002; Norris 2002). According to Robert Putnam (1993), for example, citizens, active in civic affairs and trusting of other fellow citizens, embrace the virtues of democracy in general and also support the current democratic system, which allows them to freely pursue what they value for themselves and their community. In the literature on civil society, therefore, associational activism and interpersonal trust are generally viewed as contributing to the allegiance of citizens to democracy-in-practice and their commitment to democracy-in-principle (Misher and Rose 2005; Newton 2005; Putnam 2000).

These seven theoretical models offer alternative explanations of why citizens of new democracies remain attached to democracy or detached

from non-democratic regimes. Only when we take into account all these
models together, therefore, can we offer a more comprehensive account of
why they react differently to democratic regime change. With rare excep-
tions (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Rose, Mishler, and Haer-
pfer 1998), however, previous studies have failed to do this. In none of the
previous studies to date, most notably, have patterns of subjective democ-
ratization been ascertained and explained in terms of all these seven theo-
retical models available from the literature. Consequently, we know a lot
about why people become more or less strongly attached to democracy or
detached from authoritarianism. But we know very little about why their
reactions to democratization also vary a great deal in kinds or patterns.

## IV. Measurement

As discussed above, citizen reactions to democratic regime change are
conceptualized as categorical variables whose values vary in kind. These
variables are measured by considering responses to two sets of three sepa-
rate items. The three items in the first were intended to tap the extent to
which respondents endorse the desirability, suitability, and preferability of
democracy as a political system. The three items in the second, on the other
hand, were intended to tap the extent to which they were detached from the
virtues of authoritarian regimes, including those of military, civilian, and
one-party dictatorship. Considering their responses to the three items in
each set, we first determined whether they were fully attached to democracy
and fully detached from authoritarianism. Considering the status of such
democratic attachment and authoritarian detachment at the same time, we
identified four patterns of subjective democratization.

The first pattern called *hybrids* refers to those who are neither fully de-
tached from authoritarianism nor fully attached to democracy. The second
pattern called *anti-authoritarians* refers to those who are fully detached from
authoritarianism, but are yet to endorse democracy fully. The third pattern
called *proto-democrats* refers to those who are yet to detach fully from authori-
tarianism, but endorse democracy fully. The fourth pattern called *authentic
or committed democrats* refers to those who are not only fully detached from
authoritarianism, but are also fully attached to democracy.

Why do East Asians belong to one of these four distinct patterns during
the course of democratization? We have identified seven theoretical models
as alternative explanations. The first two of them concern socialization to
practices of the authoritarian past and adherence to the values of Confu-
cianism. Adherence to Confucian values is measured by two pairs of items;

one pair tapping deference to authority, and the other tapping opposition to pluralism. Socialization to the authoritarian way of life is also measured by a pair of items involving the characteristics of gender and age. In Confucian societies, being a female often entails submissive or unequal treatment by her male counterparts at home as well as in public. Age, on the other hand, indicates the length of life experience under authoritarian rule.

The next two models deal with modernization. Modernization at the level of individual citizens takes the form of fostering economic well-being and expanding knowledge and skills. Psychologically, on the other hand, it takes the form of being exposed to the ideas of democratic politics and developing a sense of subjective competence in its process. The physical dimension of modernization is measured by levels of family income and educational attainment and with community type, whether urban or rural. Its cognitive or psychological dimension is measured in terms of exposure and mobilization into the world of politics, and the perceived ability to understand the complexity of politics.

Learning democratic politics can also take a variety of forms. In principle, citizens can learn what constitutes democracy and internalize its norms such as freedom, equality, and tolerance. In practice, they can become familiar with the way democracy operates and satisfied with its workings. Therefore, we examined the conceptual as well as practical dimensions. For the conceptual dimension, we first considered the capacity to understand democracy and the distinct modes of democratic understanding. Considering such capacity and modes together, we formulated five different types of democratic conceptions, including the ignorant (or uninformed), narrow procedural, broad procedural, narrow substantive, and broad substantive. For the practical dimension, we chose the awareness of the current regime as a democracy and the positive assessment of its overall performance as two dichotomous indicators of democratic political learning. We considered these two dichotomous indicators together and formulated four types of democratic political learning, which include unsatisfactory authoritarianism, satisfactory authoritarianism, unsatisfactory democracy, and satisfactory democracy.

Regime performance is divided into two categories, one on political performance and the other on economic performance. For the political performance category, we considered the extent to which respondents rated political parties and the parliament as trustworthy, and the degree to which they perceived national and local governments as corrupt. For the economic performance category, we combined negative, neutral and positive assessments of the national and household economies together into a 5-point index.

In the literature on civil society, social capital is widely viewed as a two-dimensional phenomenon. Structurally, it refers to the extent to which people are connected with each other through networks of voluntary associations and groups. Culturally, it refers to the extent to which they trust their fellow citizens. We considered associational membership and interpersonal trust as two separate indicators of social capital.

## V. REACTIONS TO DEMOCRATIC REGIME CHANGE

How do East Asians react to democratic regime change? To ascertain the patterns of their reactions, we first measured levels of attachment to democracy and detachment from authoritarianism. Full attachment to democracy is conceptualized as the endorsement of democratic desire, suitability of democracy, and preference for democracy. Full detachment from authoritarianism is conceptualized as the rejection of military, civilian, and one-party rule. We use these two dimensional measures of democratic and authoritarian regime orientations to create our dependent variable comprising four patterns of regime orientations. This section compares the mean levels of democratic support and authoritarian opposition across the six East Asian new democracies studied here.

To measure democratic support, we selected three questions from the EAB surveys, which tapped, separately, desirability of democracy, suitability of democracy, and preference for democracy. The first question asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they want to live in a democracy on a 10-point numeric scale in which scores of 1 and 10 indicates, respectively, "complete dictatorship" and "complete democracy." The second question asked them to rate the suitability of democracy on a 10-point scale. A score of 1 means that democracy is "completely unsuitable" and a 10 means "completely suitable." Scores of 6 and above on these two 10-point scales were considered pro-democratic responses. The third question asked whether or not respondents always prefer democracy to any other kind of government. Affirmative responses to this question were considered pro-democratic. To estimate the overall level of their attachment to democracy, we counted the number of their pro-democratic responses, which range from 0 to 3. A score of 0 indicates a complete lack of support for democracy, and 3 indicates attachment to democracy.

For each country, the top panel of Table 1 reports the percentages affirming the desirability, suitability, and preferability of democracy separately and together. In all nine countries, large majorities of from 71 to 95 percent expressed the desire to live in a democracy. In all these countries,

smaller majorities from 57 to 85 percent judged democracy as suitable for their country. In always preferring it to any other form of government, however, East Asian countries were divided into two groups. In Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan, which represent the oldest third-wave democracies in East Asia, less than half their populations expressed such democratic support. In Japan and the other five countries, majorities ranging from 51 to 73 percent expressed unqualified preference for democratic rule.

### Table 1. National Differences in Democratic and Authoritarian Orientations (in percent)

#### A. Attachment to Democracy

| Components | Japan | Korea | Mongolia | Philippines | Taiwan | Thailand | Indonesia | Singapore | Vietnam |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Desirability | 89 | 94 | 95 | 71 | 83 | 85 | 86 | 91 | 93 |
| Suitability | 75 | 79 | 85 | 57 | 67 | 82 | 80 | 86 | 90 |
| Preferability | 63 | 43 | 34 | 51 | 48 | 73 | 64 | 59 | 72 |
| (All) | 54 | 37 | 35 | 29 | 36 | 61 | 53 | 53 | 70 |

#### B. Detachment from Authoritarianism

| Components | Japan | Korea | Mongolia | Philippines | Taiwan | Thailand | Indonesia | Singapore | Vietnam |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Military rule | 91 | 91 | 83 | 73 | 88 | 71 | 62 | 92 | 64 |
| Civilian dictatorship | 79 | 83 | 35 | 59 | 76 | 69 | 84 | 86 | 76 |
| Party dictatorship | 83 | 88 | 71 | 65 | 83 | 73 | 87 | 88 | 35 |
| All | 71 | 77 | 28 | 39 | 69 | 55 | 56 | 81 | 26 |

Source: the Asian Barometer Surveys II.

When all these three indicators of pro-democratic responses are considered together, majorities were fully supportive of democracy in six countries including Japan, the oldest democracy in East Asia. In the five other countries, including Korea and Taiwan, which are known as the most vigorous new democracies in the region, only minorities of about one-third or less was fully supportive of it. When all nine East Asian countries are considered together, the pooled sample shows that full supporters of democracy constitute a minority of 48 percent. This indicates that more than half the mass citizenry in East Asia has yet to embrace democracy fully even after more than a decade of democratic rule.

To measure the levels of detachment from authoritarianism, we also selected three questions from the EAB surveys, each of which asked respondents whether they would agree or disagree with the regimes of the authoritarian past, including military rule, civilian dictatorship, and one-party dictatorship. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows percentages expressing the responses rejecting each and all of these three non-democracies. As with democratic support, we counted the number of those anti-authoritarian responses and estimated the overall level of detachment from authoritarianism. Scores of this index ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 3.

The table shows that in every East Asian country, with the exceptions of Mongolia and Vietnam, large majorities reject each non-democratic alternative. When responses to all three non-democratic regimes are considered, however, the fully detached from these regimes constitute minorities in three of the nine countries—Mongolia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Of the nine East Asian countries, Vietnam was the country whose population is fully attached to democracy to the greatest extent. From these contrasting findings, it is evident that accepting democracy fully is one thing, and rejecting its alternatives fully is another.

We now measure the overall levels of support for democracy across East Asians by combining into a 7-point index of overall support for democracy the values of two 4-point indexes measuring, respectively, the extent to which East Asians are attached to democracy and detached from authoritarianism. For each East Asian country, Figure 1 reports the mean value on this index whose values range from a low of 0 to a high of 6. All nine countries registered means which are significantly higher than the index midpoint of 3. 0. This finding clearly indicates that in every East Asian country, a majority of its citizenry tends to accept democracy and reject its alternatives. From the finding, however, it is difficult to determine how differently they react to those political systems.

## Figure 1. National Differences in the Overall Level of Democratic Support



Source: the Asian Barometer Surveys II.

To ascertain these patterns of subjective democratization among East Asians, we examined whether respondents fully accept democracy and fully reject authoritarianism, and we classified them into the four types of regime orientations: hybrids, anti-authoritarians, proto-democrats, and authentic democrats. *Hybrids* do not embrace democracy fully and remain attached to authoritarianism. *Anti-authoritarians* are not fully supportive of democracy, but are fully detached from authoritarianism. *Proto-democrats* accept democracy fully, but do not reject authoritarianism to the same extent. Finally, *authentic democrats* fully embrace democracy, and fully reject authoritarianism. Table 2 presents the distribution of these four types of regime orientations for each of the nine countries.

## Table 2. National Differences in Patterns of Subjective Democratization (in percent)

| Patterns | Japan | Korea | Mongolia | Philippines | Taiwan | Thailand | Indonesia | Singapore | Vietnam |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hybrids | 19 | 18 | 51 | 44 | 25 | 22 | 26 | 12 | 25 |
| Anti-Authoritarians | 27 | 45 | 14 | 27 | 39 | 16 | 19 | 13 | 5 |
| Proto Democrats | 20 | 5 | 21 | 17 | 6 | 23 | 19 | 6 | 49 |
| Authentic Democrats | 44 | 32 | 15 | 12 | 30 | 38 | 36 | 47 | 21 |

Source: the Asian Barometer Surveys II.

The table reveals considerable differences in the patterns of subjective democratization in which democracy and its alternatives compete against each other in the minds of East Asians. In terms of the most and least popular patterns, for example, the nine countries are divided into four groups. In Mongolia, hybrids are the most popular, and anti-authoritarians are the least popular. In the Philippines as well, hybrids are the most popular but the least popular are proto-democrats. In Korea and Taiwan, anti-authoritarians are the most popular, and proto-democrats are the least popular. In striking contrast, proto-democrats are the most popular in Vietnam where anti-authoritarians are the least popular. In Indonesia and Thailand, as in Vietnam, anti-authoritarians are the least popular, but the most popular are authentic democrats, not proto-democrats. Only in Japan and Singapore, the two richest countries in East Asia, authentic democrats, the most ardent supporters of democracy, are the most popular, and proto-democrats are the least popular. Unquestionably, regime orientations among East Asians vary far more significantly in kind or quality than in level or quantity. Why the most popular and unpopular types of regime orientations vary so much in East Asia remains a mystery.

In summary, hybrids are the most popular pattern of regime orientations in two East Asian countries. So do anti-authoritarians in two countries. Prototypes are the most popular in one country while authentic democrats are the most popular in four countries. These figures, when considered together, suggest that embracing democracy and rejecting its alternatives at the same time constitute the most common pattern of subjective democratization in East Asia. Japan and Singapore together with Thailand and Indonesia fall into this pattern of simultaneous democratization. This pattern is followed by that of rejecting authoritarianism before accepting democracy. Korea and Taiwan represent this pattern. Equally common is the pattern of remaining attached to the virtues of both democracy and authoritarianism at the same time. Mongolia and the Philippines experience this least desirable pattern. The least common in East Asia is the pattern of embracing democracy before rejecting authoritarianism. Vietnam is the only country in this pattern.

Despite such national differences, nonetheless, the nine countries are, by and large, alike in two important respects. In none of the nine countries, do authentic democrats constitute a majority. Even in Japan, East Asia's oldest democracy, slightly more than two out of five voters fully accept democracy while rejecting its alternatives fully. In all nine countries, moreover, a large majority does not belong to one single pattern; instead, more than two-thirds are divided into three different patterns. Such wide divisions may

be one of the reasons why these new East Asian democracies have been struggling to become fully consolidated democracies (Chang, Chu, and Park 2007; Cheng 2003; Croissant 2004).

   We now examine how the patterns of subjective democratization vary across different segments of the East Asian mass publics. Table 3 presents the relationship between the four patterns of regime orientation and the five demographic variables of gender, age, education, household income, and urbanization.

Table 3. Democratic Differences in Patterns of Subjective Democratization (in percent)

| Democratic Characteristics | Patterns of Subjective Democratization | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Hybrids | Anti- Authoritarians | Proto Democrats | Authentic Democrats |
| **Gender** | | | | |
| Male | 23 | 25 | 18 | 34 |
| Female | 31 | 25 | 17 | 27 |
| **Age** | | | | |
| 17-29 | 26 | 26 | 19 | 29 |
| 30-39 | 26 | 25 | 18 | 31 |
| 40-49 | 27 | 26 | 17 | 31 |
| 50-59 | 25 | 27 | 17 | 31 |
| 60 & older | 32 | 22 | 16 | 30 |
| **Education** | | | | |
| Illiterates | 36 | 20 | 21 | 24 |
| Primary Ed. | 28 | 22 | 21 | 29 |
| Secondary Ed. | 22 | 30 | 15 | 33 |
| Tertiary Ed. | 19 | 29 | 13 | 39 |
| **Income** | | | | |
| Lowest | 37 | 23 | 17 | 23 |
| Low | 26 | 27 | 15 | 31 |
| Middle | 24 | 27 | 17 | 33 |
| High | 21 | 24 | 19 | 35 |
| Highest | 19 | 21 | 25 | 35 |
| **Urbanization** | | | | |
| Rural | 24 | 23 | 19 | 34 |
| Urban | 30 | 27 | 16 | 25 |

Source: the Asian Barometer Surveys II.

Between the two genders, hybrids are significantly more numerous among females. Authentic democrats are, on the other hand, more numerous among their male counterparts. By and large, females, as compared to males, are more reluctant to reject authoritarianism and accept democracy to the fullest extent. Of five age groups, hybrids are the most numerous among those in the oldest group (60 and older), and proto-democrats are the most numerous among those in the youngest group. Higher levels of education are associated with consistently lower proportions of hybrids and higher proportions of authentic democrats. As a result, hybrids are most numerous among the illiterate, while authentic democrats are most numerous among those with a college education. Higher incomes are also associated with consistently lower proportions of hybrids and higher proportions of authentic democrats. Of five income groups, hybrids are the most numerous among the lowest income groups, while anti-authoritarians are the most numerous among middle and lower-middle income groups. Proto-democrats and authentic democrats, on the other hand, are most numerous among the high-income group, but not the highest income group. Most surprisntly, hybrids are more numerous among residents of urban communities, while authentic democrats are more among rural residents.

When all these five demographic characteristics are considered together, it appears that the proportions of hybrids are higher among females, older people, the least educated, the lowest income group, and urbanites. Those of anti-authoritarians are higher among those with a high school or college education, and middle and low middle income groups. Proto-democrats are more represented among younger people and the highest income group. Finally, authentic democrats are most numerous among males, the college-educated, the upper middle income group, and rural people.

## VI. Sources of Subjective Democratization

To examine how democracies and its alternatives interact in the minds of East Asians, we make use of seven theoretical models each of which constitutes an alternative explanation of regime orientations: socialization, culture, modernization, cognitive awareness, political learning, institutional performance, and social capital. Of these seven models, which ones offer the most and least powerful explanations of each regime orientation type? To address this question, we performed the Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) on the pooled sample of six EAB surveys.[1]

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[1] Japan was excluded from this analysis of ascertaining the patterns of democratic conceptions because its survey did not ask the open-ended question. Singapore and Vietnam

Among a variety of statistical techniques, we chose the MCA, known as the equivalent to a multiple regression analysis, using dummy variables. Unlike ordinary least-square and other statistical techniques, the MCA does not require the normal distribution of measurement units. Nor does it require that all predictors are measured on interval scales or that the relationships be linear. It is, therefore, capable of handling predictors measured on nominal and any other scales, and interrelationships of any form among the predictor variables and between a predictor and dependent variable. It is also capable of handling a dichotomous dependent variable with frequencies that are not extremely unequal (Andrews, Morgan, and Sonquist 1973). This technique is, therefore, more pertinent in the analysis of public opinion data than others, although it is not as popular.

We employed the MCA to analyze the four patterns of subjective democratization, each of which is measured as a dichotomy. In analyzing each pattern, we considered a total of 15 variables as predictors. Fourteen of these variables are independent variables representing the seven theoretical clusters known in the literature to influence citizen orientations to democratic and other regimes. In addition, six countries—Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand, Indonesia—are included in the MCA analysis as a single control variable in order to accurately estimate the extent to which each independent variable affects each pattern of subjective democratization independent of others.[2] Table 4 reports the *eta* and *beta* coefficients for each predictor. Being equivalent to standardized regression coefficients, the *beta* coefficients allow us to determine the relative importance of each independent variable as an influence on the dependent variable.

were also excluded from the MCA analysis because these countries are yet to experience democratic regime change. Without the occurrence of democratic regime change, respondents cannot be asked about their experience of it.

Table 4. Estimating the Relative Effects of Independent
and Control Variables on Four Patterns of Subjective
Democratization (MCA estimates)

| Predictors | Hybrids | | Anti Authoritarians | | Proto Democrats | | Authentic Democrats | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Eta | Beta | Eta | Beta | Eta | Beta | Eta | Beta |
| Socialization | | | | | | | | |
| Gender | .08 | .03 | .00 | .00 | .00 | .01 | .07 | .03 |
| Age | .07 | .04 | .03 | .04 | .01 | .01 | .05 | .03 |
| Modernization | | | | | | | | |
| Education | .15 | .08 | .11 | .01 | .08 | .02 | .11 | .10 |
| Income | .14 | .06 | .05 | .04 | .03 | .01 | .12 | .12 |
| Urbanization | .07 | .06 | .08 | .04 | .08 | .01 | .08 | .00 |
| Cognitive ability | .09 | .07 | .06 | .04 | .06 | .02 | .09 | .05 |
| Confucianism | .15 | .08 | .16 | .06 | .17 | .11 | .12 | .10 |
| Democratic Learning | | | | | | | | |
| Experience | .14 | .11 | .16 | .06 | .10 | .06 | .16 | .13 |
| Conceptions | .19 | .16 | .10 | .05 | .06 | .05 | .16 | .14 |
| Regime Performance | | | | | | | | |
| Institutional Trust | .06 | .01 | .19 | .04 | .14 | .03 | .04 | .02 |
| Corruption | .06 | .02 | .10 | .04 | .06 | .01 | .10 | .05 |
| Economy | .03 | .02 | .10 | .02 | .09 | .03 | .04 | .03 |
| Civil Society | | | | | | | | |
| Association | .03 | .01 | .01 | .00 | .04 | .03 | .01 | .00 |
| Trust | .10 | .02 | .02 | .01 | .00 | .00 | .08 | .02 |
| (Country) | .26 | .23 | .26 | .24 | .20 | .14 | .23 | .22 |
| (R²) | | (.15) | | (.10) | | (.06) | | (.13) |

Source: the Asian Barometer Surveys II.

Of the 15 independent and control variables in the table, 6 variables —gender, age, trust in political parties and parliaments, the assessments of the national and household finances, memberships in voluntary association, and interpersonal trust— have no significant independent effect on any of the four patterns. The first two of these four variables are indicators of socialization into authoritarian politics, while the third and fourth are indicators of regime performance. The last two are indicators of civil society.

Contrary to what is expected from the literature on socialization, varying levels of exposure to authoritarian politics do not have any significant independent effect on the way East Asians react to the democratic regime change taken place in their country. Such exposure appears to affect their reactions indirectly through the particular types of values they have acquired from the socialization process. Contrary to what is widely known in

the social capital literature, moreover, neither joining in formal associations nor trusting other fellow citizens contributes to the democratization of authoritarian regime orientations. Finally, assessments of regime performance matter, by and large, little to such subjective democratization among East Asians. This finding contrasts sharply with what is generally known in other regions in democratic transition.

Of the eight remaining independent variables, whose *beta* coefficients are .05 or higher, five variables have a significant effect only on one or two of the four patterns identified here. For example, urban living, and corruption have such an effect on one pattern while education, income, and cognitive capacity have it on two. Large incomes discourage East Asians to become hybrids. Higher education, on the other hand discourages them to become hybrids, and encourages them to become authentic democrats. Neither of these two modernization indicators significantly affects adherence to any other patterns. This finding suggests that in East Asia, direct consequences of socioeconomic development for democratization among the mass citizenry are quite limited in scope. This may be why East Asia has become a region of laggards in the current wave of democratization despite decades of rapid and sustained socioeconomic development (Chang, Chu, and Park, 2007; Cheng 2003; Croissant 2004)

Cognitive capacity significantly affects two patterns of regime orientations. Increases in exposure to politics and the ability to understand politics in general and participate in its process motivate East Asians to reorient themselves away from the hybrid pattern and toward authentic democratic patterns. Such exposure and ability, however, have no significant effect on the two other patterns of sequential democratization, the one rejecting authoritarianism before accepting democracy and the other accepting democracy before rejecting authoritarianism.

Unlike all other theoretical variables considered in our study, Confucian values and democratic political learning have significant effects on all four patterns of subjective democratization. As the adjusted percentage figures reported in Figure 2 show, those values, which stress deference to authority, discourage East Asians to become anti-authoritarians or authentic democrats, while encouraging them to become hybrids or proto-democrats. Even when the effects of all other variables are statistically removed, those unattached to Confucian values are one-and-a-half times more likely to become authentic democrats than those highly attached to those values (35% vs.19%). Moreover, the former are two-and-a-half times less likely to become proto-democrats than the latter (11% vs. 26%).

Figure 2. Adjusted Percentage of Regime Orientations
by Levels of Attachment to Confucianism (MCA estimates)



Source: the Asian Barometer Surveys II.

In striking contrast, the experience of a well-functioning democratic regime discourages them to become hybrids or anti-authoritarians, while encouraging them to become proto-democrats or authentic democrats. For example, those who embrace the current regime as a well-functioning democracy are also one-and-a-half times more likely to become authentic democrats than those who dismiss it as a malfunctioning authoritarian regime (34% *vs*. 20%). This finding accords with what is generally known in the literature on third-wave democracies (Mattes and Bratton 2007).

More notable is the finding that learning democracy-in-principle also matters significantly in the process of subjective democratization in East Asia. According to the *bet*a values reported in Table 4, how East Asians understand democracy shapes two of the four patterns more powerfully than any of all other independent variables considered, including Confucian values and perceptions of democratic regime performance. In choosing the pattern of hybrids, for example, those who are unable to define it outnumber those who are able to do so by a large margin of 25 percentage points (40% *vs*. 15 %). In choosing the pattern of authentic democrats, however, the former are outnumbered by the latter by a substantial margin, 13 percentage points (18% *vs*. 31%).

Moreover, Figure 3 shows that hybrids are more numerous among substantive conceivers than procedural conceivers of democracy (30% *vs*.

26%), and among narrow conceivers than broad conceivers (29% *vs.* 23%). Authentic democrats, on the other hand, are more numerous among procedural conceivers than substantive conceivers (32% *vs.* 22%), and among broad conceivers than narrow conceivers (34% *vs.* 29%). These findings, when considered together, suggest that the particular route many East Asians choose to take toward democratization is shaped powerfully by their ability to understand democracy and the particular way in which they conceptualize it.

Figure 3. Adjusted Percentages of Hybrids
and Authentic Democrats by Different Conceptions
of Democracy (MCA estimates)



Source: the Asian Barometer Surveys II.

For all four patterns of regime orientations, the clusters of democratic learning and Confucianism variables register the two highest *beta* coefficients. Attachment to Confucian hierarchical values is the most powerful influence on the intermediate patterns of anti-authoritarians and proto-democrats. Democratic learning, on the other hand, is the most powerful influence on the two extreme patterns of hybrids and authentic democrats. There is no doubt that Confucian values and democratic learning are not only the most pervasive, but also the most powerful influences on subjective democratization among East Asians.

Finally, we compare the number of all the variables that *significantly* affect each pattern of regime orientations to determine whether the combination of these variables varies from one pattern to another. Table 4 shows

that these combinations involve from three to seven variables. Of the 14 theoretical variables considered, only three —Confucian cultures, democratic regime experience, and democratic conceptions— are significant influences on anti-authoritarian orientations and proto-democratic orientations. In the case of authentic democratic orientations, which involve the full acceptance of democracy and the full rejection of authoritarianism, six variables, including education, cognitive capacity and political corruption, shape it significantly. In the case of hybrid orientations, the least developed pattern of subjective democratization, a total of seven independent variables, including income and urban living, are identified as significant influences.

Although the number of significant factors varies from one pattern of regime orientations to another, they are very much alike in their kind. In East Asia, it appears that different combinations of the same five variables —culture, modernization, cognitive development, and democratic political learning— determine, by and large, the contours and dynamics of subjective democratization. Of these five, Confucian culture and democratic learning are its two most powerful and pervasive sources.

## VII. Summary and Conclusions

In the scholarly community and policy circle there is a growing consensus that the democratization of authoritarian rule cannot be completed with the inauguration of competitive elections and multiparty systems alone. These electoral processes can fulfill the various necessary functions of representative democracy only when a large majority of the citizens fully accepts it, while fully rejecting its alternatives. Without such a majority of fully committed democrats, therefore, countries in democratic transition are not likely to become complete or consolidated democracies; instead, they are likely to drift as "broken-back" democracies (Rose and Shin 2001).

To understand the process of democratic consolidation from the perspective of the mass citizenry, an increasing number of international and national public opinion surveys have recently been conducted throughout global regions. Studies based on these surveys to date have been concerned exclusively with the *levels* or *magnitude* of democratic support and/or authoritarian opposition among ordinary citizens, whose political systems were transformed into a democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. Consequently, little is known about how democratic and authoritarian orientations interact with each other in the minds of these citizens. Much less is known about why the interactions of their regime orientations often vary in

kind. Our study has attempted to fill this gap in survey-based studies of de-mocratization by examining the dynamic patterns and sources of subjective democratization among the mass citizenries of six East Asian democracies.

Our pattern analysis of the EAB surveys recently conduced in the coun-tries reveals that in all East Asian democracies, majorities of these publics do not endorse democracy as "the only game in town" even after more than a decade of democratic rule. In all these countries with the exception of Japan, those fully endorsing democracy do not even constitute large plurali-ties. Instead, the majorities of their citizens remain hybrids, anti-authori-tarians, or proto-democrats by refusing to accept democracy fully or reject authoritarianism fully. A lack of broad authentic democratic support and a high degree of their fragmentation into all four distinct patterns of regime orientations constitute a notable characteristic of subjective democratiza-tion in East Asia.

Theoretically, decades of socialization into the authoritarian mode of life, the political and economic performances of democratic institutions, and greater involvement in civic life have no significant impact on the way East Asians react to the regimes of different natures. Of the four other clus-ters of theoretical variables, the clusters of modernization and cognitive capacity significantly affect the two extreme patterns, hybrids and authentic democrats. Unlike these two clusters, Confucian culture and democratic learning affect all four patterns significantly. These two mutually opposing clusters dealing, respectively, with the authoritarian past and the democratic present are the most pervasive determinants of how East Asians react to democratic regime change. In short, the number of significant influences and the kind of the most pervasive influences on regime orientations vary considerably across their patterns. This can be considered another notable characteristic of subjective democratization in East Asia.

The more notable of our findings concerns Confucianism. According to the data presented in Table 4, it affects the pattern of proto-democrats, more powerfully than democratic learning or any other theoretical variable considered. This finding, that Confucianism is the most powerful influence on the embrace of democracy, runs counter to what is known in previous research (Chang, Chu, and Tsai 2005; Dalton and Shin 2006; Park and Shin 2006). In addition, our finding reveals that Confucianism, which is widely believed to be incompatible with the values of democracy, does more than undermine subjective democratization among East Asians. As expected from the Asian values debate (Bell 2006; de Barry 1998; Fox 1997; Zakaria 1984, 2003), adherence to Confucian values undermines it by discouraging them to become anti-authoritarians or authentic democrats, while encour-

aging them to become hybrids. Furthermore, the same values encourage them to become proto-democrats, who fully embrace democracy. The more strongly they uphold those values, the more they are likely to embrace it without rejecting its alternatives fully. Since the full embrace of democracy is one important dimension of subjective democratization, we wonder whether it plays multidirectional roles of detracting from and contributing to the process at the same time (Fukuyama 1995; Hahm 2005). This should be considered one important question for future research.

Finally, our findings call into question the notion that regime orientations, either democratic or authoritarian, are a reflection of diffuse commitment reflecting deep-seated values. Contrary to what Easton (1975) and others (Di Palma 1993; Kornberg and Clarke 1983) have suggested in the past, these orientations are not impervious to change; instead they grow and decline in response to a variety of forces, including democratic learning in principle and in practice. Our results are an important piece of evidence that the divergent patterns of citizen reactions to democratic regime change are as much as an outcome as a cause of democratic practice (Mueller and Seligson 1994; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mishler and Rose 2002; Newton 2005).

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## IX. APPENDIX A. MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

*Desirability of democracy* (Q97): "Here is a scale: 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now" [scores of 6 through 10 are considered being pro-democratic].

*Suitability of democracy* (Q98): "Here is a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable for our country. If '1' means that democracy is completely unsuitable for [name of country] today and '10' means that it is completely suitable, where would you place our country today" [scores of 6 through 10 are considered being pro-democratic].

*Preference for democracy* (Q121): "Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? (1) Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government; (2) under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; (3) for people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or nondemocratic regime." [the first category is considered being pro-democratic].

*Overall support for democracy* (Q97, Q98, and Q121): a 4-point index is constructed by counting the number of the pro-democratic responses for desirability of democracy, suitability of democracy, and preference for democracy.

*Military dictatorship* (Q124): "For each statement, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? The military should come in to govern the country" [disagreements with the statement, either strong or somewhat, are considered being antiauthoritarian].

*One-party dictatorship* (Q125): "For each statement, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? No opposition party should be allowed to compete for power" [disagreements with the statement, either strong or somewhat, are considered being antiauthoritarian].

*Civilian dictatorship* (Q126): "For each statement, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things" [disagreements with the statement, either strong or somewhat, are considered being antiauthoritarian].

*Overall opposition to Authoritarianism* (Q124, Q125, and Q126): A 4-point index is constructed by counting anti-authoritarian responses to the items on military rule, civilian dictatorship, and one-party dictatorship.

*Types of Regime orientations:* Four types are identified by determining whether respondents are fully supportive of democracy and fully rejecting of authoritarianism by scoring the maximum score of 3 on the aforementioned indexes measuring the overall level of democratic support and authoritarian opposition.

*Gender* (SE002): Male=1; else=0.

*Age* (SE003): 18-29=1; 30-39=2; 40-49=3; 50-59=4; 60 and older=5; else=missing.

*Confucian values* (Q133, Q138, Q135, Q139): A 5-five point index is constructed by summing up responses expressing agreement with four statements: (Q134) "Government leaders are like the head of family; we should all follow their decisions." (Q136) "Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups." (Q079) "For the sake of the national community/society, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice his personal interest." (Q140) "If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic."

*Education* (SE005): 1=illiterate; 2=primary; 3=secondary; 4=tertiary.

*Income* (SE009): 1= lowest quintile to 5=5th quintile.

*Cognitive competence* (Q056, Q057, Q097, Q127): A 5-point index is constructed by counting affirmative or positive responses to four questions: (Q049 "How interested would you say you are in politics?" (Q050) "How often do you follow news about politics?" (Q091) "To you, what does 'democracy' mean?" (Q128) "Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on?"

*Types of democratic regime experience* (Q094, Q099): Four types are identified by determining whether respondents experienced democratic rule and satisfaction with it. (Q100) "Where would you place our country under the present government on this scale in which 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy?" Scores of 6 and higher are considered experiencing democratic rule. (Q98) "On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country—very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied?" The first two of these four categories are considered indicative of democratic satisfaction.

*Conceptions of Democracy* (Q091, Q092); five patterns are ascertained by considering the aforementioned two pairs of definition categories: (1) narrow vs. broad; and (2) procedural vs. substantive. The first pattern of the ignorant refers to those who are not able to answer either the open-ended or closed-ended question. The rest include being narrowly procedural; broadly procedural; narrowly substantive; and broadly substantive.

*Institutional trust* (Q010, Q011): A 3-point index is constructed by counting the responses expressing "a great deal" or "quite a lot of trust" in (Q9) political parties and (Q10) Parliament. "For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in it—a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or not at all."

*Corruption* (Q117, Q118): "How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?" "How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?" A 3-point index is constructed by counting the responses that "most officials are corrupt" or "almost everyone is corrupt."

*Economic performance* (Q001 and Q004): A 5-point index is constructed by counting positive responses to four questions: (Q1) "How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?" (Q2) "How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the past five years?" (Q4) "As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?" (Q5) How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was five years ago?"

*Associational membership* (Q020, Q021, and Q022): "Are you a member of any organization or formal groups?" Responses are dichotomized into two categories: yes=1; no=0.

*Social trust* (Q023): "Generally speaking, would you say that (1) 'Most people can be trusted' or (2) 'you can't be too careful in dealing with them'?" Responses are recoded [1=1; else=0].