

MASS POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN HUNGARY

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*I kindly recommend my chapter to my professor, colleague and friend:
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I. INTRODUCTION: DEFINITIONS AND CONTENTS

In the first free elections of Middle Europe, the Hungarian voters were absent in the largest proportion. In 1989-90 the majority of Hungarians observed the process of democratization from a cautious distance. The silent majority did not participate in the “melancholic revolution.” In the last 20 years six parliamentary elections were held, the institutions and law system of democracy were stabilized, frames of participation in the public life were built for the civils and the fear was over. How the character of the civic society shaped, what kind of political activity the Hungarian have, what changed in their political culture?

I will analyze the roll of privatization and marketization process in the develop of civil society. In my chapter I will work with empirical survey data set (time series and cross-national data) to present our. First of all we should clarify the content of some terms we used: democracy, political culture, civic culture.

Democracy by the definition of Almond and Verba is a political system in which the government is elected by the majority of the voters at regularly held, free elections, and where citizens control the government through institutionalized channels of mass political participation (Almond-Verba 1965). Consequently the efficacy, the performance and the quality of democracy thus depends on how effective is the control of the citizens. We now from G. Almond and S. Verba, that the attitude of the people towards the participation and political actions are fundamental conditions of the civic culture (Almond-Verba 1965: 326). The performance and the quality of democracy thus depends on how effective is this control.

Political culture is one of the umbrella-concept of political science, because it is difficult to squarely define due to its varied content. It is an understood thing that political culture is a politically direct, significant part of the social consciousness as much as ideology, public opinion and morals. By Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba “political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations towards politics among the members of political system” (Almond-Verba 1963). Lucien Pie declares political culture as “the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which given order and meaning to the political process and which provide to underlying assumptions and rules which govern the political behaviour in the political system.” Sensitized the two concept, I use the following definition: Political culture is a collective product, it came into existence through historic development. Political culture means political reaction skills which are based on a collective point of view. These skills have group qualities, so they are representing attitudes, mentality, values, behavioral frames of determined social groups (class, layer, cast, party, religious group) in which groups the current political behaviour occurs. Political culture is not static, it can change and transform. It changes as a result of its response to new ideas, new regime, new leaders, new experiences, and many other factors. Incorporating these changes, it continues from generations through the process of political socialization.

Civic culture as Almond and Verba describes contains part of the “rationality-activist” culture. It is a more mixed political culture, political activity, rationality and involvement are balanced by passivity, traditionality,

and political indifference. The citizens, in a civic culture, have a “reserve of influence.” He is a potentially active citizen whose interest in political life is not necessarily high but whose general role of extra-political activity is essentially high. As Przeworski suggests, what really matters is not the legitimacy ‘of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives.’ In other words, the consensus is grounded on the diffuse perception, at a mass level, that ‘there is no other game in town’ (Przeworski 1986, 51-52). There are three broad dimensions of a political culture basing upon the three types of orientations towards the objects: 1. The system culture, 2. The process culture and 3. The policy culture of a political system.

The first dimension of political culture is the *political system culture*. The political system denotes to the individual orientations towards the political objects which prompts him to behave in a particular way. The functioning of political system is always conditioned by these three types of orientation which are the cognitive, affective and evaluative orientation. Cognitive orientation refers to the knowledge that people have to the political object. Affective orientation is the emotional disposition to the political object thereof. The evaluative orientation refers to the individual perception about the political object and their judgment on the object by involving the use of values, information and feelings. The system culture has three types: traditional, charismatic and rational-legal.

The second dimension of political culture is the *policy culture*, which may be of two types such as the procedural and objectivinal. The agreement or consensus of the people is directed towards the procedures only. In objectivinal culture, the people, most radically falls into the category of consensus, is directed towards the goal or objective of the political system. The people have a knowledge of, feeling about and evaluation of the objective or goal of political system only. The objectivinal policy culture has two types, such as the elite culture and mass culture.

The third dimension of political culture is the *process culture*. The individual attitudes, orientations, beliefs, sentiments and values all are directed to this political process only. The individual develops his cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation toward the input and output process. The process culture has two subcategories such as the view of others (trust, hostility) and the view of self (parochial, subject, and participant culture).

In my chapter I will analyze the Hungarian political culture from different dimension. Generally speaking I see three important factors of civil society weakness in post-communist Europe. These factors are, namely, (1)

historical factor: the memory of the past dictatorial regime and experience with organisations, and the legacy of fear of participation and mistrust of all formal organisations caused by forced participation in communist organisations, (2) individual factor: the persistence of informal private networks, which function as a substitute for formal and public organisations, and (3) political psychology factor: general disappointment with the new democratic and capitalist (free market) systems of today, which has led many people to avoid participation in the public sphere. I will analyze the political culture of the Hungarian civil society, stressed the political participation. To present my theory I will use some time series data-set from survey researches from 1989 until 2010. I will start the chapter with a historical overview until the dictatorial period, than I analyze the behavior of the elite and citizens during the transition to democracy. After I present some data from the dimension of process culture, mostly citizens values, trust and corruption. I will describe the consequence of privatization to the civil society. In the last part I will present the evaluation of the performance of democracy, the roll of political party and the citizens' political involvement and electoral participation. Finally I will give some conclusions remark about "Why participation has been so low?," and about the characteristics of the current Hungarian political culture.

II. POWER, POLITICAL CLASS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

1. *Short historical retrospection*

Hungary lies in the middle of Europe where East, West, South and North meet: on the "crossroad of folks", the buffer place of German, Latin and Slavonic people. The cultural structure of the Hungarian society is a complex formation, which was shaped in the last 1100 years. One of the historic features of the Hungarians that they did not slew the immigrants and the conquered nations but did their best to make them allies. The certain ethnical groups did not melted, but in most cases they lived peacefully next to each other, so they had the chance to be separated or peacefully assimilate.

Even the state founder first Hungarian king (Szt. Istvan, in 1000 AC) stated in written records that there is a need for religious and lingual variegation because it strengthens the country. It is important that the inte-

grating strength of the Hungarian culture and rule of law was strengthened by the tolerance towards the immigrants. Throughout centuries, countless ethnical groups fled to this area, mainly Germans, Croatians, Slovaks, Polish, Romanians, Serbians, Turks, Jewish, Gypsies, Bulgarians, Italians and Greeks. Thanks to the Hungarian rule of law, they could integrate to the Hungarian society without aggressive assimilation. They did not have to deny themselves and melt to the majority of the Hungarians giving up their existence. This way, they could keep most of the characteristics of their gentile and ethnical features next to the dominant Hungarian culture. From one side, these immigrants adopted the main values of the Hungarian culture and on the other side they brought some new elements which melted into the dominant culture, so this way enriching it. Later, these new elements became strength of integrating the regime. The Hungarian Magna Charta (Aranybulla) of 1222 in a written record guaranteed the law of resistance for the people towards the despotism.

The recorded principles and laws —extended through the history— became a kind of constitution of the Hungarian statehood and secured of its law of continuity in the intellectuality of the “Saint Crown ” until 1944. In the first world war the German occupied Hungary first, then the Russian and these invaders left in abeyance the Hungarian constitutionality of one thousand years, and all the institutions of the traditional parliamentarism and constitutional kingdom. In 1946 —under Russian pressure— the republic was proclaimed, and then in 1949, the invaders forced a Stalin-type communist dictatorial constitution, which was effective until 1989. The invader Russian army left Hungary in 1991.

The four decade of dictatorship crippled the civic society, basically broke its spine, when it banned the civil organizations, the foundations, the unions suspended democratic rights, including the right of assembly, free speech and free press. The power was put under one single centre, the leadership of the communist party. From 1949 the participation in the elections became compulsory. No wonder that under the pressure of fear, 99% of the electors voted. 99.9% of them supported the candidate of the state party and 0.1% of the votes were invalid. The result was the same on the local government elections as in the parliamentary elections, which were held on the same day. The Parliament sat two times a year (in the spring and in the autumn) while the ministers, appointed by the state party brought the statutory rules. Elections were held every five years, where all the candidates represented the state party.

The process of democracy started within the system, and the election of Gorbacsov—who represented more open politics—as the main secretary made the process easier. The first sign of the slow process of democracy was when it was made compulsory that two candidates had to represent each electoral district. Thus, people could choose as well as vote. The breaking out from the system of the party states continued from the re-interpretation of the “Law of Association” in 1986. In the 1989’s National Round Table Discussions, the forces of the party states and the democratic opposition agreed about the principles of the “Temporary Constitution” and the announcement of free elections. The “Temporary Constitution” was complemented further parts guarantying democracy by the multi-party Parliament elected in 1990 (Bihari 1991).

The civil society was left out from the process of democracy, because the regime change between 1989-1990 was accomplished with negotiations, agreement and series of deals. The two decades between 1990 and 2010 is the period of the democratic transition and the stabilization of the institutes of democracy. The Hungarian process of democratic transition was governed by the elite political groups, so we can call it: “revolution of discussions,” “silent revolution,” “melancholic revolution.” But why was the civic society left out of this?

2. Silent Revolution - Pacts of Old and New Political Elite (1988-1989)

In 1989 in most Central European countries, during the democratic process, there were mass movements, strikes, demonstrations and sometimes, even firearms as well. However, the most peaceful regime change in the region was taken place in Hungary, as we said that time: “not even a window glass broke.” In Hungary, the regime change started at the end of the 1980s, which was a series of agreements between the party-state elite and the forming new political elite’s small groups. From the autumn of 1988 different party initiatives, organizations, then parties started to form one after another. In the summer of 1989 the biggest and strongest opposition parties’ elected representatives (Opposition Roundtable) —expelling the public—, started to consult in a room of the Parliament with the representatives of the communist state-party (Hungarian Socialist Worker Party =MSZMP), that was the ruling party for four decades, to discuss about the method and the progress of the division of power (Bruszt-Simon 1990). During the exclusive discussions, the old and the new elite agreed and set the time of the elections. By means of discussions of the elites the basic rules of the demo-

cracy, the electoral system, the institutions and the temporary constitution have been developed. But the whole process was a one- side agreement, because the Hungarian people were left out. In conclusion, because of the balance of forces there was an “incomplete regime change” in the broken society, so that in the political world the powers of the continuousness could keep higher positions than the powers of change or renewal (Simon 1993).

In 1988-1989 the democratic transition was formed in a special way of elite changing. The majority of the ruling party-state elite almost escaped from the power, because for exchange, there was a possibility-by means of spontaneous privatization- to convert their political power into economic power. So it was not their interest to mobilize the thousands of party-members or the armed “working guards” to protect the weak political power. On the other hand the opposition was forming with only a small intellectual group behind, and the new, forming party initiatives were not known enough, so people did not respect them, there was a lack of support. People were silent, in case of conflict it was not sure where and who they would have joined. The party-state elite and the opposition elite’s common interest was to agree as soon as possible-without the civil society- as they are unaccountable. By means of discussions-about the political process-between the old and the new political elites; they became partners, accepted and respected each other-without being authorized by the society-so the agreement was their common interest. In fact, the compromise in 1989 was a special transaction between the Hungarian elite groups with exchange of positions and each other’s respect and confirmation. So the new political elite legalized the old elite’s power-that ruled from 1956, being illegal, without free elections. For exchange, the old elite respected, accepted and legalized them as political partners. The transaction’s point -based on mutual use- was: “democratic legality for democratic legitimacy.”

In this case Latin American countries, where the middle- class and the civil organizations are also weak, the soldiers withdraw from the barracks, occupy the parliament, disperse the politicians and start a military government, a dictatorship. In western democracies, being closer to us, the democratic forces of the civil society put pressure (media, demonstrations, strikes); they enforce frequent elections- forcing the politicians to fulfil the tasks according to the people’s interest (Morlino 2005). But where was the civil society in our country during the regime change?

The Hungarian society has not always been broken, but it has become-because they were made to become broken. After World War II, the Hungarian civil society’s organic development was shattered, weakened by outsi-

de powers' forces. Since then, the Hungarian civil society has continuously suffered from horrible loss. There is not only the post-war criminal-seeking period and the Soviet occupation in our minds, but the Rákosi-era and the post- 1956 era in Europe, which was unprecedented, that broke the "backbone of the society", smashed the intellectuals, the middle-class, the peasant citizens, and it almost hid the critical intellectuals- based on traditional citizenship. People who involved actively, who did not emigrate or were not deported, remained at home, survived the hardships and persecutions, were forced to listen deeply, they turned away from political life. Even in the 1970s and 1980s Kadar's goulash communism ("consumer society"), they used batons, the impact of bullying was still strong. The civilians were pacified by violence and different promises, the organizations were smashed and banned, people were atomized. The consequences were, that the civil society became broken, they hardly had mediation role, in fact, they were left without representation, so the civil society was left out the entire process of transition (Szabó 2000). There were no social compromise between the civil society and the political class, because of the apathy- due to the lack of civilians' organization. During the democratic transition nobody asked the people's opinion about the kind of democracy they want, what they think of the new democratic system, the privatization, about the interim constitution, whether they accept it or not.

Under the dictatorship, the Hungarian civil society —as to Tocqueville's world— became a paternalist civil society. The dictatorship urged the civil society with violence and socialization for a paternalist behaviour. The point was that people had to waive from voice and the participation in the common issues, and, in return, the state (the government) looked after their social well-being.

People had no other choice, or they joined the crowd or they became marginalized physically and spiritually. This state paternalism went on until the end of the 80's, however the state's purpose was to put the burden on the people's shoulder. In 1990, the two-thirds laws were not accompanied by public outcry, because their adaptation and enactment was the continuation and the product of the former elitist policy, what the "broken society's" weak civil organizations could not compensate or they were not able to resist (Smolar 1996).

3. The Way to Elite-Democracy - without Social Control

In the first free election, which was held in the spring of 1990, the alliance of conservative parties won (Table 1). The new democracy an irreconcilable gap has formed between the politicians and the voters: politicians decided about the people- without asking them. The old-established new political class has created the “responsibles’ irresponsibility” system, in which politicians could do whatever they wanted- nobody checked them (Simon 2007). In the new democracy a political class has been created- separated from the society, whose privileges were similar to the old nomenclature’s privileges. The political class created a suitable legislation and organized the standby police. The governing politicians’ power became simply uncontrollable, especially by means of encryptions- like in the economy and law. How could we get here? When we see the events, we could understand easier what conditions and deficits have distorted the system and created a political class, operating very low efficiency and performance.

The roots of today’s problems dated back to the politicians’ regime changing compromise, they were bad compromises, a series of small and big capitulations. The compromise with negotiations between the old and the new political forces seemed to be appropriate, because they had to face with less resistance, seemed to be more successful and quick. Due to the experience of 1956, the message was to compromise, to make it less painful, making the transition peaceful and enhancing the new regime’s stability. But now we have to “pay the price” of those compromises, and we are suffering from them (Jensen and Mislivetz 2008). The special transactions between the elites had negative accompanying concomitants which became obvious only later. One of them is, that the agreement guaranteed, that the old political elite could avoid the prosecution and nobody called anybody to account, as if they were not responsible for the crimes- committed during the one-party-system. That was explained by “there was no revolution, so there will be no witch-prosecution.” But this statement cut both ways, because in the spirit of continuity they protected not only the old elite, but the new one as well. We can say that they prepared a great legal protection for the new political elite. The parties’ elected politicians have done everything to get as much protection and prerogatives of the former party-state’s nomenclature as possible. The new elite legislated to become protected; the members were “saints,” so that they could not be called to account. They did it during the new democracy, in the name of “inequality of equality,” we should say: they made the idea of equality ridiculous. As an example we can refer to the

members' to broad immunity, the several privatizations behind the political scenes, never cleared scandals (oil, the country's property, and waste of credibility). (Barnes 1999).

By the end of the second decade of regime change the total lack of social control and possibility of accountability led to the form of the country's bankruptcy. In two decades the social-liberal elite- operating without civil control- led the country to economic bankruptcy. The large proportion of national wealth has been squandered- for themselves and to globalist powers, while the country's dept became multiples. They sold our present, our future and our grandchildren's future. In 2006, after the famous Gyurcsány-speech in Balatonöszöd, it became clear that the whole country and nation was in trouble. The elitist democracy made Hungary the country in the largest dept in Europe (per capita), so the country became the weakest and most vulnerable state, where people became poorer, the insecurity is increasing, the unemployment rate is extremely high- not to mention the hunger and crime. That is the consequence of the game of false power of parties- without civil control. People got fed up with it.

As a response, in the autumn of 2006 the civilians began spontaneous demonstrations, surely- since the Golden Bull- people have the guaranteed "law of resistance" against the tyrants. This idea is deep in people's mind; however, during the dictatorship people did not dare to resist, but they survived the strongest oppression- suppressed deeply. Its manifestation was the series of demonstrations in September and October of 2006. Everybody thought, that the organized institutions of democracy means, that the brutal violence and the police-state is all over. They were wrong, and we also were wrong. The democratic opposition had to experience the painful reality when the police used tear gas, truncheons, smashed the crowds with cavalry, people were made to lie down, they used handcuffs, and beat people until they were covered with blood. Gyurcsány has had his own guards beat his own people- earlier he swore to serve those people when he won the elections- so he deserves the title of "the most tyrant Nero" in Hungary's history.

As a result of the brutal terror of the police the civil society started to organize itself, looking for the possible actions against the power. In 2007 and 2008 NGOs became political; in 2009 everyone knew that it was high time to unite, to coordinate the common actions. Together we are stronger. The leaders of the NGOs wanted to unite a consultation forum. In 2008 was born the idea about the importance of consultation of civilians and the alliance of civil organizations. In this spirit in 2008, in autumn, there were dialogues, meetings, what led to the foundation of Civil Union Forum (CÖF) by the

spring of 2009, which was the largest organizations' multi-level dialogue (Simon 2010).

Table 1
The governments in democratic Hungary (1990-2010)

	1990-1994	1994-1998	1998-2002	2002-2006	2006-2010	2010-2014
Coalition of parties	MDF+ FKGP+ KDNP	MSZP+ SZDSZ	FIDESZ+ FKGP+ MDF	MSZP+ SZDSZ	MSZP+ SZDSZ	FIDESZ+ KDNP
Political ideology	Right: Conser- vative	Left: social- liberal	Right: Conser- vative	Left: social- liberal	Left: so- cial-liberal	Right: conser- vative
Prime ministers	József Antall (90-93) Péter Boros (93-94)	Gyula Horn	Viktor Orbán	Péter Medgyessy (02-04) Ferenc Gyuresány (04-06)	Ferenc Gyuresány (06-08) Gordon Bajnai (08-09)	Viktor Orbán

The Hungarian political parties have a common feature: they are not organized enough to compare with other mid-European parties, they have quite a few members and their relationship with different organizations is weak: youths', women' organizations or pensioners (the MSZP has a strong relationship with the trade unions' leaders, but those trade unions have lost a lot of members and they are not as organized as they used to be). So the political class is barely able to reflect the society's continuous challenges, conflicts or expectations- due to the organizations' low intensity. This is closely related to the process during the 1990s- the political parties became

*Is important to take account, that the survey of March-April of 2010 carried out during the last Months of post-communist social-liberal (MSZP) government (Gyuresány-Bajnai), and before the victorious election of conservative alliance of FIDESZ-KDNP (Orbán-government).

elite parties, so the result is: complete lack of control. The political class thinks that they can do whatever, because they only depend on the voters in 4 years' time, then- during the election's campaign- they can manipulate them with different promises.

The elections in April 2010 the alliance of two opposition parties (FIDESZ-KDNP) won more than 2/3 of the seats of Parliament, which is an unprecedented story in the political history of Europe, and three other party shares the 1/3. The new conservative government with his great majority could start a constitutional process. Among post-communist countries Hungary is the only one that has not constructed a new constitution; Hungary only corrected the old one in 1989-1990. Now, after 20 years of "Provisional Constitution" it is high time to construct a new definitive constitution, with ratification by the referendum of people. So that we should proclaim the 4th Republic- by a "constitutional revolution," and the strengthening civil society movements are definitely partners in this process.

III. BETWEEN THE OLD AUTHORITARIAN AND THE NEW DEMOCRATIC REGIME

1. *How to Measure the Development of the Civil Society?*

The interest conflicts and faults of the state – socialist system could not appear in the world of politics, because the dictatorship banned the right of assembly and free press. The organization of civil forces, the formation of parties and unions, non-official public activities, interest-groups and protest actions were impossible. In lack of the free public life, the political features of the civil society remained hidden. Moreover, in the four decades of dictatorship the public opinion polls which related to the political sphere were banned. In this authoritarian system, the political behaviour, attitudes, orientation and political value system remained hidden (Gombár: *Velleitásaink* 1988). We should not forget about the fears of those who answered, because of the prohibitions they could not give their opinion. Those who have fears are not sincere, so the questionnaires included a lot of doubtful or "I don't know" answers. Until the end of 1980's we did not get a reliable picture of what is in the people's mind.

The first public opinion polls with political aspects (value systems, satisfaction) were carried out only in 1977 (Hankiss 1977). In the 1980's the

empirical survey researches carried out about the causes of contentment gave two important results. Those who were satisfied with their life, imputed their success and happiness to their own personality, while the dissatisfied people saw their failures as a result of the conditions around them and the barriers of social environment. So the satisfied people originated their success in subjective, interior reasons and saw their failure as objective, exterior reasons. An other political survey showed that in the list of priorities, the importance of participation in public life was fell away from the importance of private life. The most important value was the peace, meaning security and a life without conflicts. The less important was the freedom of religion and free speech and information (Hankiss 1980; Pataki & S. Molnár: 1987, 39, 43-45; Bruszt-Simon 1990; Simon 2008; Szabó M. 2009).

In Middle Europe the first multi-party system's public opinion poll was carried out in 1989, by the author of this study and his colleagues (Bruszt-Simon 1989). The questions of the poll were adopted from the international technical literature, basically from the work of American and West-European researchers. (G. Almond & S. Verba; S. Barnes & M. Kaase; J. J. Linz and A. Stepan; M. Kaase and H-D. Klingemann; L. Morlino and J. R. Montero). After some modification between 1990 and 2010 I have repeated this survey eight times, using the same questionnaire. Now I have a unique time-series data from the past 20 years, which I will use in this chapter. My data-set provide an excellent possibility to analyze the behaviour of Hungarian citizens, and the civil society during the transition and consolidation of democracy.

Some researchers argue that the growing number of registered civil organizations is the main indicator of the growing power of civil society. By civil society, they only mean associations, civil alliance, non-profit organizations, and they argue that interest representation organizations and pressure groups should not be considered as part of civil society. They also claim that the problems of civic culture and democratic political culture have nothing to do with civil society, with his character, values, orientations, force etc. I called this reductive aspect as "extensive concept" of civil society. Some other researchers argue that the strength of civil society in a democracy can only be measured by looking at how it is able to function and how it is able to fulfil its role. I called this other reductive aspect as "intensive concept" of civil society.

Against these two reductive opinions I will present my concept in this chapter on the "complex civil society," which has two faces: one is the "extensive developed" and other is "intensive developed" civil society in the

democracy. Instead of simplification and reduction I am convinced that the strength of civil society in a democracy depend on his complexity, which consist both, for one side how extended is the tissues of civil society (“extensive developed”), and for other side how intensive activity the tissues can produce in the public life (“intensive developed”). The main indicators of extensity are the numbers of the civil organisation, and which we could evaluate as low, medium or high intensity. The main indicators of the intensity are the efficacy, which we could evaluate as weak, medium and strong. So we can describe the character of civil society for example as high extensity and medium intensity.

I am convinced that social scientist still have a great task and debt to elaborate the measure of civil society. By my opinion civil society can be measured in three respects. First, strength of civil society can be measured by examining to what extent horizontal networks enable citizens to take decisions at local, regional and national levels, and to realise their interests. Second, the strength can be measured by examining to what extent civil society fosters the development of norms of reciprocity and trust, decreases incentives for selfish behaviour and builds up trust in horizontal networks of social interaction. Third, the spread of civility or public civiness, that is equitable and fair treatment of others, generalized interpersonal trust, tolerance and cooperation towards citizens, are also indicative of the strength of civil society in Hungary.

The strength of the civil society has a lot of components; one of them is the quantitative extensivity, thus, the extension of its texture, the number of organisations. In Hungary in 1989 less then 50 civil organizations or foundations were officially registered. In 1997 this number reached 35.000 and until 2005, 70.000 (Miszlivetz 1997; Miszlivetz & Jensen 2008). Without doubt, his quantitave growth is enormous even if a part of this organization does not work or they were only founded to escape from paying taxes. In te new democracy, the directions of changes became more diversified and heterogeneous, and the content of changes became more pluralized. Within the changes, more alternatives appeared, moreover, the textures of civil society became not only more extensive but they strengthen within the pressure groups (*i.e.* environmental protection)

2. *The strong memory on the past state-socialism*

What the data of the first empirical studies say about the civil society standing on the border of the two periods? Our first survey research data

show us from 1989, that the Hungarian citizens had the subjective perception, that in the communist region they have a “best living standard,” “the greatest freedom” and consequently his country is the “happiest barrack” of communist block. In regard of the financial conditions and freedom rights the Hungarians are much more satisfied as compared to the other state-socialist countries (Table 2). The new democratic political elite had to win the support of the masses within these conditions. To achieve this, they had to reach that the people should not compare themselves to the communist system in regard of their conditions and democratic expectations, but to the neighbouring Austria and West-Europe, which are based on market economy and democratic set-up.

The questions are:

1. Where the citizens live better?
2. Where is greater the equality between the citizens? (by law)
3. Where is greater the citizens’ possibility to be involved in the public sphere?

Table 2

Hungarians’ perception about living standard and rights in the region in 1989 (Random: best - worst; mean: 1-6)

	1. Where they live better?	2. Where is greater the equality?	3. Where is greater possibility to involved...?
1.Austria	1.24	1.94	1.73
2.Hungary	2.37	2.36	2.16
3.Czech-Slovakia	3.25	3.29	3.72
4.Jugoslavia	3.76	3.72	3.43
5.Sovietunion	4.37	3.75	3.92
6.Romania	5.92	5.77	5.99

Source: Simon, 2005, Codebook, *cit.*, at 59-67; MTA PTI, Library Archive, Budapest at. 107-108.

However, we can also see that in 2010, the judgement of the authoritarian system (order, freedom, repression) deprecated in the people’s point of view.

This process started only after 2006 and can be explained by a democratic and political process.

The trigger of this depreciation on one hand that the generation which appreciated the Kadar regime is became old or died. On the other hand,

the post communist leading party (MSZP) which protected the communist period gradually lost its popularity. The table 3 shows us the change of opinion about authoritarian regime (Kádár-era since 1956 to 1988).

Table 3
The change of opinion on the old authoritarian regime
(1991-2010) (yes in %)

	1991	1992	1993	1999	2002	2010	Change: 1991-2010
Hungarian economy has developed.	68	79	78	72	78	59	-9
Almost every citizen lived better than today.	78	89	87	79	79	63	-15
It was order and social peace.	61	77	76	79	67	31	-30
The repression was great.	38	40	38	36	40	61	+30
Looked the freedom.	54	53	52	49	43	70	+16
N= (asked people)	938	1083	1072	953	953	1001	

Source: Simon 2005, Codebook, cit., MTA PTI, Library Archive, Budapest at 96-97, and the Civic Culture Revisited (=CCR) survey of 2010 (directed by János Simon).

In 1989-ben the people compared the political regime of the last 100 years. The highest score was given to the state-socialist system, where they have the best life (3.9). The real surprise was that in 2010, after 20 years, regarding the standard of living they still judged the period of dictatorship as the best time. Moreover, the two decades of democracy was given even less score, it became the third in the list.

Adding to this, that in regard of the wellbeing, the period between the two world wars (1920-1944) was valued strongly and at the same time the

performance of our time's democracy in the last 10 years was depreciated, its labelling is far away from that of the dictatorship (Table 4).

Q. "In your opinion when people lived a better life?"

Table 4

The evaluation of the different regime by better life (Random: worst – best; mean: 1-5) (1989-2010)

	1989	2001	2010
1. in the Kádár-era (1956-1989)	3.9721 (.9926)	4.0749 (1.0019)	3.6279 (1.1484)
2. in the Horthy-era (1920-1944)	2.0321 (1.0813)	2.3322 (1.2091)	3.0427 (1.3045)
3. in our days of democracy (1989-2010)	3.3312 (1.0378)	3.3940 (1.1658)	2.7870 (1.3601)
4. in the Rákosi-era (1948-56)	1.8914 (.9637)	1.8630 (1.0309)	1.8106 (1.0508)

Source: Simon 2005, Codebook *cit*; MTA PTI, Library Archive, Budapest at 99-100. and the CCR survey of 2010.

The period of dictatorship in regard of economical performance and life standards, exceeds the performance of democracy. The relative depreciation of the performance of democracy does not mean automatically the loss of value of democracy as an expected system. Summarizing, we can see, that the past authoritarian regime has a living memory in Hungary, still strongly influencing the political system culture, in the cognitive, evaluative and affective sense.

3. Expectation and Social Paternalism Regarding the Strong Role of State in the New System

During the regime change the most important message and promises of the new political class was improve the living standard by the privatization process and strengthening the democracy by new laws and institutions.

What were the expectation of the Hungarians towards the new system, and how the new political elite in the spring of 1990 could perform it?

One of our important statement that the Hungarians saw the change of the regime with a very moderate attitude. Most researchers regard it as a “pessimistic approach to life,” which, next to the “irony and self-irony” an old characteristic of the Hungarian’s soul. In 1990, less than one quarter of the answer-givers (24 %) thought that the economic situation of the country will “be better” while 61% thought that it “will be worse”. In our researches of between 1990 – 1992 among the post-communist countries the Hungarians were the less optimistic. (Table 5). Because this reasons I have called the Hungarian system-change “Melancholic Revolution” (Simon 1993). Subsequently, aware of the finished processes, this proves that the Hungarian public opinion has a large scale of sense of reality as opposed to Romanians and Lithuanians who were full of illusions and euphoria.

The relatively lower level of citizens’ expectation facilitated the Hungarian transition to democracy. The citizens’ greater feeling of reality has opened much more the level of tolerance of citizens regarding the bad performance of government, which helped to resolve the social conflict during the transition to democracy. We should mention, that the Hungarian political elite has had a greater responsibility during the electoral campaign with his low-key promises as well.

Table 5
Expected Economic Situation in the Next Year (in %)

	Will improve	The same	Get worse	Difference
Romania	64	19	18	46
Lithuania	52	14	34	18
Slovenia	29	51	20	9
Bulgaria	23	59	18	5
East-Germany	39	27	34	5
Poland	42	21	37	5
CzechSlovakia	19	63	19	0
Estonia	19	62	20	-1
Russia	34	20	46	-12
Ukrajna	34	18	49	-15
Hungary	24	15	61	-37

Source: Bruszt L. et al., 1993 “Political Culture, Political and Economic Orientation in Central and Eastern Europe” (1990-1992): MTA PTI, Budapest and WZB, Berlin at.

In the last 20 years in our researches we followed-up how the development of market economy and the privatization made their effect in the social expectations of the people towards the state. Question: “What do you think: instead of depending so much on the government, people should learn to take care of themselves or the government doesn’t do enough to protect people from economic difficulties?” In 1991 76% toed, that the government has the obligation to protect the citizens, and in 2010 74% of respondent has the same opinion. So, after 20 years of democracy practically we can’t find any changes in the citizens’ expectation (Simon 2005: 32, and Civic Culture Repeated Survey - CCRS).

In 2010, the majority of the people (60%) thought that “There must be an upper limit of the monthly income of a person.” It is an important statement that while in Hungary in the last 20 years it was a social-liberal economy; the people’s social expectations towards the government did not decreased but increased. It shows the gap between politics and people’s expectations. Based on the above, people contrived the process of democracy as a system which did not became more open but even more, it became dramatically closed. In 1989 more than half of the citizens judged that all what happens in the country is a benefit for all the people, but this number dramatically decreased to less then a quarter. (13%) (Table 6).

Q. “Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by few big interests looking out for themselves or that it run for the benefit of all the people?”


Table 6
The process of getting close the system (1989-2010)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1999	2001	2002	2010
Run by few big interest	46	56	57	70	69	57	75	76	87
Benefit of all the people	54	44	43	30	31	43	25	24	13
N=	898	710	965	1183	1135	986	1367	1410	980

Source: Simon 2005, Codebook *cit.*, at p. 99-100, and the CCR survey of 2010,

Figure 1.

The process of getting close the system (1989-2010 in %)




As we saw in the previous section, the first 20 years in Hungary witness a weak set of civic values. The majority of the people did not attend the first free elections after 44 years. In the postcommunist region Hungary showed the lowest participation on the funding election. I presented of its two important reasons: one is the apolitization (people are politically indifferent) of the society, the other is people's expectation for a strong social role as we have shown in the above data. From one hand we saw the dictatorship made the civil society politically indifferent, paternalised it.

Those civil and political leaders who were able to take action were physically liquidated or strongly terrified. In Poland the relative autonomy of the church protected the civil society's movements; moreover, they even participated in the mobility (see the case of Solidarnost Trade Union). In East-Germany, Czech-Slovakia and Romania, the communist system frequently mobilised (forced) the people to participate in sport events, celebrations, unpaid communal work, etc. In Hungary after 1956, the communist regime started a conscious process of demobilization and apolitization combining violent and mechanism of socialization. The other reason for the relative high absence that a lot of people did not find a party which satisfied them. Due to Ivan Sze-

lényi, the aim of the new parties was to strengthen the market economy and cutback on the role of the state, while the majority of the people expected an even stronger social role from the state. We lacked a social and authentic social democratic party. “People did not find the appropriate food on the menu so they did not order anything” (Széleányi 1990). (Figure 2).

Figure 2
Participation in the first free Parliamentary election in Central Europe
(Finding-elections -1990)



Note: The content of Figure 2: Czech-Slovakia: 96, East-Germany: 90, Romania: 86, Bulgaria: 84, Hungary 1 round: 63, Hungary 2 round: 46.

IV. THE DIMENSION OF PROCESS CULTURE (1990-2010)

1. Values of Citizens

An important dimension of political culture is constituted by political values. Since 1985 I examined how the preferences of social values changed in Hungary. The data clearly show us that in all survey intervals (*i.e.* in the period of late dictatorship, at the beginning of the transition and at the time of stabilizing democracy) each survey reflected that for citizens “life

without worries” represents for the Hungarians the most important social values. People who know Hungarian bloodshed in history are not surprised that this nation considers “a life without worries” highly valuable. In the 20 century, the capital Budapest, was occupied by foreign troops seven times: in 1919 (twice), in 1944, in 1945, in 1956 (twice). The formal ruling elite was convicted; new “occupiers” or “liberators” executed all the national heroes who can be seen now on coins – their lives were ended by bullets, swords, fire, or they had to die in exile. In 1985, the “freedom values” were at the lowest rank of the hierarchy (“the state should not interfere with people’s private life;” “let everybody have a say in public matters,” “people considered creating interest groups”). It was not a surprise, that they was the less important during the authoriter system, because the risk was to large, and correspondingly, there was little to gain.

For, unlike the other Central European countries, Hungary was the only country where masses of people did not participate in the battle between political forces, where there were no spectacular demonstration, protest and strike in the streets against the system. The old and the new political elite-groups executed an agreement on the free election, and the conduct of transferring power behind the closed doors of the House of Parliament. The Hungarian transition to democracy was the quietest revolution of the 20th century, it happened so quietly that “not even a window pane was broken.” In the present we can see four important tendencies of change: 1. the narrowing of the value margin; 2. the rearrangement of the hierarchy of values; 3. the effect of actual processes on value changes; 4. the simultaneous strengthening of contradictory tendencies.

1. The most conspicuous characteristic is that the importance of each value became somewhat higher to a degree that differences between them have considerably decreased. It seems that two trends manifest in the decrease of differences between values.

2. The more visible rearrangement in the hierarchy of values began. The much more important development in the hierarchy is of the values connected with the freedom process: “Have a say for all in public affaire” (52%), “Be free to form organizations for defence of their interests” (40%).

3. The shift in values is strongly associated with processes in the importance of value “people should not be exposed authoritarian power” is now considered more valuable than before. On the other hand, economic transition brought forth considerable income differences, and people consider the value no big income differences as more important

4. One can see the manifestation of two tendencies: both social values and civic values of freedom strengthened.

Q. "Please organize the things on the cards into three groups according to their importance in your life." Put in the first group those, which are "very important," in the second those "fairly important" and put in the third those, which are "not important!"

Table 8
Order of mentioning of twelve societal values
(“very important” in %) (1985-1999)

How important it is in life of that people ?	1985	1989	Change	1991	1992	1999	Change
1. Live in quite circumstances	86	88	+2	88	88	96	+10
2. Can find work everybody	83	84	+1	85	87	93	+10
3. Live well.	75	81	+6	80	83	96	+21
4. Could study, have access to culture	72	76	+4	82	79	96	+24
5. Are not defenceless against the autocracy of the authorities	64	74	+10	75	72	86	+22
6. Could freely express their opinion.	56	54	-2	58	53	71	+15
7. Could rest and have access to entertainment	51	60	+9	68	65	89	+38
8. Are free of state interference in their private life	56	75	+19	80	76	95	+39
9. Be equal	45	45	0	44	41	61	+16
10. Have no great material differences among them	42	37	-5	42	32	57	+15
11. Have a say for all in public affaire	31	55	+24	65	64	83	+52
12. Be free to form organizations for defence of their interests	31	37	+6	49	49	71	+40

Sources: Simon, 1993. The Melancholic Revolution (Communist and Postcommunist Studies, No.) - MTA PTI.

Library Archive. Budapest and the data from survey of 2010.

The data shows us, that the majority of the citizenry rejected authoritarianism, despite these data indicates serious problems in building an attachment to democratic values, and difficulties in the development of democratic political culture in post-communist Hungary. The situation changed with some contradiction after 1989, when the transition to democracy began. We can consider several important changes, but not enough.

2. *Believe and Trust of Citizens*

An important aspect of political culture is a high level of inter-personal trust that facilitates the political cooperation and political involvement. The greater is the ties of horizontal integration of the members of a political system that ensures the stability of the political system by infusing a sense of pride among the people and by enabling them to maintain a high level of civility in their political intercourse. An individual establishes this trust culture when there is a matter of public interest.

Several studies revealed that believe and trust in democratic institutions has been consistently low since 1990 in the post-communist countries. (Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram 1996; Barnes-Simon: 1998, Mishek-Rose 1999). Data in Table 9 and Table 10 indicates that institutions of the new democracy were not only unable to gain trust since 1990 until 2010, but a significantly smaller number of citizens trusted them in 2010 than in 1991.

Q. People need to have confidence and to feel that they can trust themselves and others. To what degree do you think that you trust the following totally, to a certain point, little, or not at all? (% of together of “totally” and “a certain point”)

Table 9
Believe in the institutions and persons in post-communist countries
(1990-92, in %)

	Bulg	Cz-Sl.	Est	Pol	Litv	Hun	East Ger.	Russ	Rom	Slov	Ukr
Self	74	42	47	42	61	69	77	53	78	64	61
Families and cousinhood	79	43	51	40	61	66	73	61	48	52	62
God	21	20	20	75	49	37	11	22	69	17	36
Army	21	4	7	16	5	25	9	13	49	23	17

Compatriot	28	5	10	15	17	15	5	5	21	9	7
Church	18	10	14	16	33	19	5	9	31	11	20
Colleagues	17	5	10	14	15	25	1	6	13	14	9
Neighbours	18	3	7	8	15	23	9	6	10	10	6
Police	14	1	4	8	8	16	11	3	12	11	5
Government	11	5	6	5	15	9	2	5	24	12	6
Parliament	10	3	4	6	16	12	2	3	23	7	5
Employer	7	2	5	8	10	8	6	4	7	7	6
Oppositions party	16	2	3	7	4	11	3	3	7	5	2
Government party	13	2	5	3	2	9	5	3	26	5	7
Trade union	8	2	2	3	5	9	6	3	11	3	5
Media	6	2	4	7	9	11	1	3	-	5	5
Political parties	6	4	1	1	2	4	3	2	4	3	3
N=(12145)	1064	998	933	1270	904	906	1203	684	1685	1427	1071

Source: Bruszt L. – J. Simon – B. Wessels 1993 “Political Culture, Political and Economic Orientation in Central and Eastern Europe” Codebook of the International Survey (1990-1992): MTA PTI, Budapest and WZB, Berlin at., 59-66.

Q. People need to have confidence and to feel that they can trust themselves and others. To what degree do you think that you trust the following totally, to a certain point, little, or not at all? (% of together of “totally” and “a certain point”)

Table 10
Believe in the institutions and persons in Hungary (random of rate by decline the means since 1990 to 2010)

Belief In	1990	1993	1999	2010	Change 1990-2010	Random rate of decline
1. Self	3.6211 (.6186)	3.5414 (.6449)	3.7109 (.5337)	3.6697 (.6028)	+0.0486	0
2. Families and cousinhood	3.5701 (.6721)	3.8358 (.4556)	3.5829 (.6956)	3.5597 (.6265)	-.0104	1
3. God	2.6517 (1.2241)	2.7935 (1.1696)	2.6624 (1.6980)	2.8372 (1.1840)	+1.1855	0

Belief In	1990	1993	1999	2010	Change 1990- 2010	Random rate of decline
4. Colleagues	2.9668 (.7747)	2.9851 (.7461)	2.8541 (.7714)	2.6548 (.7667)	-.3120	7
5. Neighbours	2.7336 (.9386)	2.9107 (.9258)	2.6943 (.8612)	2.4426 (.7888)	-.2910	6
6. Compatriot	2.5934 (.83205)	2.7004 (.7772)	2.5821 (.7565)	2.3313 (.7119)	-.2621	5
7. Church	2.4596 (1.0446)	2.2504 (1.0428)	2.2617 (1.0081)	2.2443 (1.0611)	-.2153	4
8. Law system, tribunal	2.1500* (.9160)	-	-	2.1065 (.81472)	-.0435	2
9. Police	2.5349 (.9143)	2.5747 (.7907)	2.4300 (.8500)	2.0824 (.8125)	-.4525	8
10. Trade union	1.9749 (1.0087)	2.0142 (.9210)	1.9790 (.8655)	-	-	-
11. Political parties	2.0133 (.7901)	1.8734 (.7950)	2.0207 (.7657)	1.9246 (.7797)	-.0887	3
12. Parliament	2.4761 (.8651)	2.1270 (.8516)	2.2800 (.8200)	1.8801 (.7479)	-.5960	10
13. Media	2.5461 (.7971)	2.3565 (.7710)	2.3829 (.7926)	1.6437 (.7748)	-.8914	11
14. Government	2.0130 (.9960)	2.2410 (.9084)	2.2617 (.8545)	1.5341 (.7451)	-.4789	9
N= (4459)	1196	1178	1085	1000		

* The data in from survey of Nov. 1989.

Source: Simon, 2005, Codebook *cit.*, at 59-67; Simon, J. 2010. Civic, Culture Repeated survey – Codebook. MTA PTI. Library Archive. 61. and the CCR survey of 2010.

The high level interpersonal trust (self, families and cousinhood, colleagues, neighbours, compatriot) supposes dense frequent network contact and gives space to such mechanisms which urges people to have decent behaviour, honesty, computability, correctness. The rare network gives space to closeness, mistrust, frauds and corruption. When an individual tries to oppose each and every policy of the government in the out group, they develop hostile attitude towards other individuals exercising political actions. Thus there is no question of compromise, no development and no trust worthiness among the people, there is always a kind of fear psychosis exists among them people. For instance, when the British political culture is characterized by a wide spread interpersonal trust, the political culture of Mexico or Ukraine reveals a great amount of distrust and suspicion in social relations.

But what can we tell about Hungary? As we have seen in Hungary the self-trust is the highest in the random of believe hierarchy of Hungarian (Utasi 1996, Simon 2010). As we know, when an individual's attitudes, beliefs, sentiments, values and norm are oriented towards his own self as a political actor, it is called the view of self. In this self culture, the nature and extend of individual orientation, this leads Almond and Powell to classify the self culture as parochial, subject and participant types of political culture. When an individual becomes aware of his local system, local issues and involves himself in local politics, ignoring the national political system and national issues; it is called parochial political culture. So it is a narrow culture which reflects the local politics only. Here an individual has no cognition of the political system, and they do not have any affective and evaluative orientation towards the political system. Beyond his locality, an individual has no involvement in the national input, output, feedback and conversion process. He is parochial in the sense, that for the satisfaction of his wants, he looks only to his family, or to community or perhaps depends on his own efforts.

In Hungary the interpersonal trust is very high level in the families and cousinhood, after the self-trust is the first. That follows the trust in the god, in the colleagues, in neighbors and in compatriots (Table 10). They are the components of the classical parochial culture described by Almond and Powell. Such a type of political culture is rarely found to be in Western type of industrial society, but not in Central European modern agriculture based society. The parochial culture is ideal place of setting in the traditional, post-feudal society, where there are no specialized roles, and people unaware of the national political system. We should mention that the factors

of traditional parochial political cultures are strong not only in Hungary. Beside the Hungarian case the parochial political culture is very strong in the villages, and agriculture based cities in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, etcetera.

The Hungarians evaluated the different nations how friendly or enemy they are toward us and how friendly we are toward him? One finding is, that Hungarians has the feeling, that we are much friendlier toward the other nations, but hostile toward us. The other finding is, that the citizens' has very good historical memory, because our enemies are the nation's neighbors around of our country which is consequence of the Trianon Peace Dictate after the First World War (Table 11).

Q. "Which citizens are friendly and which ones are hostile toward us?" (5 point scale: 5- very friendly toward us, 1-very hostile towards us).

"I am asking you know which country we are friendly with and which country we are hostile?" (5 point scale: 5- we are very friendly towards him, 1- very hostile towards him).

Table 11

Evaluation the nations from two aspects: friendly and hostile (in 2010 – mean: hostile- friendly 1-5)

Countries	Toward us friendly Mean (st.dev)	We are friendly Mean (st.dev)	<i>Difference</i>
Very friendly			
Austria	4,00 (,865)	-	-
Poland	3,77 (,852)	3,81 (,798)	+04
Holland	3,54 (,638)	3,60 (,651)	+06
Italy	3,54 (,671)	3,63 (,681)	+13
Germany	3,51 (,816)	3,74 (,710)	+23
Spain	3,42 (,584)	3,51 (,625)	+09

UK	3,28 (,671)	3,57 (,665)	+.29
Bulgaria	3,25 (,559)	3,38 (,601)	+13
Slovenia	3,20 (,718)	3,35 (,655)	+15
USA	3.19 (,808)	3,73 (,839)	+54
Friendly			
Mexico	3,15 (,544)	3,29 (,600)	+14
Czech Rep.	3,10 (,806)	3,39 (,675)	+29
France	3,10 (,816)	3,43 (,730)	+33
Hostile			
Russia	2,86 (,841)	3,17 (,880)	+31
Ukraine	2,81 (,742)	3,09 (,790)	+28
Serbia	2,45 (,916)	2,91 (,844)	+46
Romania	2,17 (,888)	2,86 (,966)	+69
Slovakia	1,73 (,830)	2,52 (,985)	+77
Very hostile			

* The data of Austria is exceptionally from 1999 survey (conducted by Simon 2010. MTA PTI Library Archive, Budapest).

Sources: The data set are from CCR survey (conducted by Simon 2010. MTA PTI Archive, Budapest).

3. *Evaluation of corruption*

The World Bank defines corruption as “Corruption occurs when a function, whether official or private, requires the allocation of benefits or the provision of a good or service. In all cases, a position of trust is being exploited to realize private gains beyond what the position holder is entitled to” (Lal 2002: 9). Robert Klitgaard uses the equation $C=M+D-A$ (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability) (Lal 2002: 8). A position of trust exploited to realize private gains to which the holder is not entitled (Lal 2002: 8).

In Hungary the greatest possibility for corruption was during the privatization process. We can mention lot of enormous scandals from the history of privatization process of post-communist countries (Fishkin 2000 73-74.; Greenberg 1990: 24). They show the difficulties at the same times realize the process the transition to democracy and to free market, the impossibility of combining political accountability and market considerations, maintaining the principles of social justice. The process generates a hard conflict within the principles of both, the realization of two different logic of the social justice and privatization of state property for a small group. During the transition mostly injured the principle of equal justice in the case of Hungary and of post-communist countries. Generally speaking, the greatest advantage of democracy is its strong ability of self-correction, much stronger than that of the dictatorship. The biggest problem of today’s Hungarian political world that its ability for self-correction is very weak, which, to a great extent is a product of elite democracy without any social and civil control (Sárközy 1993). One of the most important negative consequences of this is the increasing corruption definitely. The tendency of feeling of corruption is very clear. In 1990 only less than the half of citizens (45%) told that the corruption has increased, but 20 years later 78%. The change since 1990 to 2010 is enormous. The process of grow is probably a record in Europe, and maybe in the word (Table 12).

In summary, these data show general dissatisfaction with democracy; low level of trust in political and civil institutions; low level of political efficacy; alarmingly low level of respect for law; rising level of intolerance and prejudice. Thus, these figures clearly indicate that there are problems in the development of civic culture regarding the new institutions of democracy in post-communist Hungary. If political parties don’t has a strong civil control, than they will be greater possibility for dirty games and corruptions.

See the history of the Hungarian democracy since 1989, and the increased level corruption (Table 12).


Q. “Would you say that under the present government corruption and selling of influence has increased, has it remained the same, or has it declined?”

Table 12: The opinion about the corruption (1990-2010)

The corruption	1990	1993	2002	2010
Has increased	45	50	60	78
Remained the same	37	41	29	20
Has declined	18	9	11	2
N=	1299	1178	1487	1000

Source: Simon, János 2005. Codebook 59-67. és Simon, J. 2010. Civic Culture Repeated survey – Codebook. MTA PTI. Library Archive. and the CCR survey of 2010.

Figure 3
The opinion about the corruption (1990-2010)



In 1997 a national survey indicated that 82% of the respondents considered “law breaking as acceptable if it promotes individual achievement”, which showed a shocking level of the acceptance of law breaking. This

has improved by 2001, but was still the highest among the former post-communist countries (77%). The proportion of those who agreed with the statement that breaking the law is necessary for individual achievement was especially high (82%) among the young generation (18-29 years old), those who lived their adult life in the new democracy, and learned ‘how things are done’ today (Sik-Tóth: 1998: 208-220).

V. CIVIL SOCIETY - FROM POWERLESS TO PROTEST (1990-2010)

The most shocking result of our survey research which was carried out in the post-communist countries in the 1990’s that how high is people’s feeling of defenselessness. The proportion of those who believed that they can act against those actions which hurt their interest is only between 5 – 20%. The numbers are so low that we can say that it is a “fourth world” as compared to the countries of the “third world” (Turkey, Mexico, Venezuela). For the citizens of the region, the most harmful heritage of decades’ communism is the strong feeling of defenselessness towards the power. The Hungarian numbers are the highest in comparison with the countries of Central and East Europe and at the beginning of the transition to democracy it came close to the level of the countries of the “third world”. Here are the perspectives! (Table 13).

Q. “If the government (local councils) made a decision which violated your interest, could you do something about it or could you not do anything about it?”

Table 13
Cross-national rank order of interest defense (1990 in %)

	Local level	National level
USA	77	75
Great Britannia	78	62
Netherland	-	38
Italy	51	28
Austria	46	-
Turkia (only agricultural population)	67	26
Mexico (non- agricultural population)	35	28

	Local level	National level
Venezuela (only agricultural population)	29	20
Romania	48	35
Hungary	31	18
Czech-Slovakia	-	18
Lithuania	23	16
Bulgaria	20	13
Slovenia	17	11
Estonia	21	9
Ukraine	15	9
Poland	14	5

Sources: G. A. Almond and B. Powell 1978: *Comparative Politics* Jr. p. 36.; For the post-communist countries see: Bruszt L. – J. Simon - B. Wessels: 1993 “Political Culture, Political and Economic Orientation in Central and Eastern Europe” “Codebook of the International Survey (1990-1992): MTA PTI and WZB, Budapest and Berlin, at 91-92.

Although this chapter does not involve Rumanian political culture directly, one has to say that Rumanian data were the most provoking for us. It is well know that in Rumania the development of democracy draws the most severe criticism in European and international political discussion, so the 48 and 35% ratio is surprising. From the answers given to open questions and everyday events in Rumanian politics, I found an acceptable explanation. In the questionnaire I also asked respondents in another open question about “what?” they would do. The answer which referred to the violent action of individual, *i.e.* pre-democratic violent political action dominated, like “I would shove the table in his face”, “I have two strong fists,” “I would go and get a stick.” Within a short period after data collection, “political stick-fights,” which included several victims, had taken place (in 1990: Turgu Mures and Bucharest). In 1991 the president of Romania himself hit a journalist for asking a question that the President took as an insult. It seems that violent individual judgement is a traditional element of Romanian political culture. We should also point to the question, again, following Sartori’s warning, whether it is enough to compare figures and data only get the right answer (Sartori 1991).

Privatization had an important role in the dissociation of the party state. Earlier, the state had 80% ownership, so it was the employer of almost all people, making them defenceless. Thus privatization offered a great possibility to establish the independent economic source for the civic society, but – unlike in the other countries of the region – majority of the people was left out from it. I will argue that radical pro-market economic reforms debilitated civil society in post-1990 Hungary, I argue that although economic and political transformations can be regarded as remarkable, there are serious problems with the development of civic culture. Since 1993 the factories, infrastructure and the means of production were sold to those who offered the most money for it. By this, only the richest and the foreigners could obtain significant means of production and resources. Re-privatization and partial compensation occurred only the agriculture 80% of the means of production of Hungary was privatized between 1993 and 1998. The majority of the people could not obtain independent economic basics, they regarded the process as making them even more defenceless, now the employer is not the state any more, but a private or a multinational company. Unemployment appeared (10-17%) which phenomena did not exist in the state socialism. Defenceless on the labour market escalated in relation of people towards public life: feeling of defenceless and powerlessness grew. Privatization in the short run did not strengthen the development of civil society, moreover set it back for years, especially between 1993 and 1998.

However, the government and the parliament, instead of fostering the participation of labour organizations in economic and social policymaking, strove to decrease their bargaining capacity and successfully blocked the access of employees' and employers' organizations. After the first modification of 1992, in 1995 the parliament again modified the Labour Code and the new regulations put more burden on employees at workplaces. The modification proposal was submitted to the parliament by the socio-liberal government. Although employee and employer organisations in the IRC strongly protested the proposal, the government ignored their opinion and submitted its original proposal to the legislature.¹ The reason of this hostile behaviour of the government towards labour organisations

¹ Berényi, Zoltán, *Constitutional Democracy and Civil Society in Post-Communist Hungary*, Budapest, Institute for Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Science, 1999, at 123.

was that it did not want to allow employees' and employers' organizations to put limits on its economic policy-making capacity and successfully blocked the access of employees' and employers' organizations. The reason of this hostile behaviour of the government towards labour organisations was that it did not want to allow employees' and employers' organizations to put limits on its economic policy-making. Struggling with the problem of rapid and drastic decline in membership, labour organisations were unable to prevent the government in imposing subsequent restrictions on their rights (Berényi 2006).

What changed in Hungary throughout the 20 years of democracy? How the democratic institutional frames and the guaranteed rules of law changed people's notion in interest-defence? We search the answer in our timed date analysis. (Table: 14).

Table 14
Interest defense in Hungary
(Time series data 1985-2010 – yes in %)


	1985	1989	1990	1991	1993	1999	2001	2010	Change (1985- 2010)
National level	11	12	18	16	9	12	11	16	+5
Local level	25	24	31	34	25	28	27	40	+15
Workplace level	47	-	-	-	-	-	29	41	-6

Sources: Simon, 2005. Codebook, *cit.*, at 59-67. and Simon, 2010, Civic Culture Repeated survey – Codebook.

MTA PTI. Library Archive. Budapest and the survey of 2010 (directed by J. S.).

Table 14

Interest defense in Hungary (at the local, national and work place level - 1985-2010 – yes in %)



When we analyse the Hungarian data of it is important to see that in the two important areas of democracy, in the national and local politics, the changes does not show a linear growth but peaks and relapses followed each other. We can point out only in the long run that the number of those, who do not feel vulnerable are increasing. We must also see that behind the changes of data there are different factors in the beginning, the middle and in the end of 1990's, or after 2000. Until 1992 the memories of the people were dominated by the past experiences and compared with the years of authority, they felt they have better chances in the democratic system. This notion however started to fade away and the number of the powerless increased, (Table 14). Between 1993-1998 the process of privatization became very effective meaning that a lot of people lost their existential security. Masses of factories were closed, unemployment and financial insecurity suddenly started to grow –until the elections in 1998– while the trade unions, interest-unions were weak. The suspected fraud in the parliament elections in 2002 resulted in nationwide demonstrations. These demonstrations became more frequent after the 2006 election which were based on lies. The demands included the resignation of the government and bringing forward new parliament elections. (Simon 2010).

VI. DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION

1. *The evaluation of democracy and political parties*

In 1999, 94% of the answer-givers did not agree with the statement: “Hungary needs democratic development” but only 17% said that “our democracy is the same as in the Western countries”. Moreover, 86% felt that in Hungary “democracy did not come true” (Codebook, 55-56). The majority of the people (60 %) agreed that the democracy is the best governing method for them. But with the performance of democracy was valued at 2.84 in a scale of 1-10. The contentment with the institutions of democracy is also on a very low level. Only 3 and 4% of the people said that “totally satisfied” or “largely satisfied” with the performance of the governing party, the government or the Parliament (see Tables 15, 16, 17).

Table 15
The democracy is the best system for us (%-ban)

	1999	2001	2002	2010
Agree	65	61	62	60
Disagree	35	39	38	40
N=	1085	1201	1286	1001

Simon János 2005: Közvélemény a magyar demokrácia 15 évéről (MTA PTI, Pártok, választások és politikai kultúra csoport)

52-53. és a 2010-es adatok Simon, 2010. Civic Culture Repeated survey – Codebook. MTA PTI, Library Archive, Budapest

Q. How contented are you with the functioning of the Hungarian democracy? (scale 1-10)

Table 16
Satisfaction with the functioning
of democracy (1990-2010) (non – yes: 1-4)

	1990	1992	1999	2010
Mean	3.927	3.945	4.422	2.841

Simon János 2005: Közvélemény a magyar demokrácia 15 évéről (MTA PTI, Pártok, választások és politikai kultúra csoport)

52-53. és a 2010-es adatok Simon, 2010. Civic Culture Repeated survey – Codebook. MTA PTI, Library Archive, Budapest

Table 17
Satisfaction with the performance
of the political institutes and politicians (2010 in %)

	“No satisfied” and “a little bit satisfied”	“Certain level” and „totally satisfied”	Mean
Government parties	97	3	1.4076
Government	96	4	1.4230
Parliament	96	4	1.5842
Your MP representant	78	22	1.8415
Opposition parties	77	23	1.9574
Your representant in local council	75	25	1.9816
President of Republic	65	35	2.1464

Data from 2010 CCR survey Simon 2010. New Codebook... *cit.*, MTA PTI, Library Archive, Budapest.

In the last two decades the political parties had the chance to integrate into the society. The question is, how successful were they in this respect. The time data show that the judgement about the parties declined between 1989-2010. In 2010 only 75% answered that it is important to have parties in the democracy while ten years earlier 94% thought the same. In 1989 the majority of answer-givers thought that through the political parties they have the chance to participate in politics and in 2010 only less than half of them (46%). At the same time there is a continual growth in the number of answer-givers who thought that the parties only serve the interests of their leaders. In 2010 this proportion was 61%. The only favourable change in respect of democracy that while in 1990, 55% said that they can not see the different between the parties, after 20 years only 22%. The citizens opinion about the political parties see Table 18.

- Questions:
1. We need political parties if we want democratic development.
 2. I can't say any difference between the existing parties.
 3. Parties provide opportunity to participate in political activities.
 4. Parties only serve their leader's interest.

Table 18.
Opinion about the political parties (agree in %)

	1989	1990	1991	1993	1999	2002	2010
1. We need	85	85	90	92	94	-	75
2. I can't say	44	55	36	31	26	30	22
3. Provide	91	74	72	78	82	60	46
4. Only serve	44	55	53	59	56	53	61

Simon 2005: *Közvélemény a magyar demokrácia 15 évéről* (MTA PTI, Pártok, választások és politikai kultúra csoport).

52-53. és a 2010-es adatok Simon, 2010. *Civic Culture Repeated survey – Codebook*. MTA PTI, Library Archive, Budapest

The parties ignore the organized civil society; they only communicate with people during the election campaigns. The civil organizations, trade unions, interest unions, chambers are left out, so the common field between the people and the power is missing. The role of the common field should be mediating, proposing, filtering, controlling and consensus-building. In lack of this, majority of people think that instead of the earlier one-party power, they are ruled by a multi-party power. They are not satisfied with the democracy and their standard of life.

In summary, lot of data show us a general dissatisfaction with democracy; low level of trust in political and civil institutions; low level of political efficacy; alarmingly low level of respect for law, and low level evaluation of works of the political parties. Thus, clearly indicate that there are problems in the development of civic culture regarding the new institutions of democracy in post-communist Hungary. No wonder that people are not satisfied with the performance of democracy. However they do not want dictatorship instead of democracy, but finally, “real regime change” and “real democracy” after the years of post-communist dictatorship.

2. Political Involvement and Electoral Participation

We could see even in the beginning of the regime-change that Hungarians show only a little interest towards the world of politics led by elite groups. They sought the opportunity for happiness and emergence in their personal relations in the private sphere (Table 19).

Question: "Do you agree with the statement: I totally lost my interest in politics?" (Data are in decreasing order).

Table 19
Lost the Interest in Politics in Central and East Europe (at the Beginning of Transition - 1990 in %)

Country	Absolute agree	Agree	Rather agree	Rather don't agree	Absolute don't agree
Hungary	22	27	27	17	2
Bulgaria	21	26	24	19	10
Russia	19	33	30	14	4
Lithuania	16	36	26	20	2
Ukraine	13	32	37	12	6
Poland	10	36	36	9	7
Czech-Slovakia	7	24	42	23	4
East Germany	4	19	50	19	8

Forrás: Times-Mirror: East-West Attitude Survey. Preliminary Findings, July 1, 1991. q. 400.s.

In 2010 more than one-third (35%) of the answer-givers felt that "better not to take part in the political life otherwise one can be in trouble." Two-third (74%) of them thinks that „ordinary people are often left out from the power” and „one can never have an insight to the world of politician.”

The willingness of participation did not grow nor in the period of democratic transition (1989-1998), neither in the period of democratic stabilization, because, on the one hand the experiences of the last system still took effect, and on the other hand the present processes, mainly the exclusiveness of privatisation were against the civic interests. In Hungary in 2010 as compared to 1989 the distance between the people and politics did not decrease but increased in most respect. The Hungarians political participation remain poor, in international comparison one of the poorest in Europe (Tables 20 and 21).

Table 20
 Cross-National Indicators of Political Participation

Indicators	France	Italy	Ger- ma-ny	East G.	Czech R.	Poland	Hung.
Associations							
Cultural, sport	43.5	24.7	33.8	28.1	18.9	9.6	7.5
Help people	21,8	16,6	21.1	28.4	2.5	6,1	2.6
Religious	10.0	12.7	20.5	18.4	2.5	6.1	2.6
Non-political involvement at least % 1 in 3	54.5	35.7	51.9	47.9	22.2	17.9	9.9
Associational involvement % 1 in 9	62.9	42.4	67.1	59.8	29.8	22.3	13.7
Trade union	7.2	7.5	10.7	8.3	4.8	2.3	1.6
Professional	11.8	7.9	16.1	13.7	5.3	3.0	2.3
Environmental	11.2	9.0	15.5	12.4	5.8	4.4	1.3
Local problem	17.0	11.7	19.1	12.4	6.8	3.7	3.1
Peace, human rights	9.7	11.7	14.5	9.6	0.8	1.4	1.2
Sign. petitions	29.7	15.7	36.2	37.7	14.5	4.1	6.4
Send letters	7.1	8.8	28.7	26.9	10.0	1.8	3.3
Part. elec. campaign	5.5	8.6	12.6	11.5	7.5	3.2	2.6
Political party	4.0	6.1	13.0	8.3	4.0	1.5	1.8
Pol. conventional involvement % 2 in 9	52.7	41.8	68.5	62.8	32.5	16.0	15.0
Boycott	13.9	10.5	18.1	13.1	5.4	4.5	3.6
Critical consumer	30.9	17.5	21.2	14.3	3.3	4.9	11.1

Indicators	France	Italy	Ger- ma-ny	East G.	Czech R.	Poland	Hung.
Not form.org. groups	4.9	5.0	9.9	6.0	4.9	3.3	3.5
Petition by internet	6.0	1.0	10.9	9.8	3.9	1.4	0.6
Demonstration	15.7	12.3	16.4	15.4	4.7	4.3	1.2
Unauthorized demon.	3.6	3.8	8.2	5.7	2.3	0.1	0.9
Displayed objects	10.8	10.7	18.0	16.2	6.4	13.9	12.7
Pol. unconventional involvement % 1 in 7	49.5	37.3	52.5	44.9	18.0	23.2	23.5
Pol. conventional involvement % 1 in 16	69.8	56.8	77.8	74.4	37.2	31.6	29.6
Talk about politics	41.2	47.1	63.1	61.6	38.4	40.8	33.9
Watch tv, read newspaper	66.8	57.9	78.4	79.3	48.8	60.7	67.1
Political interest % at least 1 in 2	72.1	64.4	85.7	86.2	54.0	64.0	69.3

Source: Fondazione Nord Est/ LaPolis-Univ. di Urbino, conducted by Pragma Srl (by Ilvo Diamanti, Elisa Lello and Fabio Bordignon) July-Sept. 2005 (N=5927).

Table 22
Political Activity in Hungary (in %)

Do and/or support	1990	1993	1999	2001	2010	Change since: 1990 or 1993 until 2010)
Interest to politics (often + very often)						
read politics in newspaper	73	42	50	-	37	-23
watching pol. in tv	-	69	-	37	42	-27
read politics in internet	-	-	-	-	33	
discuss on politics	69	36	36	-	27	-42
convince friend	34	-	29	12	28	-6

Political actions (yes)						
Support attend pol. meeting	4	3	4	3	9	+5
Support sign protest	75	81	86	-	71	-4
support demonstrations	79	73	82	-	36	-43
support strike	47	40	47	-	-	
sup.use police force again	11	14	36	-	18	+7
Parties and politicians (
We need parties for democracy	55	92	94	-	75	+20
No every parties are the same	45	69	74	70	78	+33
Give possibility to participate	54	78	82	54	46	-8
Party serves his leaders only.	55	59	56	-	60	+5
Powerless (yes)						
National level	8**	9	12	11	16	+8
Local level	22**	25	28	27	40	+18
Workplace level	47*	-	-	32	59	+12

*1985 **1989

Source: Simon, 2005, Codebook cit., at pp. 59-67. and Simon, 2010. Civic Culture Repeated survey – Codebook, MTA PTI. Library Archive. Budapest and the survey of 2010.

Table 23
Hungarians participation on the democratic Parliamentary
election (I. Rounds - 1990-2010)

	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
Right to participate (million)	7.820	7.959	8.062	8.061	8 046	8 034
Participated (million)	5.093	5.485	4.536	5.685	5.457	5.172
Participation (%-ban)	63.4	68.9	56.2	70.5	67.8 %	64.4 %
Change in participation %	-	+3.8	-12.7	+14.3	-2.7	-3.4

Source: www.valasztas.hu

What can be said so far about participation in Hungary? All the evidence indicated that membership in voluntary associations and mainline political involvement are significantly lower than in peer democracy or in the other countries of Central Europe. Even if participation is known to have fallen off in those countries as well. In any event there is testable reason – among them unemployment and the church’s hesitancy to spur the faithful to action- to account for low participation in Hungary.

VII. CONCLUSION REMARKS

In my chapter I analyzed the mass political culture in Hungary, and we described the character of the Hungarian civil society and the citizens’ political behavior during the transition and consolidation of democracy. I used empirical survey data set, time series and cross-national to describe the character of civil society.

My analyzes support the concept, that the civil society during the 40 years communist system was deformed by repression, persecution, fear and ideological lead political socialization. The “broken civil society” started his self reconstruction process during the transition to democracy and freedom. Our arguments support our conception that the civic society’s deformation under the dictatorship and its formation in the two decades of democracy does not include a straight, linearly strengthening development. This kind of development could have been led to a formation of higher level and stronger intensity. Instead, the formation went on through irregular, cyclic changes, in which the strengthening mixed with weakening, ascending with descending and the composition of all these in different measures. On the whole, it led to a formation of civic society of more extensivity – as compared to the earlier situation – but a relatively low intensity.

I argued that radical pro-market economic reforms debilitated civil society in post-1990 Hungary, although economic and political transformations can be regarded as remarkable, there are serious problems with the development of civic culture. Very difficult at the same times realize the process the transition to democracy and to free market, the impossibility of combining political accountability and market considerations, maintaining the principles of social justice. Marketization in these conditions brought about accelerating social polarization and accelerating growth of income inequality. The process generates a hard conflict within the principles of both, the realization of two different logic of the social justice and privatization of state property for a small group. During the transition mostly injured

the principle of equal justice in the case of Hungary and of post-communist countries.

Because of the incalculable behavior of the political class the actors of the civil society oft became insure, they last their motivation, and they debilitated in the public space. The reason of hostile behaviour of the government, and political elite towards labour organisations was that it did not want to allow employees' and employers' organizations to put limits on its economic policy-making. Struggling with the problem of rapid and drastic decline in membership, labour organisations were unable to prevent the government in imposing subsequent restrictions on their rights.

I elaborated a two dimensional model to description of civil society: the "extensive approach" and the "intensive approach." Using the extensive (quantitative) approach I find during the last twenty years rapid and great grow in the number of non-profit civil organization (in 1989: less the 50; in 1997: 35000; and in 2005: 70000). I used the qualitative approach and I prepared me three ways for analysis. First with the qualitative number I measured the strength of civil society by examining to what extent horizontal networks enable citizens to take decisions at local, regional and national levels, and to realise their interests. Second, the strength can be measured by examining to what extent civil society fosters the development of norms of reciprocity and trust, decreases incentives for selfish behaviour and builds up trust in horizontal networks of social interaction. Third, the spread of civility or public "civicness," that is equitable and fair treatment of others, generalized interpersonal trust, corruption, tolerance, cooperation towards citizens, are also indicative of the strength of civil society in Hungary. As the result I find in the last twenty years the texture of Hungarian civil society was growing definitely, in space gets more extensive, but in affectivity don't become more stronger, and don't become more intensive. In sum I cab say that the civil society gets medium extensivity, but remain low intensivity.

The Hungarian citizens in his behaviour conserved his traditional attitudes. As we saw 20 years in Hungary witness a weak set of civic values regarding the institutions and organizations. During that time, horizontal networks of social interaction were unable to gain the trust of the citizenry; instead, trust in civil organizations was just as low as in political institutions. In Hungary the interpersonal trust is very high level in the families and cousinhood, after the self-trust is the first. That follows the trust in the god, in the colleagues, in neighbors and in compatriots. They are the components of the classical parochial culture described by Almond and Powell.

Such a type of political culture is rarely found to be in Western type of industrial society, but not in Central European modern agriculture based society. The parochial culture is ideal place of setting in the traditional, post-feudal society, where there are no specialized roles, and people unaware of the national political system. We should mention that the factors of traditional parochial political cultures are strong not only in Hungary, but in the Central European countries.

We presented in our chapter, that especially the level of civic involvement and conventional political participation has been very low to modest in Hungary because the influence of four factors of process as below show: 1. memory of past regime; 2. the experience of elite privatization process; 3. the relatively closed political class without any civil control; and 4. the great distance of political class from the civil society.

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