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The Secretary of War *ad interim* will give the necessary instructions to carry this order into effect.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., September 4, 1867.

The heads of the several Executive Departments of the Government are instructed to furnish each person holding an appointment in their respective Departments with an official copy of the proclamation of the President bearing date the 3d instant, with directions strictly to observe its requirements for an earnest support of the Constitution of the United States and a faithful execution of the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[NOTE.—The Fortieth Congress, second session, met December 2, 1867, in conformity to the Constitution of the United States, and on July 27, 1868, in accordance with the concurrent resolution of July 24, adjourned to September 21; again met September 21, and adjourned to October 16; again met October 16, and adjourned to November 10; again met November 10 and adjourned to December 7, 1868; the latter meetings and adjournments being in accordance with the concurrent resolution of September 21.]

THIRD ANNUAL MESSAGE.

WASHINGTON, *December 3, 1867.*

Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:

The continued disorganization of the Union, to which the President has so often called the attention of Congress, is yet a subject of profound and patriotic concern. We may, however, find some relief from that anxiety in the reflection that the painful political situation, although before untried by ourselves, is not new in the experience of nations. Political science, perhaps as highly perfected in our own time and country as in any other, has not yet disclosed any means by which civil wars can be absolutely prevented. An enlightened nation, however, with a wise and beneficent constitution of free government, may diminish their frequency and mitigate their severity by directing all its proceedings in accordance with its fundamental law.

When a civil war has been brought to a close, it is manifestly the first interest and duty of the state to repair the injuries which the war has inflicted, and to secure the benefit of the lessons it teaches as fully and

as speedily as possible. This duty was, upon the termination of the rebellion, promptly accepted, not only by the executive department, but by the insurrectionary States themselves, and restoration in the first moment of peace was believed to be as easy and certain as it was indispensable. The expectations, however, then so reasonably and confidently entertained were disappointed by legislation from which I felt constrained by my obligations to the Constitution to withhold my assent.

It is therefore a source of profound regret that in complying with the obligation imposed upon the President by the Constitution to give to Congress from time to time information of the state of the Union I am unable to communicate any definitive adjustment, satisfactory to the American people, of the questions which since the close of the rebellion have agitated the public mind. On the contrary, candor compels me to declare that at this time there is no Union as our fathers understood the term, and as they meant it to be understood by us. The Union which they established can exist only where all the States are represented in both Houses of Congress; where one State is as free as another to regulate its internal concerns according to its own will, and where the laws of the central Government, strictly confined to matters of national jurisdiction, apply with equal force to all the people of every section. That such is not the present "state of the Union" is a melancholy fact, and we must all acknowledge that the restoration of the States to their proper legal relations with the Federal Government and with one another, according to the terms of the original compact, would be the greatest temporal blessing which God, in His kindest providence, could bestow upon this nation. It becomes our imperative duty to consider whether or not it is impossible to effect this most desirable consummation.

The Union and the Constitution are inseparable. As long as one is obeyed by all parties, the other will be preserved; and if one is destroyed, both must perish together. The destruction of the Constitution will be followed by other and still greater calamities. It was ordained not only to form a more perfect union between the States, but to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Nothing but implicit obedience to its requirements in all parts of the country will accomplish these great ends. Without that obedience we can look forward only to continual outrages upon individual rights, incessant breaches of the public peace, national weakness, financial dishonor, the total loss of our prosperity, the general corruption of morals, and the final extinction of popular freedom. To save our country from evils so appalling as these, we should renew our efforts again and again.

To me the process of restoration seems perfectly plain and simple. It consists merely in a faithful application of the Constitution and laws. The execution of the laws is not now obstructed or opposed by physical

force. There is no military or other necessity, real or pretended, which can prevent obedience to the Constitution, either North or South. All the rights and all the obligations of States and individuals can be protected and enforced by means perfectly consistent with the fundamental law. The courts may be everywhere open, and if open their process would be unimpeded. Crimes against the United States can be prevented or punished by the proper judicial authorities in a manner entirely practicable and legal. There is therefore no reason why the Constitution should not be obeyed, unless those who exercise its powers have determined that it shall be disregarded and violated. The mere naked will of this Government, or of some one or more of its branches, is the only obstacle that can exist to a perfect union of all the States.

On this momentous question and some of the measures growing out of it I have had the misfortune to differ from Congress, and have expressed my convictions without reserve, though with becoming deference to the opinion of the legislative department. Those convictions are not only unchanged, but strengthened by subsequent events and further reflection. The transcendent importance of the subject will be a sufficient excuse for calling your attention to some of the reasons which have so strongly influenced my own judgment. The hope that we may all finally concur in a mode of settlement consistent at once with our true interests and with our sworn duties to the Constitution is too natural and too just to be easily relinquished.

It is clear to my apprehension that the States lately in rebellion are still members of the National Union. When did they cease to be so? The "ordinances of secession" adopted by a portion (in most of them a very small portion) of their citizens were mere nullities. If we admit now that they were valid and effectual for the purpose intended by their authors, we sweep from under our feet the whole ground upon which we justified the war. Were those States afterwards expelled from the Union by the war? The direct contrary was averred by this Government to be its purpose, and was so understood by all those who gave their blood and treasure to aid in its prosecution. It can not be that a successful war, waged for the preservation of the Union, had the legal effect of dissolving it. The victory of the nation's arms was not the disgrace of her policy; the defeat of secession on the battlefield was not the triumph of its lawless principle. Nor could Congress, with or without the consent of the Executive, do anything which would have the effect, directly or indirectly, of separating the States from each other. To dissolve the Union is to repeal the Constitution which holds it together, and that is a power which does not belong to any department of this Government, or to all of them united.

This is so plain that it has been acknowledged by all branches of the Federal Government. The Executive (my predecessor as well as myself) and the heads of all the Departments have uniformly acted upon the principle that the Union is not only undissolved, but indissoluble. Congress

submitted an amendment of the Constitution to be ratified by the Southern States, and accepted their acts of ratification as a necessary and lawful exercise of their highest function. If they were not States, or were States out of the Union, their consent to a change in the fundamental law of the Union would have been nugatory, and Congress in asking it committed a political absurdity. The judiciary has also given the solemn sanction of its authority to the same view of the case. The judges of the Supreme Court have included the Southern States in their circuits, and they are constantly, *in banc* and elsewhere, exercising jurisdiction which does not belong to them unless those States are States of the Union.

If the Southern States are component parts of the Union, the Constitution is the supreme law for them, as it is for all the other States. They are bound to obey it, and so are we. The right of the Federal Government, which is clear and unquestionable, to enforce the Constitution upon them implies the correlative obligation on our part to observe its limitations and execute its guaranties. Without the Constitution we are nothing; by, through, and under the Constitution we are what it makes us. We may doubt the wisdom of the law, we may not approve of its provisions, but we can not violate it merely because it seems to confine our powers within limits narrower than we could wish. It is not a question of individual or class or sectional interest, much less of party predominance, but of duty—of high and sacred duty—which we are all sworn to perform. If we can not support the Constitution with the cheerful alacrity of those who love and believe in it, we must give to it at least the fidelity of public servants who act under solemn obligations and commands which they dare not disregard.

The constitutional duty is not the only one which requires the States to be restored. There is another consideration which, though of minor importance, is yet of great weight. On the 22d day of July, 1861, Congress declared by an almost unanimous vote of both Houses that the war should be conducted solely for the purpose of preserving the Union and maintaining the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and laws, without impairing the dignity, equality, and rights of the States or of individuals, and that when this was done the war should cease. I do not say that this declaration is personally binding on those who joined in making it, any more than individual members of Congress are personally bound to pay a public debt created under a law for which they voted. But it was a solemn, public, official pledge of the national honor, and I can not imagine upon what grounds the repudiation of it is to be justified. If it be said that we are not bound to keep faith with rebels, let it be remembered that this promise was not made to rebels only. Thousands of true men in the South were drawn to our standard by it, and hundreds of thousands in the North gave their lives in the belief that it would be carried out. It was made on the day after the first great battle of the war had been fought and lost. All patriotic and intelligent men then

saw the necessity of giving such an assurance, and believed that without it the war would end in disaster to our cause. Having given that assurance in the extremity of our peril, the violation of it now, in the day of our power, would be a rude rending of that good faith which holds the moral world together; our country would cease to have any claim upon the confidence of men; it would make the war not only a failure, but a fraud.

Being sincerely convinced that these views are correct, I would be unfaithful to my duty if I did not recommend the repeal of the acts of Congress which place ten of the Southern States under the domination of military masters. If calm reflection shall satisfy a majority of your honorable bodies that the acts referred to are not only a violation of the national faith, but in direct conflict with the Constitution, I dare not permit myself to doubt that you will immediately strike them from the statute book.

To demonstrate the unconstitutional character of those acts I need do no more than refer to their general provisions. It must be seen at once that they are not authorized. To dictate what alterations shall be made in the constitutions of the several States; to control the elections of State legislators and State officers, members of Congress and electors of President and Vice-President, by arbitrarily declaring who shall vote and who shall be excluded from that privilege; to dissolve State legislatures or prevent them from assembling; to dismiss judges and other civil functionaries of the State and appoint others without regard to State law; to organize and operate all the political machinery of the States; to regulate the whole administration of their domestic and local affairs according to the mere will of strange and irresponsible agents, sent among them for that purpose—these are powers not granted to the Federal Government or to any one of its branches. Not being granted, we violate our trust by assuming them as palpably as we would by acting in the face of a positive interdict; for the Constitution forbids us to do whatever it does not affirmatively authorize, either by express words or by clear implication. If the authority we desire to use does not come to us through the Constitution, we can exercise it only by usurpation, and usurpation is the most dangerous of political crimes. By that crime the enemies of free government in all ages have worked out their designs against public liberty and private right. It leads directly and immediately to the establishment of absolute rule, for undelegated power is always unlimited and unrestrained.

The acts of Congress in question are not only objectionable for their assumption of ungranted power, but many of their provisions are in conflict with the direct prohibitions of the Constitution. The Constitution commands that a republican form of government shall be guaranteed to all the States; that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, arrested without a judicial warrant, or punished without a fair trial before an impartial jury; that the privilege

of *habeas corpus* shall not be denied in time of peace, and that no bill of attainder shall be passed even against a single individual. Yet the system of measures established by these acts of Congress does totally subvert and destroy the form as well as the substance of republican government in the ten States to which they apply. It binds them hand and foot in absolute slavery, and subjects them to a strange and hostile power, more unlimited and more likely to be abused than any other now known among civilized men. It tramples down all those rights in which the essence of liberty consists, and which a free government is always most careful to protect. It denies the *habeas corpus* and the trial by jury. Personal freedom, property, and life, if assailed by the passion, the prejudice, or the rapacity of the ruler, have no security whatever. It has the effect of a bill of attainder or bill of pains and penalties, not upon a few individuals, but upon whole masses, including the millions who inhabit the subject States, and even their unborn children. These wrongs, being expressly forbidden, can not be constitutionally inflicted upon any portion of our people, no matter how they may have come within our jurisdiction, and no matter whether they live in States, Territories, or districts.

I have no desire to save from the proper and just consequences of their great crime those who engaged in rebellion against the Government, but as a mode of punishment the measures under consideration are the most unreasonable that could be invented. Many of those people are perfectly innocent; many kept their fidelity to the Union untainted to the last; many were incapable of any legal offense; a large proportion even of the persons able to bear arms were forced into rebellion against their will, and of those who are guilty with their own consent the degrees of guilt are as various as the shades of their character and temper. But these acts of Congress confound them all together in one common doom. Indiscriminate vengeance upon classes, sects, and parties, or upon whole communities, for offenses committed by a portion of them against the governments to which they owed obedience was common in the barbarous ages of the world; but Christianity and civilization have made such progress that recourse to a punishment so cruel and unjust would meet with the condemnation of all unprejudiced and right-minded men. The punitive justice of this age, and especially of this country, does not consist in stripping whole States of their liberties and reducing all their people, without distinction, to the condition of slavery. It deals separately with each individual, confines itself to the forms of law, and vindicates its own purity by an impartial examination of every case before a competent judicial tribunal. If this does not satisfy all our desires with regard to Southern rebels, let us console ourselves by reflecting that a free Constitution, triumphant in war and unbroken in peace, is worth far more to us and our children than the gratification of any present feeling.

I am aware it is assumed that this system of government for the Southern States is not to be perpetual. It is true this military government is

to be only provisional, but it is through this temporary evil that a greater evil is to be made perpetual. If the guaranties of the Constitution can be broken provisionally to serve a temporary purpose, and in a part only of the country, we can destroy them everywhere and for all time. Arbitrary measures often change, but they generally change for the worse. It is the curse of despotism that it has no halting place. The intermitted exercise of its power brings no sense of security to its subjects, for they can never know what more they will be called to endure when its red right hand is armed to plague them again. Nor is it possible to conjecture how or where power, unrestrained by law, may seek its next victims. The States that are still free may be enslaved at any moment; for if the Constitution does not protect all, it protects none.

It is manifestly and avowedly the object of these laws to confer upon negroes the privilege of voting and to disfranchise such a number of white citizens as will give the former a clear majority at all elections in the Southern States. This, to the minds of some persons, is so important that a violation of the Constitution is justified as a means of bringing it about. The morality is always false which excuses a wrong because it proposes to accomplish a desirable end. We are not permitted to do evil that good may come. But in this case the end itself is evil, as well as the means. The subjugation of the States to negro domination would be worse than the military despotism under which they are now suffering. It was believed beforehand that the people would endure any amount of military oppression for any length of time rather than degrade themselves by subjection to the negro race. Therefore they have been left without a choice. Negro suffrage was established by act of Congress, and the military officers were commanded to superintend the process of clothing the negro race with the political privileges torn from white men.

The blacks in the South are entitled to be well and humanely governed, and to have the protection of just laws for all their rights of person and property. If it were practicable at this time to give them a Government exclusively their own, under which they might manage their own affairs in their own way, it would become a grave question whether we ought to do so, or whether common humanity would not require us to save them from themselves. But under the circumstances this is only a speculative point. It is not proposed merely that they shall govern themselves, but that they shall rule the white race, make and administer State laws, elect Presidents and members of Congress, and shape to a greater or less extent the future destiny of the whole country. Would such a trust and power be safe in such hands?

The peculiar qualities which should characterize any people who are fit to decide upon the management of public affairs for a great state have seldom been combined. It is the glory of white men to know that they have had these qualities in sufficient measure to build upon this continent a great political fabric and to preserve its stability for more than ninety

years, while in every other part of the world all similar experiments have failed. But if anything can be proved by known facts, if all reasoning upon evidence is not abandoned, it must be acknowledged that in the progress of nations negroes have shown less capacity for government than any other race of people. No independent government of any form has ever been successful in their hands. On the contrary, wherever they have been left to their own devices they have shown a constant tendency to relapse into barbarism. In the Southern States, however, Congress has undertaken to confer upon them the privilege of the ballot. Just released from slavery, it may be doubted whether as a class they know more than their ancestors how to organize and regulate civil society. Indeed, it is admitted that the blacks of the South are not only regardless of the rights of property, but so utterly ignorant of public affairs that their voting can consist in nothing more than carrying a ballot to the place where they are directed to deposit it. I need not remind you that the exercise of the elective franchise is the highest attribute of an American citizen, and that when guided by virtue, intelligence, patriotism, and a proper appreciation of our free institutions it constitutes the true basis of a democratic form of government, in which the sovereign power is lodged in the body of the people. A trust artificially created, not for its own sake, but solely as a means of promoting the general welfare, its influence for good must necessarily depend upon the elevated character and true allegiance of the elector. It ought, therefore, to be reposed in none except those who are fitted morally and mentally to administer it well; for if conferred upon persons who do not justly estimate its value and who are indifferent as to its results, it will only serve as a means of placing power in the hands of the unprincipled and ambitious, and must eventuate in the complete destruction of that liberty of which it should be the most powerful conservator. I have therefore heretofore urged upon your attention the great danger—

to be apprehended from an untimely extension of the elective franchise to any new class in our country, especially when the large majority of that class, in wielding the power thus placed in their hands, can not be expected correctly to comprehend the duties and responsibilities which pertain to suffrage. Yesterday, as it were, 4,000,000 persons were held in a condition of slavery that had existed for generations; to-day they are freemen and are assumed by law to be citizens. It can not be presumed, from their previous condition of servitude, that as a class they are as well informed as to the nature of our Government as the intelligent foreigner who makes our land the home of his choice. In the case of the latter neither a residence of five years and the knowledge of our institutions which it gives nor attachment to the principles of the Constitution are the only conditions upon which he can be admitted to citizenship; he must prove in addition a good moral character, and thus give reasonable ground for the belief that he will be faithful to the obligations which he assumes as a citizen of the Republic. Where a people—the source of all political power—speak by their suffrages through the instrumentality of the ballot box, it must be carefully guarded against the control of those who are corrupt in principle and enemies of free institutions, for it can only become to our political and social system a safe conductor

of healthy popular sentiment when kept free from demoralizing influences. Controlled through fraud and usurpation by the designing, anarchy and despotism must inevitably follow. In the hands of the patriotic and worthy our Government will be preserved upon the principles of the Constitution inherited from our fathers. It follows, therefore, that in admitting to the ballot box a new class of voters not qualified for the exercise of the elective franchise we weaken our system of government instead of adding to its strength and durability.

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I yield to no one in attachment to that rule of general suffrage which distinguishes our policy as a nation. But there is a limit, wisely observed hitherto, which makes the ballot a privilege and a trust, and which requires of some classes a time suitable for probation and preparation. To give it indiscriminately to a new class, wholly unprepared by previous habits and opportunities to perform the trust which it demands, is to degrade it, and finally to destroy its power, for it may be safely assumed that no political truth is better established than that such indiscriminate and all-embracing extension of popular suffrage must end at last in its destruction.

I repeat the expression of my willingness to join in any plan within the scope of our constitutional authority which promises to better the condition of the negroes in the South, by encouraging them in industry, enlightening their minds, improving their morals, and giving protection to all their just rights as freedmen. But the transfer of our political inheritance to them would, in my opinion, be an abandonment of a duty which we owe alike to the memory of our fathers and the rights of our children.

The plan of putting the Southern States wholly and the General Government partially into the hands of negroes is proposed at a time peculiarly unpropitious. The foundations of society have been broken up by civil war. Industry must be reorganized, justice reestablished, public credit maintained, and order brought out of confusion. To accomplish these ends would require all the wisdom and virtue of the great men who formed our institutions originally. I confidently believe that their descendants will be equal to the arduous task before them, but it is worse than madness to expect that negroes will perform it for us. Certainly we ought not to ask their assistance till we despair of our own competency.

The great difference between the two races in physical, mental, and moral characteristics will prevent an amalgamation or fusion of them together in one homogeneous mass. If the inferior obtains the ascendency over the other, it will govern with reference only to its own interests—for it will recognize no common interest—and create such a tyranny as this continent has never yet witnessed. Already the negroes are influenced by promises of confiscation and plunder. They are taught to regard as an enemy every white man who has any respect for the rights of his own race. If this continues it must become worse and worse, until all order will be subverted, all industry cease, and the fertile fields of the South grow up into a wilderness. Of all the dangers which our nation has yet encountered, none are equal to those which must result from the success of the effort now making to Africanize the half of our country.

I would not put considerations of money in competition with justice and right; but the expenses incident to "reconstruction" under the

system adopted by Congress aggravate what I regard as the intrinsic wrong of the measure itself. It has cost uncounted millions already, and if persisted in will add largely to the weight of taxation, already too oppressive to be borne without just complaint, and may finally reduce the Treasury of the nation to a condition of bankruptcy. We must not delude ourselves. It will require a strong standing army and probably more than $200,000,000 per annum to maintain the supremacy of negro governments after they are established. The sum thus thrown away would, if properly used, form a sinking fund large enough to pay the whole national debt in less than fifteen years. It is vain to hope that negroes will maintain their ascendency themselves. Without military power they are wholly incapable of holding in subjection the white people of the South.

I submit to the judgment of Congress whether the public credit may not be injuriously affected by a system of measures like this. With our debt and the vast private interests which are complicated with it, we can not be too cautious of a policy which might by possibility impair the confidence of the world in our Government. That confidence can only be retained by carefully inculcating the principles of justice and honor on the popular mind and by the most scrupulous fidelity to all our engagements of every sort. Any serious breach of the organic law, persisted in for a considerable time, can not but create fears for the stability of our institutions. Habitual violation of prescribed rules, which we bind ourselves to observe, must demoralize the people. Our only standard of civil duty being set at naught, the sheet anchor of our political morality is lost, the public conscience swings from its moorings and yields to every impulse of passion and interest. If we repudiate the Constitution, we will not be expected to care much for mere pecuniary obligations. The violation of such a pledge as we made on the 22d day of July, 1861, will assuredly diminish the market value of our other promises. Besides, if we acknowledge that the national debt was created, not to hold the States in the Union, as the taxpayers were led to suppose, but to expel them from it and hand them over to be governed by negroes, the moral duty to pay it may seem much less clear. I say it may *seem* so, for I do not admit that this or any other argument in favor of repudiation can be entertained as sound; but its influence on some classes of minds may well be apprehended. The financial honor of a great commercial nation, largely indebted and with a republican form of government administered by agents of the popular choice, is a thing of such delicate texture and the destruction of it would be followed by such unspeakable calamity that every true patriot must desire to avoid whatever might expose it to the slightest danger.

The great interests of the country require immediate relief from these enactments. Business in the South is paralyzed by a sense of general insecurity, by the terror of confiscation, and the dread of negro supremacy.

The Southern trade, from which the North would have derived so great a profit under a government of law, still languishes, and can never be revived until it ceases to be fettered by the arbitrary power which makes all its operations unsafe. That rich country—the richest in natural resources the world ever saw—is worse than lost if it be not soon placed under the protection of a free constitution. Instead of being, as it ought to be, a source of wealth and power, it will become an intolerable burden upon the rest of the nation.

Another reason for retracing our steps will doubtless be seen by Congress in the late manifestations of public opinion upon this subject. We live in a country where the popular will always enforces obedience to itself, sooner or later. It is vain to think of opposing it with anything short of legal authority backed by overwhelming force. It can not have escaped your attention that from the day on which Congress fairly and formally presented the proposition to govern the Southern States by military force, with a view to the ultimate establishment of negro supremacy, every expression of the general sentiment has been more or less adverse to it. The affections of this generation can not be detached from the institutions of their ancestors. Their determination to preserve the inheritance of free government in their own hands and transmit it undivided and unimpaired to their own posterity is too strong to be successfully opposed. Every weaker passion will disappear before that love of liberty and law for which the American people are distinguished above all others in the world.

How far the duty of the President "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution" requires him to go in opposing an unconstitutional act of Congress is a very serious and important question, on which I have deliberated much and felt extremely anxious to reach a proper conclusion. Where an act has been passed according to the forms of the Constitution by the supreme legislative authority, and is regularly enrolled among the public statutes of the country, Executive resistance to it, especially in times of high party excitement, would be likely to produce violent collision between the respective adherents of the two branches of the Government. This would be simply civil war, and civil war must be resorted to only as the last remedy for the worst of evils. Whatever might tend to provoke it should be most carefully avoided. A faithful and conscientious magistrate will concede very much to honest error, and something even to perverse malice, before he will endanger the public peace; and he will not adopt forcible measures, or such as might lead to force, as long as those which are peaceable remain open to him or to his constituents. It is true that cases may occur in which the Executive would be compelled to stand on its rights, and maintain them regardless of all consequences. If Congress should pass an act which is not only in palpable conflict with the Constitution, but will certainly, if carried out, produce immediate and irreparable injury to the organic

structure of the Government, and if there be neither judicial remedy for the wrongs it inflicts nor power in the people to protect themselves without the official aid of their elected defender—if, for instance, the legislative department should pass an act even through all the forms of law to abolish a coordinate department of the Government—in such a case the President must take the high responsibilities of his office and save the life of the nation at all hazards. The so-called reconstruction acts, though as plainly unconstitutional as any that can be imagined, were not believed to be within the class last mentioned. The people were not wholly disarmed of the power of self-defense. In all the Northern States they still held in their hands the sacred right of the ballot, and it was safe to believe that in due time they would come to the rescue of their own institutions. It gives me pleasure to add that the appeal to our common constituents was not taken in vain, and that my confidence in their wisdom and virtue seems not to have been misplaced.

It is well and publicly known that enormous frauds have been perpetrated on the Treasury and that colossal fortunes have been made at the public expense. This species of corruption has increased, is increasing, and if not diminished will soon bring us into total ruin and disgrace. The public creditors and the taxpayers are alike interested in an honest administration of the finances, and neither class will long endure the large-handed robberies of the recent past. For this discreditable state of things there are several causes. Some of the taxes are so laid as to present an irresistible temptation to evade payment. The great sums which officers may win by connivance at fraud create a pressure which is more than the virtue of many can withstand, and there can be no doubt that the open disregard of constitutional obligations avowed by some of the highest and most influential men in the country has greatly weakened the moral sense of those who serve in subordinate places. The expenses of the United States, including interest on the public debt, are more than six times as much as they were seven years ago. To collect and disburse this vast amount requires careful supervision as well as systematic vigilance. The system, never perfected, was much disorganized by the "tenure-of-office bill," which has almost destroyed official accountability. The President may be thoroughly convinced that an officer is incapable, dishonest, or unfaithful to the Constitution, but under the law which I have named the utmost he can do is to complain to the Senate and ask the privilege of supplying his place with a better man. If the Senate be regarded as personally or politically hostile to the President, it is natural, and not altogether unreasonable, for the officer to expect that it will take his part as far as possible, restore him to his place, and give him a triumph over his Executive superior. The officer has other chances of impunity arising from accidental defects of evidence, the mode of investigating it, and the secrecy of the hearing. It is not wonderful that official malfeasance should become bold in proportion as the delinquents learn to think

themselves safe. I am entirely persuaded that under such a rule the President can not perform the great duty assigned to him of seeing the laws faithfully executed, and that it disables him most especially from enforcing that rigid accountability which is necessary to the due execution of the revenue laws.

The Constitution invests the President with authority to *decide* whether a removal should be made in any given case; the act of Congress declares in substance that he shall only *accuse* such as he supposes to be unworthy of their trust. The Constitution makes him sole *judge* in the premises, but the statute takes away his jurisdiction, transfers it to the Senate, and leaves him nothing but the odious and sometimes impracticable duty of becoming a *prosecutor*. The prosecution is to be conducted before a tribunal whose members are not, like him, responsible to the whole people, but to separate constituent bodies, and who may hear his accusation with great disfavor. The Senate is absolutely without any known standard of decision applicable to such a case. Its judgment can not be anticipated, for it is not governed by any rule. The law does not define what shall be deemed good cause for removal. It is impossible even to conjecture what may or may not be so considered by the Senate. The nature of the subject forbids clear proof. If the charge be incapacity, what evidence will support it? Fidelity to the Constitution may be understood or misunderstood in a thousand different ways, and by violent party men, in violent party times, unfaithfulness to the Constitution may even come to be considered meritorious. If the officer be accused of dishonesty, how shall it be made out? Will it be inferred from acts unconnected with public duty, from private history, or from general reputation, or must the President await the commission of an actual misdemeanor in office? Shall he in the meantime risk the character and interest of the nation in the hands of men to whom he can not give his confidence? Must he forbear his complaint until the mischief is done and can not be prevented? If his zeal in the public service should impel him to anticipate the overt act, must he move at the peril of being tried himself for the offense of slandering his subordinate? In the present circumstances of the country someone must be held responsible for official delinquency of every kind. It is extremely difficult to say where that responsibility should be thrown if it be not left where it has been placed by the Constitution. But all just men will admit that the President ought to be entirely relieved from such responsibility if he can not meet it by reason of restrictions placed by law upon his action.

The unrestricted power of removal from office is a very great one to be trusted even to a magistrate chosen by the general suffrage of the whole people and accountable directly to them for his acts. It is undoubtedly liable to abuse, and at some periods of our history perhaps has been abused. If it be thought desirable and constitutional that it should be so limited as to make the President merely a common informer against

other public agents, he should at least be permitted to act in that capacity before some open tribunal, independent of party politics, ready to investigate the merits of every case, furnished with the means of taking evidence, and bound to decide according to established rules. This would guarantee the safety of the accuser when he acts in good faith, and at the same time secure the rights of the other party. I speak, of course, with all proper respect for the present Senate, but it does not seem to me that any legislative body can be so constituted as to insure its fitness for these functions.

It is not the theory of this Government that public offices are the property of those who hold them. They are given merely as a trust for the public benefit, sometimes for a fixed period, sometimes during good behavior, but generally they are liable to be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, which represents the collective majesty and speaks the will of the people. The forced retention in office of a single dishonest person may work great injury to the public interests. The danger to the public service comes not from the power to remove, but from the power to appoint. Therefore it was that the framers of the Constitution left the power of removal unrestricted, while they gave the Senate a right to reject all appointments which in its opinion were not fit to be made. A little reflection on this subject will probably satisfy all who have the good of the country at heart that our best course is to take the Constitution for our guide, walk in the path marked out by the founders of the Republic, and obey the rules made sacred by the observance of our great predecessors.

The present condition of our finances and circulating medium is one to which your early consideration is invited.

The proportion which the currency of any country should bear to the whole value of the annual produce circulated by its means is a question upon which political economists have not agreed. Nor can it be controlled by legislation, but must be left to the irrevocable laws which everywhere regulate commerce and trade. The circulating medium will ever irresistibly flow to those points where it is in greatest demand. The law of demand and supply is as unerring as that which regulates the tides of the ocean; and, indeed, currency, like the tides, has its ebbs and flows throughout the commercial world.

At the beginning of the rebellion the bank-note circulation of the country amounted to not much more than $200,000,000; now the circulation of national-bank notes and those known as "legal-tenders" is nearly seven hundred millions. While it is urged by some that this amount should be increased, others contend that a decided reduction is absolutely essential to the best interests of the country. In view of these diverse opinions, it may be well to ascertain the real value of our paper issues when compared with a metallic or convertible currency. For this purpose let us inquire how much gold and silver could be purchased by

the seven hundred millions of paper money now in circulation. Probably not more than half the amount of the latter, showing that when our paper currency is compared with gold and silver its commercial value is compressed into three hundred and fifty millions. This striking fact makes it the obvious duty of the Government, as early as may be consistent with the principles of sound political economy, to take such measures as will enable the holder of its notes and those of the national banks to convert them without loss into specie or its equivalent. A reduction of our paper circulating medium need not necessarily follow. This, however, would depend upon the law of demand and supply, though it should be borne in mind that by making legal-tender and bank notes convertible into coin or its equivalent their present specie value in the hands of their holders would be enhanced 100 per cent.

Legislation for the accomplishment of a result so desirable is demanded by the highest public considerations. The Constitution contemplates that the circulating medium of the country shall be uniform in quality and value. At the time of the formation of that instrument the country had just emerged from the War of the Revolution, and was suffering from the effects of a redundant and worthless paper currency. The sages of that period were anxious to protect their posterity from the evils that they themselves had experienced. Hence in providing a circulating medium they conferred upon Congress the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof, at the same time prohibiting the States from making anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts.

The anomalous condition of our currency is in striking contrast with that which was originally designed. Our circulation now embraces, first, notes of the national banks, which are made receivable for all dues to the Government, excluding imposts, and by all its creditors, excepting in payment of interest upon its bonds and the securities themselves; second, legal-tender notes, issued by the United States, and which the law requires shall be received as well in payment of all debts between citizens as of all Government dues, excepting imposts; and, third, gold and silver coin. By the operation of our present system of finance, however, the metallic currency, when collected, is reserved only for one class of Government creditors, who, holding its bonds, semiannually receive their interest in coin from the National Treasury. They are thus made to occupy an invidious position, which may be used to strengthen the arguments of those who would bring into disrepute the obligations of the nation. In the payment of all its debts the plighted faith of the Government should be inviolably maintained. But while it acts with fidelity toward the bondholder who loaned his money that the integrity of the Union might be preserved, it should at the same time observe good faith with the great masses of the people, who, having rescued the Union from the perils of rebellion, now bear the burdens of taxation, that the Government may be able to fulfill its engagements. There is no reason which

will be accepted as satisfactory by the people why those who defend us on the land and protect us on the sea; the pensioner upon the gratitude of the nation, bearing the scars and wounds received while in its service; the public servants in the various Departments of the Government; the farmer who supplies the soldiers of the Army and the sailors of the Navy; the artisan who toils in the nation's workshops, or the mechanics and laborers who build its edifices and construct its forts and vessels of war, should, in payment of their just and hard-earned dues, receive depreciated paper, while another class of their countrymen, no more deserving, are paid in coin of gold and silver. Equal and exact justice requires that all the creditors of the Government should be paid in a currency possessing a uniform value. This can only be accomplished by the restoration of the currency to the standard established by the Constitution; and by this means we would remove a discrimination which may, if it has not already done so, create a prejudice that may become deep rooted and widespread and imperil the national credit.

The feasibility of making our currency correspond with the constitutional standard may be seen by reference to a few facts derived from our commercial statistics.

The production of precious metals in the United States from 1849 to 1857, inclusive, amounted to $579,000,000; from 1858 to 1860, inclusive, to $137,500,000, and from 1861 to 1867, inclusive, to $457,500,000—making the grand aggregate of products since 1849 $1,174,000,000. The amount of specie coined from 1849 to 1857 inclusive, was $439,000,000; from 1858 to 1860, inclusive, $125,000,000, and from 1861 to 1867, inclusive, $310,000,000—making the total coinage since 1849 $874,000,000. From 1849 to 1857, inclusive, the net exports of specie amounted to $271,000,000; from 1858 to 1860, inclusive, to $148,000,000, and from 1861 to 1867, inclusive, $322,000,000—making the aggregate of net exports since 1849 $741,000,000. These figures show an excess of product over net exports of $433,000,000. There are in the Treasury $111,000,000 in coin, something more than $40,000,000 in circulation on the Pacific Coast, and a few millions in the national and other banks—in all about $160,000,000. This, however, taking into account the specie in the country prior to 1849, leaves more than $300,000,000 which have not been accounted for by exportation, and therefore may yet remain in the country.

These are important facts and show how completely the inferior currency will supersede the better, forcing it from circulation among the masses and causing it to be exported as a mere article of trade, to add to the money capital of foreign lands. They show the necessity of retiring our paper money, that the return of gold and silver to the avenues of trade may be invited and a demand created which will cause the retention at home of at least so much of the productions of our rich and inexhaustible gold-bearing fields as may be sufficient for purposes of circulation. It is

unreasonable to expect a return to a sound currency so long as the Government by continuing to issue irredeemable notes fills the channels of circulation with depreciated paper. Notwithstanding a coinage by our mints, since 1849, of $874,000,000, the people are now strangers to the currency which was designed for their use and benefit, and specimens of the precious metals bearing the national device are seldom seen, except when produced to gratify the interest excited by their novelty. If depreciated paper is to be continued as the permanent currency of the country, and all our coin is to become a mere article of traffic and speculation, to the enhancement in price of all that is indispensable to the comfort of the people, it would be wise economy to abolish our mints, thus saving the nation the care and expense incident to such establishments, and let all our precious metals be exported in bullion. The time has come, however, when the Government and national banks should be required to take the most efficient steps and make all necessary arrangements for a resumption of specie payments at the earliest practicable period. Specie payments having been once resumed by the Government and banks, all notes or bills of paper issued by either of a less denomination than $20 should by law be excluded from circulation, so that the people may have the benefit and convenience of a gold and silver currency which in all their business transactions will be uniform in value at home and abroad.

Every man of property or industry, every man who desires to preserve what he honestly possesses or to obtain what he can honestly earn, has a direct interest in maintaining a safe circulating medium—such a medium as shall be real and substantial, not liable to vibrate with opinions, not subject to be blown up or blown down by the breath of speculation, but to be made stable and secure. A disordered currency is one of the greatest political evils. It undermines the virtues necessary for the support of the social system and encourages propensities destructive of its happiness; it wars against industry, frugality, and economy, and it fosters the evil spirits of extravagance and speculation.

It has been asserted by one of our profound and most gifted statesmen that—

Of all the contrivances for cheating the laboring classes of mankind, none has been more effectual than that which deludes them with paper money. This is the most effectual of inventions to fertilize the rich man's fields by the sweat of the poor man's brow. Ordinary tyranny, oppression, excessive taxation—these bear lightly on the happiness of the mass of the community compared with a fraudulent currency and the robberies committed by depreciated paper. Our own history has recorded for our instruction enough, and more than enough, of the demoralizing tendency, the injustice, and the intolerable oppression on the virtuous and well disposed of a degraded paper currency authorized by law or in any way countenanced by government.

It is one of the most successful devices, in times of peace or war, expansions or revulsions, to accomplish the transfer of all the precious metals from the great mass of the people into the hands of the few, where they are hoarded in secret places or deposited in strong boxes under bolts and bars, while the people are left to endure all the inconvenience, sacrifice,

and demoralization resulting from the use of a depreciated and worthless paper money.

The condition of our finances and the operations of our revenue system are set forth and fully explained in the able and instructive report of the Secretary of the Treasury. On the 30th of June, 1866, the public debt amounted to $2,783,425,879; on the 30th of June last it was $2,692,199,215, showing a reduction during the fiscal year of $91,226,664. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1867, the receipts were $490,634,010 and the expenditures $346,729,129, leaving an available surplus of $143,904,880. It is estimated that the receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, will be $417,161,928 and that the expenditures will reach the sum of $393,269,226, leaving in the Treasury a surplus of $23,892,702. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1869, it is estimated that the receipts will amount to $381,000,000 and that the expenditures will be $372,000,000, showing an excess of $9,000,000 in favor of the Government.

The attention of Congress is earnestly invited to the necessity of a thorough revision of our revenue system. Our internal-revenue laws and impost system should be so adjusted as to bear most heavily on articles of luxury, leaving the necessaries of life as free from taxation as may be consistent with the real wants of the Government, economically administered. Taxation would not then fall unduly on the man of moderate means; and while none would be entirely exempt from assessment, all, in proportion to their pecuniary abilities, would contribute toward the support of the State. A modification of the internal-revenue system, by a large reduction in the number of articles now subject to tax, would be followed by results equally advantageous to the citizen and the Government. It would render the execution of the law less expensive and more certain, remove obstructions to industry, lessen the temptations to evade the law, diminish the violations and frauds perpetrated upon its provisions, make its operations less inquisitorial, and greatly reduce in numbers the army of taxgatherers created by the system, who "take from the mouth of honest labor the bread it has earned." Retrenchment, reform, and economy should be carried into every branch of the public service, that the expenditures of the Government may be reduced and the people relieved from oppressive taxation; a sound currency should be restored, and the public faith in regard to the national debt sacredly observed. The accomplishment of these important results, together with the restoration of the Union of the States upon the principles of the Constitution, would inspire confidence at home and abroad in the stability of our institutions and bring to the nation prosperity, peace, and good will.

The report of the Secretary of War *ad interim* exhibits the operations of the Army and of the several bureaus of the War Department. The aggregate strength of our military force on the 30th of September last was 56,315. The total estimate for military appropriations is $77,124,707, including a deficiency in last year's appropriation of $13,600,000. The

payments at the Treasury on account of the service of the War Department from January 1 to October 29, 1867—a period of ten months—amounted to $109,807,000. The expenses of the military establishment, as well as the numbers of the Army, are now three times as great as they have ever been in time of peace, while the discretionary power is vested in the Executive to add millions to this expenditure by an increase of the Army to the maximum strength allowed by the law.

The comprehensive report of the Secretary of the Interior furnishes interesting information in reference to the important branches of the public service connected with his Department. The menacing attitude of some of the warlike bands of Indians inhabiting the district of country between the Arkansas and Platte rivers and portions of Dakota Territory required the presence of a large military force in that region. Instigated by real or imaginary grievances, the Indians occasionally committed acts of barbarous violence upon emigrants and our frontier settlements; but a general Indian war has been providentially averted. The commissioners under the act of 20th July, 1867, were invested with full power to adjust existing difficulties, negotiate treaties with the disaffected bands, and select for them reservations remote from the traveled routes between the Mississippi and the Pacific. They entered without delay upon the execution of their trust, but have not yet made any official report of their proceedings. It is of vital importance that our distant Territories should be exempt from Indian outbreaks, and that the construction of the Pacific Railroad, an object of national importance, should not be interrupted by hostile tribes. These objects, as well as the material interests and the moral and intellectual improvement of the Indians, can be most effectually secured by concentrating them upon portions of country set apart for their exclusive use and located at points remote from our highways and encroaching white settlements.

Since the commencement of the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress 510 miles of road have been constructed on the main line and branches of the Pacific Railway. The line from Omaha is rapidly approaching the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains, while the terminus of the last section of constructed road in California, accepted by the Government on the 24th day of October last, was but 11 miles distant from the summit of the Sierra Nevada. The remarkable energy evinced by the companies offers the strongest assurance that the completion of the road from Sacramento to Omaha will not be long deferred.

During the last fiscal year 7,041,114 acres of public land were disposed of, and the cash receipts from sales and fees exceeded by one-half million dollars the sum realized from those sources during the preceding year. The amount paid to pensioners, including expenses of disbursements, was $18,619,956, and 36,482 names were added to the rolls. The entire number of pensioners on the 30th of June last was 155,474. Eleven thousand six hundred and fifty-five patents and designs were issued

during the year ending September 30, 1867, and at that date the balance in the Treasury to the credit of the patent fund was $286,607.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy states that we have seven squadrons actively and judiciously employed, under efficient and able commanders, in protecting the persons and property of American citizens, maintaining the dignity and power of the Government, and promoting the commerce and business interests of our countrymen in every part of the world. Of the 238 vessels composing the present Navy of the United States, 56, carrying 507 guns, are in squadron service. During the year the number of vessels in commission has been reduced 12, and there are 13 less on squadron duty than there were at the date of the last report. A large number of vessels were commenced and in the course of construction when the war terminated, and although Congress had made the necessary appropriations for their completion, the Department has either suspended work upon them or limited the slow completion of the steam vessels, so as to meet the contracts for machinery made with private establishments. The total expenditures of the Navy Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1867, were $31,034,011. No appropriations have been made or required since the close of the war for the construction and repair of vessels, for steam machinery, ordnance, provisions and clothing, fuel, hemp, etc., the balances under these several heads having been more than sufficient for current expenditures. It should also be stated to the credit of the Department that, besides asking no appropriations for the above objects for the last two years, the Secretary of the Navy, on the 30th of September last, in accordance with the act of May 1, 1820, requested the Secretary of the Treasury to carry to the surplus fund the sum of $65,000,000, being the amount received from the sales of vessels and other war property and the remnants of former appropriations.

The report of the Postmaster-General shows the business of the Post-Office Department and the condition of the postal service in a very favorable light, and the attention of Congress is called to its practical recommendations. The receipts of the Department for the year ending June 30, 1867, including all special appropriations for sea and land service and for free mail matter, were $19,978,693. The expenditures for all purposes were $19,235,483, leaving an unexpended balance in favor of the Department of $743,210, which can be applied toward the expenses of the Department for the current year. The increase of postal revenue, independent of specific appropriations, for the year 1867 over that of 1866 was $850,040. The increase of revenue from the sale of stamps and stamped envelopes was $783,404. The increase of expenditures for 1867 over those of the previous year was owing chiefly to the extension of the land and ocean mail service. During the past year new postal conventions have been ratified and exchanged with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the North German Union, Italy, and the colonial government at Hong Kong,

reducing very largely the rates of ocean and land postages to and from and within those countries.

The report of the Acting Commissioner of Agriculture concisely presents the condition, wants, and progress of an interest eminently worthy the fostering care of Congress, and exhibits a large measure of useful results achieved during the year to which it refers.

The reestablishment of peace at home and the resumption of extended trade, travel, and commerce abroad have served to increase the number and variety of questions in the Department for Foreign Affairs. None of these questions, however, have seriously disturbed our relations with other states.

The Republic of Mexico, having been relieved from foreign intervention, is earnestly engaged in efforts to reestablish her constitutional system of government. A good understanding continues to exist between our Government and the Republics of Hayti and San Domingo, and our cordial relations with the Central and South American States remain unchanged. The tender, made in conformity with a resolution of Congress, of the good offices of the Government with a view to an amicable adjustment of peace between Brazil and her allies on one side and Paraguay on the other, and between Chile and her allies on the one side and Spain on the other, though kindly received, has in neither case been fully accepted by the belligerents. The war in the valley of the Parana is still vigorously maintained. On the other hand, actual hostilities between the Pacific States and Spain have been more than a year suspended. I shall, on any proper occasion that may occur, renew the conciliatory recommendations which have been already made. Brazil, with enlightened sagacity and comprehensive statesmanship, has opened the great channels of the Amazon and its tributaries to universal commerce. One thing more seems needful to assure a rapid and cheering progress in South America. I refer to those peaceful habits without which states and nations can not in this age well expect material prosperity or social advancement.

The Exposition of Universal Industry at Paris has passed, and seems to have fully realized the high expectations of the French Government. If due allowance be made for the recent political derangement of industry here, the part which the United States has borne in this exhibition of invention and art may be regarded with very high satisfaction. During the exposition a conference was held of delegates from several nations, the United States being one, in which the inconveniences of commerce and social intercourse resulting from the diverse standards of money value were very fully discussed, and plans were developed for establishing by universal consent a common principle for the coinage of gold. These conferences are expected to be renewed, with the attendance of many foreign states not hitherto represented. A report of these interesting proceedings will be submitted to Congress, which will, no doubt, justly

appreciate the great object and be ready to adopt any measure which may tend to facilitate its ultimate accomplishment.

On the 25th of February, 1862, Congress declared by law that Treasury notes, without interest, authorized by that act should be legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States. An annual remittance of $30,000, less stipulated expenses, accrues to claimants under the convention made with Spain in 1834. These remittances, since the passage of that act, have been paid in such notes. The claimants insist that the Government ought to require payment in coin. The subject may be deemed worthy of your attention.

No arrangement has yet been reached for the settlement of our claims for British depredations upon the commerce of the United States. I have felt it my duty to decline the proposition of arbitration made by Her Majesty's Government, because it has hitherto been accompanied by reservations and limitations incompatible with the rights, interest, and honor of our country. It is not to be apprehended that Great Britain will persist in her refusal to satisfy these just and reasonable claims, which involve the sacred principle of nonintervention—a principle henceforth not more important to the United States than to all other commercial nations.

The West India islands were settled and colonized by European States simultaneously with the settlement and colonization of the American continent. Most of the colonies planted here became independent nations in the close of the last and the beginning of the present century. Our own country embraces communities which at one period were colonies of Great Britain, France, Spain, Holland, Sweden, and Russia. The people in the West Indies, with the exception of those of the island of Hayti, have neither attained nor aspired to independence, nor have they become prepared for self-defense. Although possessing considerable commercial value, they have been held by the several European States which colonized or at some time conquered them, chiefly for purposes of military and naval strategy in carrying out European policy and designs in regard to this continent. In our Revolutionary War ports and harbors in the West India islands were used by our enemy, to the great injury and embarrassment of the United States. We had the same experience in our second war with Great Britain. The same European policy for a long time excluded us even from trade with the West Indies, while we were at peace with all nations. In our recent civil war the rebels and their piratical and blockade-breaking allies found facilities in the same ports for the work, which they too successfully accomplished, of injuring and devastating the commerce which we are now engaged in rebuilding. We labored especially under this disadvantage, that European steam vessels employed by our enemies found friendly shelter, protection, and supplies in West Indian ports, while our naval operations were necessarily carried on from our own distant shores. There was

then a universal feeling of the want of an advanced naval outpost between the Atlantic coast and Europe. The duty of obtaining such an outpost peacefully and lawfully, while neither doing nor menacing injury to other states, earnestly engaged the attention of the executive department before the close of the war, and it has not been lost sight of since that time. A not entirely dissimilar naval want revealed itself during the same period on the Pacific coast. The required foothold there was fortunately secured by our late treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and it now seems imperative that the more obvious necessities of the Atlantic coast should not be less carefully provided for. A good and convenient port and harbor, capable of easy defense, will supply that want. With the possession of such a station by the United States, neither we nor any other American nation need longer apprehend injury or offense from any transatlantic enemy. I agree with our early statesmen that the West Indies naturally gravitate to, and may be expected ultimately to be absorbed by, the continental States, including our own. I agree with them also that it is wise to leave the question of such absorption to this process of natural political gravitation. The islands of St. Thomas and St. John, which constitute a part of the group called the Virgin Islands, seemed to offer us advantages immediately desirable, while their acquisition could be secured in harmony with the principles to which I have alluded. A treaty has therefore been concluded with the King of Denmark for the cession of those islands, and will be submitted to the Senate for consideration.

It will hardly be necessary to call the attention of Congress to the subject of providing for the payment to Russia of the sum stipulated in the treaty for the cession of Alaska. Possession having been formally delivered to our commissioner, the territory remains for the present in care of a military force, awaiting such civil organization as shall be directed by Congress.

The annexation of many small German States to Prussia and the reorganization of that country under a new and liberal constitution have induced me to renew the effort to obtain a just and prompt settlement of the long-vexed question concerning the claims of foreign states for military service from their subjects naturalized in the United States.

In connection with this subject the attention of Congress is respectfully called to a singular and embarrassing conflict of laws. The executive department of this Government has hitherto uniformly held, as it now holds, that naturalization in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States absolves the recipient from his native allegiance. The courts of Great Britain hold that allegiance to the British Crown is indefeasible, and is not absolved by our laws of naturalization. British judges cite courts and law authorities of the United States in support of that theory against the position held by the executive authority of the United States. This conflict perplexes the public mind concerning the rights of naturalized citizens and impairs the national authority abroad.

I called attention to this subject in my last annual message, and now again respectfully appeal to Congress to declare the national will unmistakably upon this important question.

The abuse of our laws by the clandestine prosecution of the African slave trade from American ports or by American citizens has altogether ceased, and under existing circumstances no apprehensions of its renewal in this part of the world are entertained. Under these circumstances it becomes a question whether we shall not propose to Her Majesty's Government a suspension or discontinuance of the stipulations for maintaining a naval force for the suppression of that trade.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

SPECIAL MESSAGES.

WASHINGTON, *December 3, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the King of Denmark, stipulating for the cession of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John, in the West Indies.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 3, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua, signed at the city of Managua on the 21st day of June last. This instrument has been framed pursuant to the amendments of the Senate of the United States to the previous treaty between the parties of the 16th of March, 1859.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 4, 1867.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a final report from the Attorney-General, additional to the reports submitted by him December 31, 1866, March 2, 1867, and July 8, 1867, in reply to a resolution of the House of Representatives December 10, 1866, requesting "a list of the names of all persons engaged in the late rebellion against the United States Government who have been pardoned by the President from April 15, 1865, to this date; that said list shall also state the rank of each person who has been so pardoned, if he has been engaged in the military service of the so-called Confederate government, and the position if he shall have held any civil office

under said so-called Confederate government; and shall also state whether such person has at any time prior to April 14, 1861, held any office under the United States Government, and, if so, what office, together with the reason for granting such pardon, and also the names of the person or persons at whose solicitation such pardon was granted."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 4, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 26th ultimo, a report * from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 5, 1867.*

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 17th July last, requesting me to communicate all information received at the several Departments of the Government touching the organization within or near the territory of the United States of armed bodies of men for the purpose of avenging the death of the Archduke Maximilian or of intervening in Mexican affairs, and what measures have been taken to prevent the organization or departure of such organized bodies for the purpose of carrying out such objects, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers accompanying it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 5, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I submit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a commercial treaty between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of Madagascar, signed at Antananarivo on the 14th of February last.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 10, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 25th ultimo, a report † from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

* Relating to the removal of J. Lothrop Motley from his post as minister of the United States at Vienna.

† Relating to the formation and the functions of the Government of the united States of North Germany.

WASHINGTON, *December 10, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit a copy of a dispatch of the 17th of July last, addressed to the Secretary of State, and of the papers which accompanied it, from Anson Burlingame, esq., minister of the United States to China, relating to a proposed modification of the existing treaty between this Government and that of China.

The Senate is aware that the original treaty is chiefly *ex parte* in its character. The proposed modification, though not of sufficient importance to warrant all the usual forms, does not seem to be objectionable; but it can not be legally accepted by the executive government without the advice and consent of the Senate. If this should be given, it may be indicated by a resolution, upon the adoption of which the United States minister to China will be instructed to inform the Government of that country that the modification has been assented to.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 12, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

On the 12th of August last I suspended Mr. Stanton from the exercise of the office of Secretary of War, and on the same day designated General Grant to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*.

The following are copies of the Executive orders:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, August 12, 1867.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.

You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, all records, books, and other property now in your custody and charge.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., August 12, 1867.

General ULYSSES S. GRANT,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day suspended as Secretary of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, and will at once enter upon the discharge of the duties of the office.

The Secretary of War has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

The following communication was received from Mr. Stanton:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, August 12, 1867.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: Your note of this date has been received, informing me that by virtue of the powers and authority vested in you as President by the Constitution and laws

of the United States I am suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same, and also directing me at once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my custody and charge.

Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your right under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without any legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary.

But inasmuch as the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed *ad interim*, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force.

The suspension has not been revoked, and the business of the War Department is conducted by the Secretary *ad interim.*

Prior to the date of this suspension I had come to the conclusion that the time had arrived when it was proper Mr. Stanton should retire from my Cabinet. The mutual confidence and general accord which should exist in such a relation had ceased. I supposed that Mr. Stanton was well advised that his continuance in the Cabinet was contrary to my wishes, for I had repeatedly given him so to understand by every mode short of an express request that he should resign. Having waited full time for the voluntary action of Mr. Stanton, and seeing no manifestation on his part of an intention to resign, I addressed him the following note on the 5th of August:

SIR: Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

To this note I received the following reply:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 5, 1867.

SIR: Your note of this day has been received, stating that public considerations of a high character constrain you to say that my resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress.

This reply of Mr. Stanton was not merely a disinclination of compliance with the request for his resignation; it was a defiance, and something more. Mr. Stanton does not content himself with assuming that public considerations bearing upon his continuance in office form as fully a rule of action for himself as for the President, and that upon so delicate a question as the fitness of an officer for continuance in his office the officer is as competent and as impartial to decide as his superior, who is responsible for his conduct. But he goes further, and plainly intimates what he means by "public considerations of a high character," and this is nothing else than his loss of confidence in his superior. He says that

these public considerations have "alone induced me to continue at the head of this Department," and that they "constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress."

This language is very significant. Mr. Stanton holds the position unwillingly. He continues in office only under a sense of high public duty. He is ready to leave when it is safe to leave, and as the danger he apprehends from his removal then will not exist when Congress is here, he is constrained to remain during the interim. What, then, is that danger which can only be averted by the presence of Mr. Stanton or of Congress? Mr. Stanton does not say that "public considerations of a high character" constrain him to hold on to the office indefinitely. He does not say that no one other than himself can at any time be found to take his place and perform its duties. On the contrary, he expresses a desire to leave the office at the earliest moment consistent with these high public considerations. He says, in effect, that while Congress is away he must remain, but that when Congress is here he can go. In other words, he has lost confidence in the President. He is unwilling to leave the War Department in his hands or in the hands of anyone the President may appoint or designate to perform its duties. If he resigns, the President may appoint a Secretary of War that Mr. Stanton does not approve; therefore he will not resign. But when Congress is in session the President can not appoint a Secretary of War which the Senate does not approve; consequently when Congress meets Mr. Stanton is ready to resign.

Whatever cogency these "considerations" may have had on Mr. Stanton, whatever right he may have had to entertain such considerations, whatever propriety there might be in the expression of them to others, one thing is certain, it was official misconduct, to say the least of it, to parade them before his superior officer.

Upon the receipt of this extraordinary note I only delayed the order of suspension long enough to make the necessary arrangements to fill the office. If this were the only cause for his suspension, it would be ample. Necessarily it must end our most important official relations, for I can not imagine a degree of effrontery which would embolden the head of a Department to take his seat at the council table in the Executive Mansion after such an act; nor can I imagine a President so forgetful of the proper respect and dignity which belong to his office as to submit to such intrusion. I will not do Mr. Stanton the wrong to suppose that he entertained any idea of offering to act as one of my constitutional advisers after that note was written. There was an interval of a week between that date and the order of suspension, during which two Cabinet meetings were held. Mr. Stanton did not present himself at either, nor was he expected.

On the 12th of August Mr. Stanton was notified of his suspension and that General Grant had been authorized to take charge of the Department.

In his answer to this notification, of the same date, Mr. Stanton expresses himself as follows:

> Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your right under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without any legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary.
>
> But inasmuch as the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed *ad interim*, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force.

It will not escape attention that in his note of August 5 Mr. Stanton stated that he had been constrained to continue in the office, even before he was requested to resign, by considerations of a high public character. In this note of August 12 a new and different sense of public duty compels him to deny the President's right to suspend him from office without the consent of the Senate. This last is the public duty of resisting an act contrary to law, and he charges the President with violation of the law in ordering his suspension.

Mr. Stanton refers generally to the Constitution and laws of the "United States," and says that a sense of public duty "under" these compels him to deny the right of the President to suspend him from office. As to his sense of duty under the Constitution, that will be considered in the sequel. As to his sense of duty under "the laws of the United States," he certainly can not refer to the law which creates the War Department, for that expressly confers upon the President the unlimited right to remove the head of the Department. The only other law bearing upon the question is the tenure-of-office act, passed by Congress over the Presidential veto March 2, 1867. This is the law which, under a sense of public duty, Mr. Stanton volunteers to defend.

There is no provision in this law which compels any officer coming within its provisions to remain in office. It forbids removals—not resignations. Mr. Stanton was perfectly free to resign at any moment, either upon his own motion or in compliance with a request or an order. It was a matter of choice or of taste. There was nothing compulsory in the nature of legal obligation. Nor does he put his action upon that imperative ground. He says he acts under a "sense of public duty," not of legal obligation, compelling him to hold on and leaving him no choice. The public duty which is upon him arises from the respect which he owes to the Constitution and the laws, violated in his own case. He is therefore compelled by this sense of public duty to vindicate violated law and to stand as its champion.

This was not the first occasion in which Mr. Stanton, in discharge of a public duty, was called upon to consider the provisions of that law. That tenure-of-office law did not pass without notice. Like other acts, it was sent to the President for approval. As is my custom, I submitted its

consideration to my Cabinet for their advice upon the question whether I should approve it or not. It was a grave question of constitutional law, in which I would, of course, rely most upon the opinion of the Attorney-General and of Mr. Stanton, who had once been Attorney-General.

Every member of my Cabinet advised me that the proposed law was unconstitutional. All spoke without doubt or reservation, but Mr. Stanton's condemnation of the law was the most elaborate and emphatic. He referred to the constitutional provisions, the debates in Congress, especially to the speech of Mr. Buchanan when a Senator, to the decisions of the Supreme Court, and to the usage from the beginning of the Government through every successive Administration, all concurring to establish the right of removal as vested by the Constitution in the President. To all these he added the weight of his own deliberate judgment, and advised me that it was my duty to defend the power of the President from usurpation and to veto the law.

I do not know when a sense of public duty is more imperative upon a head of Department than upon such an occasion as this. He acts then under the gravest obligations of law, for when he is called upon by the President for advice it is the Constitution which speaks to him. All his other duties are left by the Constitution to be regulated by statute, but this duty was deemed so momentous that it is imposed by the Constitution itself.

After all this I was not prepared for the ground taken by Mr. Stanton in his note of August 12. I was not prepared to find him compelled by a new and indefinite sense of public duty, under "the Constitution," to assume the vindication of a law which, under the solemn obligations of public duty imposed by the Constitution itself, he advised me was a violation of that Constitution. I make great allowance for a change of opinion, but such a change as this hardly falls within the limits of greatest indulgence.

Where our opinions take the shape of advice, and influence the action of others, the utmost stretch of charity will scarcely justify us in repudiating them when they come to be applied to ourselves.

But to proceed with the narrative. I was so much struck with the full mastery of the question manifested by Mr. Stanton, and was at the time so fully occupied with the preparation of another veto upon the pending reconstruction act, that I requested him to prepare the veto upon this tenure-of-office bill. This he declined, on the ground of physical disability to undergo at the time the labor of writing, but stated his readiness to furnish what aid might be required in the preparation of materials for the paper.

At the time this subject was before the Cabinet it seemed to be taken for granted that as to those members of the Cabinet who had been appointed by Mr. Lincoln their tenure of office was not fixed by the provisions of the act. I do not remember that the point was distinctly

decided, but I well recollect that it was suggested by one member of the Cabinet who was appointed by Mr. Lincoln, and that no dissent was expressed.

Whether the point was well taken or not did not seem to me of any consequence, for the unanimous expression of opinion against the constitutionality and policy of the act was so decided that I felt no concern, so far as the act had reference to the gentlemen then present, that I would be embarrassed in the future. The bill had not then become a law. The limitation upon the power of removal was not yet imposed, and there was yet time to make any changes. If any one of these gentlemen had then said to me that he would avail himself of the provisions of that bill in case it became a law, I should not have hesitated a moment as to his removal. No pledge was then expressly given or required. But there are circumstances when to give an expressed pledge is not necessary, and when to require it is an imputation of possible bad faith. I felt that if these gentlemen came within the purview of the bill it was as to them a dead letter, and that none of them would ever take refuge under its provisions.

I now pass to another subject. When, on the 15th of April, 1865, the duties of the Presidential office devolved upon me, I found a full Cabinet of seven members, all of them selected by Mr. Lincoln. I made no change. On the contrary, I shortly afterwards ratified a change determined upon by Mr. Lincoln, but not perfected at his death, and admitted his appointee, Mr. Harlan, in the place of Mr. Usher, who was in office at the time.

The great duty of the time was to reestablish government, law, and order in the insurrectionary States. Congress was then in recess, and the sudden overthrow of the rebellion required speedy action. This grave subject had engaged the attention of Mr. Lincoln in the last days of his life, and the plan according to which it was to be managed had been prepared and was ready for adoption. A leading feature of that plan was that it should be carried out by the Executive authority, for, so far as I have been informed, neither Mr. Lincoln nor any member of his Cabinet doubted his authority to act or proposed to call an extra session of Congress to do the work. The first business transacted in Cabinet after I became President was this unfinished business of my predecessor. A plan or scheme of reconstruction was produced which had been prepared for Mr. Lincoln by Mr. Stanton, his Secretary of War. It was approved, and at the earliest moment practicable was applied in the form of a proclamation to the State of North Carolina, and afterwards became the basis of action in turn for the other States.

Upon the examination of Mr. Stanton before the Impeachment Committee he was asked the following question:

Did any one of the Cabinet express a doubt of the power of the executive branch of the Government to reorganize State governments which had been in rebellion without the aid of Congress?

He answered:

None whatever. I had myself entertained no doubt of the authority of the President to take measures for the organization of the rebel States on the plan proposed during the vacation of Congress and agreed in the plan specified in the proclamation in the case of North Carolina.

There is perhaps no act of my Administration for which I have been more denounced than this. It was not originated by me, but I shrink from no responsibility on that account, for the plan approved itself to my own judgment, and I did not hesitate to carry it into execution.

Thus far and upon this vital policy there was perfect accord between the Cabinet and myself, and I saw no necessity for a change. As time passed on there was developed an unfortunate difference of opinion and of policy between Congress and the President upon this same subject and upon the ultimate basis upon which the reconstruction of these States should proceed, especially upon the question of negro suffrage. Upon this point three members of the Cabinet found themselves to be in sympathy with Congress. They remained only long enough to see that the difference of policy could not be reconciled. They felt that they should remain no longer, and a high sense of duty and propriety constrained them to resign their positions. We parted with mutual respect for the sincerity of each other in opposite opinions, and mutual regret that the difference was on points so vital as to require a severance of official relations. This was in the summer of 1866. The subsequent sessions of Congress developed new complications, when the suffrage bill for the District of Columbia and the reconstruction acts of March 2 and March 23, 1867, all passed over the veto. It was in Cabinet consultations upon these bills that a difference of opinion upon the most vital points was developed. Upon these questions there was perfect accord between all the members of the Cabinet and myself, except Mr. Stanton. He stood alone, and the difference of opinion could not be reconciled. That unity of opinion which, upon great questions of public policy or administration, is so essential to the Executive was gone.

I do not claim that a head of Department should have no other opinions than those of the President. He has the same right, in the conscientious discharge of duty, to entertain and express his own opinions as has the President. What I do claim is that the President is the responsible head of the Administration, and when the opinions of a head of Department are irreconcilably opposed to those of the President in grave matters of policy and administration there is but one result which can solve the difficulty, and that is a severance of the official relation. This in the past history of the Government has always been the rule, and it is a wise one, for such differences of opinion among its members must impair the efficiency of any Administration.

I have now referred to the general grounds upon which the withdrawal of Mr. Stanton from my Administration seemed to me to be proper and

necessary, but I can not omit to state a special ground, which, if it stood alone, would vindicate my action.

The sanguinary riot which occurred in the city of New Orleans on the 30th of August, 1866, justly aroused public indignation and public inquiry, not only as to those who were engaged in it, but as to those who, more or less remotely, might be held to responsibility for its occurrence. I need not remind the Senate of the effort made to fix that responsibility on the President. The charge was openly made, and again and again reiterated all through the land, that the President was warned in time, but refused to interfere.

By telegrams from the lieutenant-governor and attorney-general of Louisiana, dated the 27th and 28th of August, I was advised that a body of delegates claiming to be a constitutional convention were about to assemble in New Orleans; that the matter was before the grand jury, but that it would be impossible to execute civil process without a riot; and this question was asked:

> Is the military to interfere to prevent process of court?

This question was asked at a time when the civil courts were in the full exercise of their authority, and the answer sent by telegraph on the same 28th of August was this:

> The military will be expected to sustain, and not to interfere with, the proceedings of the courts.

On the same 28th of August the following telegram was sent to Mr. Stanton by Major-General Baird, then (owing to the absence of General Sheridan) in command of the military at New Orleans:

> Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
> *Secretary of War:*
>
> A convention has been called, with the sanction of Governor Wells, to meet here on Monday. The lieutenant-governor and city authorities think it unlawful, and propose to break it up by arresting the delegates. I have given no orders on the subject, but have warned the parties that I could not countenance or permit such action without instructions to that effect from the President. Please instruct me at once by telegraph.

The 28th of August was on Saturday. The next morning, the 29th, this dispatch was received by Mr. Stanton at his residence in this city. He took no action upon it, and neither sent instructions to General Baird himself nor presented it to me for such instructions. On the next day (Monday) the riot occurred. I never saw this dispatch from General Baird until some ten days or two weeks after the riot, when, upon my call for all the dispatches, with a view to their publication, Mr. Stanton sent it to me.

These facts all appear in the testimony of Mr. Stanton before the Judiciary Committee in the impeachment investigation.

On the 30th, the day of the riot, and after it was suppressed, General Baird wrote to Mr. Stanton a long letter, from which I make the following extract:

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that a very serious riot has occurred here to-day. I had not been applied to by the convention for protection, but the lieutenant-governor and the mayor had freely consulted with me, and I was so fully convinced that it was so strongly the intent of the city authorities to preserve the peace, in order to prevent military interference, that I did not regard an outbreak as a thing to be apprehended. The lieutenant-governor had assured me that even if a writ of arrest was issued by the court the sheriff would not attempt to serve it without my permission, and for to-day they designed to suspend it. I inclose herewith copies of my correspondence with the mayor and of a dispatch which the lieutenant-governor claims to have received from the President. I regret that no reply to my dispatch to you of Saturday has yet reached me. General Sheridan is still absent in Texas.

The dispatch of General Baird of the 28th asks for immediate instructions, and his letter of the 30th, after detailing the terrible riot which had just happened, ends with the expression of regret that the instructions which he asked for were not sent. It is not the fault or the error or the omission of the President that this military commander was left without instructions; but for all omissions, for all errors, for all failures to instruct when instruction might have averted this calamity, the President was openly and persistently held responsible. Instantly, without waiting for proof, the delinquency of the President was heralded in every form of utterance. Mr. Stanton knew then that the President was not responsible for this delinquency. The exculpation was in his power, but it was not given by him to the public, and only to the President in obedience to a requisition for all the dispatches.

No one regrets more than myself that General Baird's request was not brought to my notice. It is clear from his dispatch and letter that if the Secretary of War had given him proper instructions the riot which arose on the assembling of the convention would have been averted.

There may be those ready to say that I would have given no instructions even if the dispatch had reached me in time, but all must admit that I ought to have had the opportunity.

The following is the testimony given by Mr. Stanton before the impeachment investigation committee as to this dispatch:

Q. Referring to the dispatch of the 28th of July by General Baird, I ask you whether that dispatch on its receipt was communicated?

A. I received that dispatch on Sunday forenoon. I examined it carefully, and considered the question presented. I did not see that I could give any instructions different from the line of action which General Baird proposed, and made no answer to the dispatch.

Q. I see it stated that this was received at 10.20 p. m. Was that the hour at which it was received by you?

A. That is the date of its reception in the telegraph office Saturday night. I received it on Sunday forenoon at my residence. A copy of the dispatch was furnished to the President several days afterwards, along with all the other dispatches

and communications on that subject, but it was not furnished by me before that time. I suppose it may have been ten or fifteen days afterwards.

Q. The President himself being in correspondence with those parties upon the same subject, would it not have been proper to have advised him of the reception of that dispatch?

A. I know nothing about his correspondence, and know nothing about any correspondence except this one dispatch. We had intelligence of the riot on Thursday morning. The riot had taken place on Monday.

It is a difficult matter to define all the relations which exist between the heads of Departments and the President. The legal relations are well enough defined. The Constitution places these officers in the relation of his advisers when he calls upon them for advice. The acts of Congress go further. Take, for example, the act of 1789 creating the War Department. It provides that—

> There shall be a principal officer therein to be called the Secretary for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the President of the United States; and, furthermore, the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said Department in such manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order and instruct.

Provision is also made for the appointment of an inferior officer by the head of the Department, to be called the chief clerk, "who, whenever said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States," shall have the charge and custody of the books, records, and papers of the Department.

The legal relation is analogous to that of principal and agent. It is the President upon whom the Constitution devolves, as head of the executive department, the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed; but as he can not execute them in person, he is allowed to select his agents, and is made responsible for their acts within just limits. So complete is this presumed delegation of authority in the relation of a head of Department to the President that the Supreme Court of the United States have decided that an order made by a head of Department is presumed to be made by the President himself.

The principal, upon whom such responsibility is placed for the acts of a subordinate, ought to be left as free as possible in the matter of selection and of dismissal. To hold him to responsibility for an officer beyond his control; to leave the question of the fitness of such an agent to be decided *for* him and not *by* him; to allow such a subordinate, when the President, moved by "public considerations of a high character," requests his resignation, to assume for himself an equal right to act upon his own views of "public considerations" and to make his own conclusions paramount to those of the President—to allow all this is to reverse the just order of administration and to place the subordinate above the superior.

There are, however, other relations between the President and a head of Department beyond these defined legal relations, which necessarily attend

them, though not expressed. Chief among these is mutual confidence. This relation is so delicate that it is sometimes hard to say when or how it ceases. A single flagrant act may end it at once, and then there is no difficulty. But confidence may be just as effectually destroyed by a series of causes too subtle for demonstration. As it is a plant of slow growth, so, too, it may be slow in decay. Such has been the process here. I will not pretend to say what acts or omissions have broken up this relation. They are hardly susceptible of statement, and still less of formal proof. Nevertheless, no one can read the correspondence of the 5th of August without being convinced that this relation was effectually gone on both sides, and that while the President was unwilling to allow Mr. Stanton to remain in his Administration, Mr. Stanton was equally unwilling to allow the President to carry on his Administration without his presence.

In the great debate which took place in the House of Representatives in 1789, in the first organization of the principal Departments, Mr. Madison spoke as follows:

> It is evidently the intention of the Constitution that the first magistrate should be responsible for the executive department. So far, therefore, as we do not make the officers who are to aid him in the duties of that department responsible to him, he is not responsible to the country. Again: Is there no danger that an officer, when he is appointed by the concurrence of the Senate and has friends in that body, may choose rather to risk his establishment on the favor of that branch than rest it upon the discharge of his duties to the satisfaction of the executive branch, which is constitutionally authorized to inspect and control his conduct? And if it should happen that the officers connect themselves with the Senate, they may mutually support each other, and for want of efficacy reduce the power of the President to a mere vapor, in which case his responsibility would be annihilated, and the expectation of it is unjust. The high executive officers, joined in cabal with the Senate, would lay the foundation of discord, and end in an assumption of the executive power only to be removed by a revolution in the Government.

Mr. Sedgwick, in the same debate, referring to the proposition that a head of Department should only be removed or suspended by the concurrence of the Senate, used this language:

> But if proof be necessary, what is then the consequence? Why, in nine cases out of ten, where the case is very clear to the mind of the President that the man ought to be removed, the effect can not be produced, because it is absolutely impossible to produce the necessary evidence. Are the Senate to proceed without evidence? Some gentlemen contend not. Then the object will be lost. Shall a man under these circumstances be saddled upon the President who has been appointed for no other purpose but to aid the President in performing certain duties? Shall he be continued, I ask again, against the will of the President? If he is, where is the responsibility? Are you to look for it in the President, who has no control over the officer, no power to remove him if he acts unfeelingly or unfaithfully? Without you make him responsible you weaken and destroy the strength and beauty of your system. What is to be done in cases which can only be known from a long acquaintance with the conduct of an officer?

I had indulged the hope that upon the assembling of Congress Mr. Stanton would have ended this unpleasant complication according to his

intimation given in his note of August 12. The duty which I have felt myself called upon to perform was by no means agreeable, but I feel that I am not responsible for the controversy or for the consequences.

Unpleasant as this necessary change in my Cabinet has been to me upon personal considerations, I have the consolation to be assured that so far as the public interests are involved there is no cause for regret.

Salutary reforms have been introduced by the Secretary *ad interim*, and great reductions of expenses have been effected under his administration of the War Department, to the saving of millions to the Treasury.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 14, 1867.*

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, I transmit herewith a copy of the papers relating to the trial by a military commission of Albert M. D. C. Lusk, of Louisiana. No action in the case has yet been taken by the President.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 17, 1867.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit for the information of the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary of State, with an accompanying paper.*

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 17, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 6th instant, concerning the International Monetary Conference held at Paris in June last, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 17, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate, an agreement between the diplomatic representatives of certain foreign powers in Japan, including the minister of the United States, on the one part, and plenipotentiaries on the part of the Japanese Government, relative to the settlement of Yokohama.

* Report of George H. Sharpe relative to the assassination of President Lincoln and the attempted assassination of Secretary Seward.

This instrument can not be legally binding upon the United States unless sanctioned by the Senate. There appears to be no objection to its approval.

A copy of General Van Valkenburgh's dispatch to the Secretary of State, by which the agreement was accompanied, and of the map to which it refers, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 18, 1867.*

Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives:

An official copy of the order issued by Major-General Winfield S. Hancock, commander of the Fifth Military District, dated headquarters in New Orleans, La., on the 29th day of November, has reached me through the regular channels of the War Department, and I herewith communicate it to Congress for such action as may seem to be proper in view of all the circumstances.

It will be perceived that General Hancock announces that he will make the law the rule of his conduct; that he will uphold the courts and other civil authorities in the performance of their proper duties, and that he will use his military power only to preserve the peace and enforce the law. He declares very explicitly that the sacred right of the trial by jury and the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be crushed out or trodden under foot. He goes further, and in one comprehensive sentence asserts that the principles of American liberty are still the inheritance of this people and ever should be.

When a great soldier, with unrestricted power in his hands to oppress his fellow-men, voluntarily foregoes the chance of gratifying his selfish ambition and devotes himself to the duty of building up the liberties and strengthening the laws of his country, he presents an example of the highest public virtue that human nature is capable of practicing. The strongest claim of Washington to be "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen" is founded on the great fact that in all his illustrious career he scrupulously abstained from violating the legal and constitutional rights of his fellow-citizens. When he surrendered his commission to Congress, the President of that body spoke his highest praise in saying that he had "always regarded the rights of the civil authorities through all dangers and disasters." Whenever power above the law courted his acceptance, he calmly put the temptation aside. By such magnanimous acts of forbearance he won the universal admiration of mankind and left a name which has no rival in the history of the world.

I am far from saying that General Hancock is the only officer of the American Army who is influenced by the example of Washington. Doubtless thousands of them are faithfully devoted to the principles for which the men of the Revolution laid down their lives. But the distinguished honor belongs to him of being the first officer in high command

south of the Potomac, since the close of the civil war, who has given utterance to these noble sentiments in the form of a military order.

I respectfully suggest to Congress that some public recognition of General Hancock's patriotic conduct is due, if not to him, to the friends of law and justice throughout the country. Of such an act as his at such a time it is but fit that the dignity should be vindicated and the virtue proclaimed, so that its value as an example may not be lost to the nation.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 19, 1867.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to a resolution of that body of the 16th instant, a report* from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 20, 1867.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I herewith transmit to Congress a report, dated the 20th instant, with the accompanying papers, received from the Secretary of State in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "An act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the United States," approved August 18, 1856.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 31, 1867.*

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th instant, requesting information concerning alleged interference by Russian naval vessels with whaling vessels of the United States, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers referred to therein.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 6, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, containing the information requested in their resolution of the 16th ultimo, relative to the amount of United States bonds issued to the Union Pacific Railroad Company and each of its branches, including the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

*Relating to the removal of Governor Ballard, of the Territory of Idaho.

WASHINGTON, *January 7, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of yesterday, making inquiry how many and what State legislatures have ratified the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as the fourteenth article.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 7, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

A Spanish steamer named *Nuestra Señora* being in the harbor of Port Royal, S. C., on the 1st of December, 1861, Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman, who was in command of the United States forces there, received information which he supposed justified him in seizing her, as she was on her way from Charleston to Havana with insurgent correspondence on board. The seizure was made accordingly, and during the ensuing spring the vessel was sent to New York, in order that the legality of the seizure might be tried.

By a decree of June 20, 1863, Judge Betts ordered the vessel to be restored, and by a subsequent decree, of October 15, 1863, he referred the adjustment of damages to amicable negotiations between the two Governments.

While the proceeding in admiralty was pending, the vessel was appraised and taken by the Navy Department at the valuation of $28,000, which sum that Department paid into the Treasury.

As the amount of this valuation can not legally be drawn from the Treasury without authority from Congress, I recommend an appropriation for that purpose.

It is proposed to appoint a commissioner on the part of this Government to adjust, informally in this case, with a similar commissioner on the part of Spain, the question of damages, the commissioners to name an arbiter for points upon which they may disagree. When the amount of the damages shall thus have been ascertained, application will be made to Congress for a further appropriation toward paying them.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 14, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of War *ad interim*, with the accompanying papers, prepared in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of March 15, 1867, requesting information in reference to contracts for ordnance projectiles and small arms.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 14, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith the report made by the commissioners appointed under the act of Congress approved on the 20th day of July, 1867, entitled "An act to establish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes," together with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 14, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of yesterday, calling for information relating to the appointment of the American minister at Pekin to a diplomatic or other mission on behalf of the Chinese Government by the Emperor of China, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State upon the subject, together with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON CITY, *January 14, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, the following treaties, concluded at "Medicine Lodge Creek," Kansas, between the Indian tribes therein named and the United States, by their commissioners appointed by the act of Congress approved July 20, 1867, entitled "An act to establish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes," viz:

A treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche tribes, concluded October 21, 1867.

A treaty with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes, concluded October 28, 1867.

A treaty with the Arapahoe and Cheyenne tribes, dated October 28, 1867.

A letter of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting said treaties, is herewith inclosed.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 17, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

With reference to the convention between the United States and Denmark for the cession of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John, in the West Indies, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State on the subject of the vote of St. Thomas on the question of accepting the cession.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 23, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the request of the Senate of yesterday, I return herewith their resolution of the 21st instant, calling for information in reference to James A. Seddon, late Secretary of War of the so-called Confederate States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I have received the following preamble and resolution, adopted by the Senate on the 8th instant:

> Whereas Senate bill No. 141, and entitled "An act for the further security of equal rights in the District of Columbia," having at this present session passed both Houses of Congress, was afterwards, on the 11th day of December, 1867, duly presented to the President of the United States for his approval and signature; and
>
> Whereas more than ten days, exclusive of Sundays, have since elapsed in this session without said bill having been returned, either approved or disapproved: Therefore,
>
> *Resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to inform the Senate whether said bill has been delivered to and received by the Secretary of State, as provided by the second section of the act of the 27th day of July, 1789.

As the act which the resolution mentions has no relevancy to the subject under inquiry, it is presumed that it was the intention of the Senate to refer to the law of the 15th September, 1789, the second section of which prescribes—

> That whenever a bill, order, resolution, or vote of the Senate and House of Representatives, having been approved and signed by the President of the United States, or not having been returned by him with his objections, shall become a law or take effect, it shall forthwith thereafter be received by the said Secretary from the President; and whenever a bill, order, resolution, or vote shall be returned by the President with his objections, and shall, on being reconsidered, be agreed to be passed, and be approved by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and thereby become a law or take effect, it shall in such case be received by the said Secretary from the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in whichsoever House it shall last have been so approved.

Inasmuch as the bill "for the further security of equal rights in the District of Columbia" has not become a law in either of the modes designated in the section above quoted, it has not been delivered to the Secretary of State for record and promulgation. The Constitution expressly declares that—

> If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

As stated in the preamble to the resolution, the bill to which it refers was presented for my approval on the 11th day of December, 1867. On

the 20th of same month, and before the expiration of the ten days after the presentation of the bill to the President, the two Houses, in accordance with a concurrent resolution adopted on the 3d [13th] of December, adjourned until the 6th of January, 1868. Congress by their adjournment thus prevented the return of the bill within the time prescribed by the Constitution, and it was therefore left in the precise condition in which that instrument positively declares a bill "shall not be a law."

If the adjournment in December did not cause the failure of this bill, because not such an adjournment as is contemplated by the Constitution in the clause which I have cited, it must follow that such was the nature of the adjournments during the past year, on the 30th day of March until the first Wednesday of July and from the 20th of July until the 21st of November. Other bills will therefore be affected by the decision which may be rendered in this case, among them one having the same title as that named in the resolution, and containing similar provisions, which, passed by both Houses in the month of July last, failed to become a law by reason of the adjournment of Congress before ten days for its consideration had been allowed the Executive.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 27, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 22d instant, calling for a copy of the report of Abram S. Hewitt, commissioner of the United States to the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1867, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompany it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 27, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the documents to which it refers, in relation to the formal transfer of territory from Russia to the United States in accordance with the treaty of the 30th of March last.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to its ratification, an additional article to the treaty of navigation and commerce with Russia of the 18th of December, 1832, which additional article was concluded and signed between the plenipotentiaries of the two Governments at Washington on the 27th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 3, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, suggesting the necessity for a further appropriation toward defraying the expense of employing copying clerks, with a view to enable his Department seasonably to answer certain calls for information.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 3, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 27th ultimo, directing the Secretary of State to furnish information in regard to the trial of John H. Surratt, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 3, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report* from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 28th of January.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 10, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, relative to depredations upon and the future care of the reservations of lands for the "purpose of supplying timber for the Navy of the United States."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 10, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 1st instant, I transmit herewith a report from the Postmaster-General, in reference to the appointment of a special agent to take charge of the post-office at Penn Yan, in the State of New York.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 10, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with the accompanying papers, on the subject of a transfer of the Peninsula and Bay of

*Relating to the famine in Sweden and Norway.

Samana to the United States. The advice and consent of the Senate to the transfer, upon the terms proposed in the draft of a convention with the Dominican Republic, are requested.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 10, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I submit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, the accompanying consular convention between the United States and the Govenrment of His Majesty the King of Italy.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 10, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 30th ultimo, requesting information as to the number of justices of the peace now in commission in each ward, respectively, of the city of Washington.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 10, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the two years last past, I transmit a partial report from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a portion of the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 11, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution adopted yesterday by the House of Representatives, requesting any further correspondence the President "may have had with General U. S. Grant, in addition to that heretofore submitted, on the subject of the recent vacation by the latter of the War Office," I transmit herewith a copy of a communication addressed to General Grant on the 10th instant, together with a copy of the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *February 10, 1868.*

General U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: The extraordinary character of your letter of the 3d instant * would seem to preclude any reply on my part; but the manner in which publicity has been given to the correspondence of which that letter forms a part and the grave questions which are involved induce me to take this mode of giving, as a proper sequel to the communications which have passed between us, the statements of the five members of the Cabinet who were present on the occasion of our conversation on the 14th ultimo. Copies of the letters which they have addressed to me upon the subject are accordingly herewith inclosed.

You speak of my letter of the 31st ultimo † as a reiteration of the "many and gross misrepresentations" contained in certain newspaper articles, and reassert the correctness of the statements contained in your communication of the 28th ultimo,‡ adding—and here I give your own words—"anything in yours in reply to it to the contrary notwithstanding."

When a controversy upon matters of fact reaches the point to which this has been brought, further assertion or denial between the immediate parties should cease, especially where upon either side it loses the character of the respectful discussion which is required by the relations in which the parties stand to each other and degenerates in tone and temper. In such a case, if there is nothing to rely upon but the opposing statements, conclusions must be drawn from those statements alone and from whatever intrinsic probabilities they afford in favor of or against either of the parties. I should not shrink from this test in this controversy; but, fortunately, it is not left to this test alone. There were five Cabinet officers present at the conversation the detail of which in my letter of the 28th [31st †] ultimo you allow yourself to say contains "many and gross misrepresentations." These gentlemen heard that conversation and have read my statement. They speak for themselves, and I leave the proof without a word of comment.

I deem it proper before concluding this communication to notice some of the statements contained in your letter.

You say that a performance of the promises alleged to have been made by you to the President "would have involved a resistance to law and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton." You then state that you had fears the President would, on the removal of Mr. Stanton, appoint someone in his place who would embarrass the Army in carrying out the reconstruction acts, and add:

"It was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the office of Secretary of War *ad interim*, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by withholding it from him in opposition to law, or, not doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would, as the statements and assumptions in your communication plainly indicate was sought."

First of all, you here admit that from the very beginning of what you term "the whole history" of your connection with Mr. Stanton's suspension you intended to circumvent the President. It was to carry out that intent that you accepted the appointment. This was in your mind at the time of your acceptance. It was not, then, in obedience to the order of your superior, as has heretofore been supposed, that you assumed the duties of the office. You knew it was the President's purpose to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming the office of Secretary of War, and you intended to defeat that purpose. You accepted the office, not in the interest of the President, but of Mr. Stanton.—If this purpose, so entertained by you, had been confined to yourself; if when accepting the office you had done so with a mental reservation to frustrate the President, it would have been a tacit deception. In the ethics of

* See pp. 618–620. † See pp. 615–618. ‡ See pp. 613–615.

some persons such a course is allowable. But you can not stand even upon that questionable ground. The "history" of your connection with this transaction, as written by yourself, places you in a different predicament, and shows that you not only concealed your design from the President, but induced him to suppose that you would carry out his purpose to keep Mr. Stanton out of office by retaining it yourself after an attempted restoration by the Senate, so as to require Mr. Stanton to establish his right by judicial decision.

I now give that part of this "history" as written by yourself in your letter of the 28th ultimo:*

"Some time after I assumed the duties of Secretary of War *ad interim* the President asked me my views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue, in case the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to obtain possession of his office. My reply was, in substance, that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, illustrating my position by citing the ground I had taken in the case of the Baltimore police commissioners."

Now, at that time, as you admit in your letter of the 3d instant,† you held the office for the very object of defeating an appeal to the courts. In that letter you say that in accepting the office one motive was to prevent the President from appointing some other person who would retain possession, and thus make judicial proceedings necessary. You knew the President was unwilling to trust the office with anyone who would not by holding it compel Mr. Stanton to resort to the courts. You perfectly understood that in this interview, "some time" after you accepted the office, the President, not content with your silence, desired an expression of your views, and you answered him that Mr. Stanton "would have to appeal to the courts." If the President reposed confidence *before* he knew your views, and that confidence had been violated, it might have been said he made a mistake; but a violation of confidence reposed *after* that conversation was no mistake of his nor of yours. It is the fact only that needs be stated, that at the date of this conversation you did not intend to hold the office with the purpose of forcing Mr. Stanton into court, but did hold it then and had accepted it to prevent that course from being carried out. In other words, you said to the President, "That is the proper course," and you said to yourself, "I have accepted this office, and now hold it to defeat that course." The excuse you make in a subsequent paragraph of that letter of the 28th ultimo,* that afterwards you changed your views as to what would be a proper course, has nothing to do with the point now under consideration. The point is that *before* you changed your views you had secretly determined to do the very thing which at last you did—surrender the office to Mr. Stanton. You may have changed your views as to the law, but you certainly did not change your views as to the course you had marked out for yourself from the beginning.

I will only notice one more statement in your letter of the 3d instant †—that the performance of the promises which it is alleged were made by you would have involved you in the resistance of law. I know of no statute that would have been violated had you, carrying out your promises in good faith, tendered your resignation when you concluded not to be made a party in any legal proceedings. You add:

"I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion by your recent orders directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War, *my superior* and your subordinate, without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am to disobey."

On the 24th‡ ultimo you addressed a note to the President requesting in writing an order given to you verbally five days before to disregard orders from Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War until you "knew from the President himself that they were his orders."

On the 29th,§ in compliance with your request, I did give you instructions in writing "not to obey any order from the War Department assumed to be issued by the

*See pp. 613–615. †See pp. 618–620. ‡See p. 613. §See p. 615.

direction of the President unless such order is known by the General Commanding the armies of the United States to have been authorized by the Executive."

There are some orders which a Secretary of War may issue without the authority of the President; there are others which he issues simply as the agent of the President, and which purport to be "by direction" of the President. For such orders the President is responsible, and he should therefore know and understand what they are before giving such "direction." Mr. Stanton states in his letter of the 4th instant,* which accompanies the published correspondence, that he "has had no correspondence with the President since the 12th of August last;" and he further says that since he resumed the duties of the office he has continued to discharge them "without any personal or written communication with the President;" and he adds, "No orders have been issued from this Department in the name of the President with my knowledge, and I have received no orders from him."

It thus seems that Mr. Stanton now discharges the duties of the War Department without any reference to the President and without using his name.

My order to you had only reference to orders "assumed to be issued by the direction of the President." It would appear from Mr. Stanton's letter that you have received no such orders from him. However, in your note to the President of the 30th ultimo,† in which you acknowledge the receipt of the written order of the 29th,† you say that you have been informed by Mr. Stanton that he has not received any order limiting his authority to issue orders to the Army, according to the practice of the Department, and state that "while this authority to the War Department is not countermanded it will be satisfactory evidence to me that any orders issued from the War Department by direction of the President are authorized by the Executive."

The President issues an order to you to obey no order from the War Department purporting to be made "by the direction of the President" until you have referred it to him for his approval. You reply that you have received the President's order and will not obey it, but will obey an order purporting to be given by his direction *if it comes from the War Department.* You will not obey the direct order of the President, but will obey his indirect order. If, as you say, there has been a practice in the War Department to issue orders in the name of the President without his direction, does not the precise order you have requested and have received change the practice as to the General of the Army? Could not the President countermand any such order issued to you from the War Department? If you should receive an order from that Department, issued in the name of the President, to do a special act, and an order directly from the President himself not to do the act, is there a doubt which you are to obey? You answer the question when you say to the President, in your letter of the 3d instant,‡ the Secretary of War is "my superior and your subordinate," and yet you refuse obedience to the superior out of a deference to the subordinate.

Without further comment upon the insubordinate attitude which you have assumed, I am at a loss to know how you can relieve yourself from obedience to the orders of the President, who is made by the Constitution the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and is therefore the official superior as well of the General of the Army as of the Secretary of War.

Respectfully, yours, ANDREW JOHNSON.

[Letter addressed to each of the members of the Cabinet present at the conversation between the President and General Grant on the 14th of January, 1868, and answers thereto.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, D. C., February 5, 1868.*

SIR: The Chronicle of this morning contains a correspondence between the President and General Grant reported from the War Department in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives.

* See pp. 612–613. † See p. 615. ‡ See pp. 618–620.

I beg to call your attention to that correspondence, and especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, and to request you to state what was said in that conversation.

Very respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 5, 1868.*

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: Your note of this date was handed to me this evening. My recollection of the conversation at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, corresponds with your statement of it in the letter of the 31st ultimo* in the published correspondence.

The three points specified in that letter, giving your recollection of the conversation, are correctly stated.

Very respectfully,

GIDEON WELLES.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *February 6, 1868.*

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: I have received your note of the 5th instant, calling my attention to the correspondence between yourself and General Grant as published in the Chronicle of yesterday, especially to that part of it which relates to what occurred at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th ultimo, and requesting me to state what was said in the conversation referred to.

I can not undertake to state the precise language used, bnt I have no hesitation in saying that your account of that conversation as given in your letter to General Grant under date of the 31st ultimo* substantially and in all important particulars accords with my recollection of it.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

HUGH McCULLOCH.

POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 6, 1868.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 5th of February, calling my attention to the correspondence published in the Chronicle between the President and General Grant, and especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, with a request that I state what was said in that conversation.

In reply I have the honor to state that I have read carefully the correspondence in question, and particularly the letter of the President to General Grant dated January 31, 1868.* The following extract from your letter of the 31st January to General Grant is, according to my recollection, a correct statement of the conversation that took place between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January last. In the presence of the Cabinet the President asked General Grant whether, "in conversation which took place after his appointment as Secretary of War *ad interim*, he did not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide any judicial proceedings that might follow the nonconcurrence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension, or, should he wish not to become involved in such a controversy, to put the President in the same position with respect to the office as he occupied previous to General Grant's appointment, by returning

*See pp. 615-618.

it to the President in time to anticipate such action by the Senate." This General Grant admitted.

The President then asked General Grant if at the conference on the preceding Saturday he had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested General Grant to state what he intended to do, and, further, if in reply to that inquiry he (General Grant) had not referred to their former conversations, saying that from them the President understood his position, and that his (General Grant's) action would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached.

To these questions General Grant replied in the affirmative.

The President asked General Grant if at the conclusion of their interview on Saturday it was not understood that they were to have another conference on Monday before final action by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton.

General Grant replied that such was the understanding, but that he did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday he had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman, and was occupied with "many little matters," and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day.

I take this mode of complying with the request contained in the President's letter to me, because my attention had been called to the subject before, when the conversation between the President and General Grant was under consideration.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. W. RANDALL,
Postmaster-General.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D. C., February 6, 1868.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: I am in receipt of yours of yesterday, calling my attention to a correspondence between yourself and General Grant published in the Chronicle newspaper, and especially to that part of said correspondence "which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January," and requesting me "to state what was said in that conversation."

In reply I submit the following statement: At the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, 1868, General Grant appeared and took his accustomed seat at the board. When he had been reached in the order of business, the President asked him, as usual, if he had anything to present.

In reply the General, after referring to a note which he had that morning addressed to the President, inclosing a copy of the resolution of the Senate refusing to concur in the reasons for the suspension of Mr. Stanton, proceeded to say that he regarded his duties as Secretary of War *ad interim* terminated by that resolution, and that he could not lawfully exercise such duties for a moment after the adoption of the resolution by the Senate; that the resolution reached him last night, and that this morning he had gone to the War Department, entered the Secretary's room, bolted one door on the inside, locked the other on the outside, delivered the key to the Adjutant-General, and proceeded to the Headquarters of the Army and addressed the note above mentioned to the President, informing him that he (General Grant) was no longer Secretary of War *ad interim*.

The President expressed great surprise at the course which General Grant had thought proper to pursue, and, addressing himself to the General, proceeded to say, in substance, that he had anticipated such action on the part of the Senate, and, being very desirous to have the constitutionality of the tenure-of-office bill tested and his right to suspend or remove a member of the Cabinet decided by the judicial tribunals of the country, he had some time ago, and shortly after General Grant's appointment as Secretary of War *ad interim*, asked the General what his action would be in the event that the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension of

Mr. Stanton, and that the General had then agreed either to remain at the head of the War Department till a decision could be obtained from the court or resign the office into the hands of the President before the case was acted upon by the Senate, so as to place the President in the same situation he occupied at the time of his (Grant's) appointment.

The President further said that the conversation was renewed on the preceding Saturday, at which time he asked the General what he intended to do if the Senate should undertake to reinstate Mr. Stanton, in reply to which the General referred to their former conversation upon the same subject and said: "You understand my position, and my conduct will be conformable to that understanding;" that he (the General) then expressed a repugnance to being made a party to a judicial proceeding, saying that he would expose himself to fine and imprisonment by doing so, as his continuing to discharge the duties of Secretary of War *ad interim* after the Senate should have refused to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton would be a violation of the tenure-of-office bill; that in reply to this he (the President) informed General Grant he had not suspended Mr. Stanton under the tenure-of-office bill, but by virtue of the powers conferred on him by the Constitution; and that, as to the fine and imprisonment, he (the President) would pay whatever fine was imposed and submit to whatever imprisonment might be adjudged against him (the General); that they continued the conversation for some time, discussing the law at length, and that they finally separated without having reached a definite conclusion, and with the understanding that the General would see the President again on Monday.

In reply General Grant admitted that the conversations had occurred, and said that at the first conversation he had given it as his opinion to the President that in the event of nonconcurrence by the Senate in the action of the President in respect to the Secretary of War the question would have to be decided by the court—that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the court to reinstate him in office; that the *ins* would remain in till they could be displaced and the *outs* put in by legal proceedings; and that he *then* thought so, and had agreed that if he should change his mind he would notify the President in time to enable him to make another appointment, but that at the time of the first conversation he had not looked very closely into the law; that it had recently been discussed by the newspapers, and that this had induced him to examine it more carefully, and that he had come to the conclusion that if the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension Mr. Stanton would thereby be reinstated, and that he (Grant) could not continue thereafter to act as Secretary of War *ad interim* without subjecting himself to fine and imprisonment, and that he came over on Saturday to inform the President of this change in his views, and did so inform him; that the President replied that he had not suspended Mr. Stanton under the tenure-of-office bill, but under the Constitution, and had appointed him (Grant) by virtue of the authority derived from the Constitution, etc.; that they continued to discuss the matter some time, and finally he left, without any conclusion having been reached, expecting to see the President again on Monday.

He then proceeded to explain why he had not called on the President on Monday, saying that he had had a long interview with General Sherman, that various little matters had occupied his time till it was late, and that he did not think the Senate would act so soon, and asked: "Did not General Sherman call on you on Monday?"

I do not know what passed between the President and General Grant on Saturday, except as I learned it from the conversation between them at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, and the foregoing is substantially what then occurred. The precise words used on the occasion are not, of course, given exactly in the order in which they were spoken, but the ideas expressed and the facts stated are faithfully preserved and presented.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

O. H. BROWNING.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 6, 1868.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: The meeting to which you refer in your letter was a regular Cabinet meeting. While the members were assembling, and before the President had entered the council chamber, General Grant on coming in said to me that he was in attendance there, not as a member of the Cabinet, but upon invitation, and I replied by the inquiry whether there was a change in the War Department. After the President had taken his seat, business went on in the usual way of hearing matters submitted by the several Secretaries. When the time came for the Secretary of War, General Grant said that he was now there, not as Secretary of War, but upon the President's invitation; that he had retired from the War Department. A slight difference then appeared about the supposed invitation, General Grant saying that the officer who had borne his letter to the President that morning announcing his retirement from the War Department had told him that the President desired to see him at the Cabinet, to which the President answered that when General Grant's communication was delivered to him the President simply replied that he supposed General Grant would be very soon at the Cabinet meeting. I regarded the conversation thus begun as an incidental one. It went on quite informally, and consisted of a statement on your part of your views in regard to the understanding of the tenure upon which General Grant had assented to hold the War Department *ad interim* and of his replies by way of answer and explanation. It was respectful and courteous on both sides. Being in this conversational form, its details could only have been preserved by verbatim report. So far as I know, no such report was made at the time. I can give only the general effect of the conversation. Certainly you stated that, although you had reported the reasons for Mr. Stanton's suspension to the Senate, you nevertheless held that he would not be entitled to resume the office of Secretary of War even if the Senate should disapprove of his suspension, and that you had proposed to have the question tested by judicial process, to be applied to the person who should be the incumbent of the Department under your designation of Secretary of War *ad interim* in the place of Mr. Stanton. You contended that this was well understood between yourself and General Grant; that when he entered the War Department as Secretary *ad interim* he expressed his concurrence in a belief that the question of Mr. Stanton's restoration would be a question for the courts; that in a subsequent conversation with General Grant you had adverted to the understanding thus had, and that General Grant expressed his concurrence in it; that at some conversation which had been previously held General Grant said he still adhered to the same construction of the law, but said if he should change his opinion he would give you seasonable notice of it, so that you should in any case be placed in the same position in regard to the War Department that you were while General Grant held it *ad interim*. I did not understand General Grant as denying nor as explicitly admitting these statements in the form and full extent to which you made them. His admission of them was rather indirect and circumstantial, though I did not understand it to be an evasive one. He said that, reasoning from what occurred in the case of the police in Maryland, which he regarded as a parallel one, he was of opinion, and so assured you, that it would be his right and duty under your instructions to hold the War Office after the Senate should disapprove of Mr. Stanton's suspension until the question should be decided upon by the courts; that he remained until very recently of that opinion, and that on the Saturday before the Cabinet meeting a conversation was held between yourself and him in which the subject was generally discussed.

General Grant's statement was that in that conversation he had stated to you the legal difficulties which might arise, involving fine and imprisonment, under the civil-tenure bill, and that he did not care to subject himself to those penalties; that you replied to this remark that you regarded the civil-tenure bill as unconstitutional

and did not think its penalties were to be feared, or that you would voluntarily assume them; and you insisted that General Grant should either retain the office until relieved by yourself, according to what you claimed was the original understanding between yourself and him, or, by seasonable notice of change of purpose on his part, put you in the same situation which you would be if he adhered. You claimed that General Grant finally said in that Saturday's conversation that you understood his views, and his proceedings thereafter would be consistent with what had been so understood. General Grant did not controvert, nor can I say that he admitted, this last statement. Certainly General Grant did not at any time in the Cabinet meeting insist that he had in the Saturday's conversation, either distinctly or finally, advised you of his determination to retire from the charge of the War Department otherwise than under your own subsequent direction. He acquiesced in your statement that the Saturday's conversation ended with an expectation that there would be a subsequent conference on the subject, which he, as well as yourself, supposed could seasonably take place on Monday. You then alluded to the fact that General Grant did not call upon you on Monday, as you had expected from that conversation. General Grant admitted that it was his expectation or purpose to call upon you on Monday. General Grant assigned reasons for the omission. He said he was in conference with General Sherman; that there were many little matters to be attended to; he had conversed upon the matter of the incumbency of the War Department with General Sherman, and he expected that General Sherman would call upon you on Monday. My own mind suggested a further explanation, but I do not remember whether it was mentioned or not, namely, that it was not supposed by General Grant on Monday that the Senate would decide the question so promptly as to anticipate further explanation between yourself and him if delayed beyond that day. General Grant made another explanation—that he was engaged on Sunday with General Sherman, and I think, also, on Monday, in regard to the War Department matter, with a hope, though he did not say in an effort, to procure an amicable settlement of the affair of Mr. Stanton, and he still hoped that it would be brought about.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 11, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

The accompanying letter from General Grant, received since the transmission to the House of Representatives of my communication of this date, is submitted to the House as a part of the correspondence referred to in the resolution of the 10th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., February 11, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 10th instant,* accompanied by statements of five Cabinet ministers of their recollection of what occurred in Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January. Without admitting anything in these statements where they differ from anything heretofore stated by me, I propose to notice only that portion of your communication wherein I am charged with insubordination. I think it will be plain to the reader of my letter of

*See pp. 603–610.

the 30th of January * that I did not propose to disobey any legal order of the President distinctly given, but only gave an interpretation of what would be regarded as satisfactory evidence of the President's sanction to orders communicated by the Secretary of War. I will say here that your letter of the 10th instant † contains the first intimation I have had that you did not accept that interpretation.

Now for reasons for giving that interpretation. It was clear to me before my letter of January 30 * was written that I, the person having more public business to transact with the Secretary of War than any other of the President's subordinates, was the only one who had been instructed to disregard the authority of Mr. Stanton where his authority was derived as agent of the President.

On the 27th of January I received a letter from the Secretary of War (copy herewith) directing me to furnish escort to public treasure from the Rio Grande to New Orleans, etc., at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury to him. I also send two other inclosures, showing recognition of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War by both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster-General, in all of which cases the Secretary of War had to call upon me to make the orders requested or give the information desired, and where his authority to do so is derived, in my view, as agent of the President.

With an order so clearly ambiguous as that of the President here referred to, it was my duty to inform the President of my interpretation of it and to abide by that interpretation until I received other orders.

Disclaiming any intention, now or heretofore, of disobeying any legal order of the President distinctly communicated,

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 27, 1868.

General U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Army United States.

GENERAL: The Secretary of the Treasury has requested this Department to afford A. F. Randall, special agent of the Treasury Department, such military aid as may be necessary to secure and forward for deposit from Brownsville, Tex., to New Orleans public moneys in possession of custom-house officers at Brownsville, and which are deemed insecure at that place.

You will please give such directions as you may deem proper to the officer commanding at Brownsville to carry into effect the request of the Treasury Department, the instructions to be sent by telegraph to Galveston, to the care of A. F. Randall, special agent, who is at Galveston waiting telegraphic orders, there being no telegraphic communication with Brownsville, and the necessity for military protection to the public moneys represented as urgent.

Please favor me with a copy of such instructions as you may give, in order that they may be communicated to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Yours, truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT, CONTRACT OFFICE,
Washington, February 3, 1868.

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: It has been represented to this Department that in October last a military commission was appointed to settle upon some general plan of defense for the Texas frontiers, and that the said commission has made a report recommending a line of posts from the Rio Grande to the Red River.

* See p. 615. † See pp. 603-605.

An application is now pending in this Department for a change in the course of the San Antonio and El Paso mail, so as to send it by way of Forts Mason, Griffin, and Stockton instead of Camps Hudson and Lancaster. This application requires immediate decision, but before final action can be had thereon it is desired to have some official information as to the report of the commission above referred to.

Accordingly, I have the honor to request that you will cause this Department to be furnished as early as possible with the information desired in the premises, and also with a copy of the report, if any has been made by the commission.

Very respectfully, etc.,

GEO. W. McLELLAN,
Second Assistant Postmaster-General.

FEBRUARY 3, 1868.

Referred to the General of the Army for report.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *January 29, 1868.*

The Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: It is represented to this Department that a band of robbers has obtained such a foothold in the section of country between Humboldt and Lawrence, Kans., committing depredations upon travelers, both by public and private conveyance, that the safety of the public money collected by the receiver of the land office at Humboldt requires that it should be guarded during its transit from Humboldt to Lawrence. I have therefore the honor to request that the proper commanding officer of the district may be instructed by the War Department, if in the opinion of the honorable Secretary of War it can be done without prejudice to the public interests, to furnish a sufficient military guard to protect such moneys as may be *in transitu* from the above office for the purpose of being deposited to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States. As far as we are now advised, such service will not be necessary oftener than once a month. Will you please advise me of the action taken, that I may instruct the receiver and the Commissioner of the General Land Office in the matter?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. McCULLOCH,
Secretary of the Treasury.

Respectfully referred to the General of the Army to give the necessary orders in this case and to furnish this Department a copy for the information of the Secretary of the Treasury.

By order of the Secretary of War:

ED. SCHRIVER,
Inspector-General.

[The following are inserted because they have direct bearing on the two messages from the President of February 11, 1868, and their inclosures.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, February 4, 1868.

Hon. SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SIR: In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 3d instant, I transmit herewith copies furnished me by General Grant of correspondence between him and the President relating to the Secretary of War, and which he reports to be all the correspondence he has had with the President on the subject.

I have had no correspondence with the President since the 12th of August last.

After the action of the Senate on his alleged reason for my suspension from the office of Secretary of War, I resumed the duties of that office, as required by the act of Congress, and have continued to discharge them without any personal or written communication with the President. No orders have been issued from this Department in the name of the President with my knowledge, and I have received no orders from him.

The correspondence sent herewith embraces all the correspondence known to me on the subject referred to in the resolution of the House of Representatives.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, January 24, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor very respectfully to request to have in writing the order which the President gave me verbally on Sunday, the 19th instant, to disregard the orders of the Hon. E. M. Stanton as Secretary of War until I knew from the President himself that they were his orders.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *General.*

General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., January 28, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: On the 24th instant I requested you to give me in writing the instructions which you had previously given me verbally not to obey any order from Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, unless I knew that it came from yourself. To this written request I received a message that has left doubt in my mind of your intentions. To prevent any possible misunderstanding, therefore, I renew the request that you will give me written instructions, and till they are received will suspend action on your verbal ones.

I am compelled to ask these instructions in writing in consequence of the many and gross misrepresentations affecting my personal honor circulated through the press for the last fortnight, purporting to come from the President, of conversations which occurred either with the President privately in his office or in Cabinet meeting. What is written admits of no misunderstanding.

In view of the misrepresentations referred to, it will be well to state the facts in the case.

Some time after I assumed the duties of Secretary of War *ad interim* the President asked me my views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue, in case the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to obtain possession of his office. My reply was, in substance, that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, illustrating my position by citing the ground I had taken in the case of the Baltimore police commissioners.

In that case I did not doubt the technical right of Governor Swann to remove the old commissioners and to appoint their successors. As the old commissioners refused to give up, however, I contended that no resource was left but to appeal to the courts.

Finding that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office,

whether sustained in the suspension or not, I stated that I had not looked particularly into the tenure-of-office bill, but that what I had stated was a general principle, and if I should change my mind in this particular case I would inform him of the fact.

Subsequently, on reading the tenure-of-office bill closely, I found that I could not, without violation of the law, refuse to vacate the office of Secretary of War the moment Mr. Stanton was reinstated by the Senate, even though the President should order me to retain it, which he never did.

Taking this view of the subject, and learning on Saturday, the 11th instant, that the Senate had taken up the subject of Mr. Stanton's suspension, after some conversation with Lieutenant-General Sherman and some members of my staff, in which I stated that the law left me no discretion as to my action should Mr. Stanton be reinstated, and that I intended to inform the President, I went to the President for the sole purpose of making this decision known, and did so make it known.

In doing this I fulfilled the promise made in our last preceding conversation on the subject.

The President, however, instead of accepting my view of the requirements of the tenure-of-office bill, contended that he had suspended Mr. Stanton under the authority given by the Constitution, and that the same authority did not preclude him from reporting, as an act of courtesy, his reasons for the suspension to the Senate; that, having appointed me under the authority given by the Constitution, and not under any act of Congress, I could not be governed by the act. I stated that the law was binding on me, constitutional or not, until set aside by the proper tribunal. An hour or more was consumed, each reiterating his views on this subject, until, getting late, the President said he would see me again.

I did not agree to call again on Monday, nor at any other definite time, nor was I sent for by the President until the following Tuesday.

From the 11th to the Cabinet meeting on the 14th instant a doubt never entered my mind about the President's fully understanding my position, namely, that if the Senate refused to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton my powers as Secretary of War *ad interim* would cease and Mr. Stanton's right to resume at once the functions of his office would under the law be indisputable, and I acted accordingly. With Mr. Stanton I had no communication, direct nor indirect, on the subject of his reinstatement during his suspension.

I knew it had been recommended to the President to send in the name of Governor Cox, of Ohio, for Secretary of War, and thus save all embarrassment—a proposition that I sincerely hoped he would entertain favorably; General Sherman seeing the President at my particular request to urge this on the 13th instant.

On Tuesday (the day Mr. Stanton reentered the office of the Secretary of War) General Comstock, who had carried my official letter announcing that with Mr. Stanton's reinstatement by the Senate I had ceased to be Secretary of War *ad interim*, and who saw the President open and read the communication, brought back to me from the President a message that he wanted to see me that day at the Cabinet meeting, after I had made known the fact that I was no longer Secretary of War *ad interim*.

At this meeting, after opening it as though I were a member of the Cabinet, when reminded of the notification already given him that I was no longer Secretary of War *ad interim*, the President gave a version of the conversations alluded to already. In this statement it was asserted that in both conversations I had agreed to hold on to the office of Secretary of War until displaced by the courts, or resign, so as to place the President where he would have been had I never accepted the office. After hearing the President through, I stated our conversations substantially as given in this letter. I will add that my conversation before the Cabinet embraced other matter not pertinent here, and is therefore left out.

I in no wise admitted the correctness of the President's statement of our conversations, though, to soften the evident contradiction my statement gave, I said (alluding to our first conversation on the subject) the President might have understood me the way he said, namely, that I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstatement. I made no such promise.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
January 30, 1868.

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War for his information.

U. S. GRANT, *General.*

[Indorsement of the President on General Grant's note of January 24, 1868.*]

JANUARY 29, 1868.

As requested in this communication, General Grant is instructed in writing not to obey any order from the War Department assumed to be issued by the direction of the President unless such order is known by the General Commanding the armies of the United States to have been authorized by the Executive.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, January 30, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the return of my note of the 24th instant,* with your indorsement thereon, that I am not to obey any order from the War Department assumed to be issued by the direction of the President unless such order is known by me to have been authorized by the Executive, and in reply thereto to say that I am informed by the Secretary of War that he has not received from the Executive any order or instructions limiting or impairing his authority to issue orders to the Army, as has heretofore been his practice under the law and the customs of the Department. While this authority to the War Department is not countermanded it will be satisfactory evidence to me that any orders issued from the War Department by direction of the President are authorized by the Executive.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES,
January 30, 1868.

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War for his information.

U. S. GRANT, *General.*

The President to General Grant.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *January 31, 1868.*

General U. S. GRANT,
Commanding United States Armies.

GENERAL: I have received your communication of the 28th instant,† renewing your request of the 24th,* that I should repeat in a written form my verbal instructions of

*See p. 613. †See pp. 613–615.

the 19th instant, viz, that you obey no order from the Hon. Edwin M. Stanton as Secretary of War unless you have information that it was issued by the President's directions.

In submitting this request (with which I complied on the 29th instant*) you take occasion to allude to recent publications in reference to the circumstances connected with the vacation by yourself of the office of Secretary of War *ad interim*, and with the view of correcting statements which you term "gross misrepresentations" give at length your own recollection of the facts under which, without the sanction of the President, from whom you had received and accepted the appointment, you yielded the Department of War to the present incumbent.

As stated in your communication, some time after you had assumed the duties of Secretary of War *ad interim* we interchanged views respecting the course that should be pursued in the event of nonconcurrence by the Senate in the suspension from office of Mr. Stanton. I sought that interview, calling myself at the War Department. My sole object in then bringing the subject to your attention was to ascertain definitely what would be your own action should such an attempt be made for his restoration to the War Department. That object was accomplished, for the interview terminated with the distinct understanding that if upon reflection you should prefer not to become a party to the controversy or should conclude that it would be your duty to surrender the Department to Mr. Stanton upon action in his favor by the Senate you were to return the office to me prior to a decision by the Senate, in order that if I desired to do so I might designate someone to succeed you. It must have been apparent to you that had not this understanding been reached it was my purpose to relieve you from the further discharge of the duties of Secretary of War *ad interim* and to appoint some other person in that capacity.

Other conversations upon this subject ensued, all of them having on my part the same object and leading to the same conclusion as the first. It is not necessary, however, to refer to any of them excepting that of Saturday, the 11th instant, mentioned in your communication. As it was then known that the Senate had proceeded to consider the case of Mr. Stanton, I was anxious to learn your determination. After a protracted interview, during which the provisions of the tenure-of-office bill were freely discussed, you said that, as had been agreed upon in our first conference, you would either return the office to my possession in time to enable me to appoint a successor before final action by the Senate upon Mr. Stanton's suspension, or would remain as its head, awaiting a decision of the question by judicial proceedings. It was then understood that there would be a further conference on Monday, by which time I supposed you would be prepared to inform me of your final decision. You failed, however, to fulfill the engagement, and on Tuesday notified me in writing of the receipt by you of official notification of the action of the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton, and at the same time informed me that according to the act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices your functions as Secretary of War *ad interim* ceased from the moment of the receipt of the notice. You thus, in disregard of the understanding between us, vacated the office without having given me notice of your intention to do so. It is but just, however, to say that in your communication you claim that you did inform me of your purpose, and thus "fulfilled the promise made in our last preceding conversation on this subject." The fact that such a promise existed is evidence of an arrangement of the kind I have mentioned. You had found in our first conference "that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office whether sustained in the suspension or not." You knew what reasons had induced the President to ask from you a promise; you also knew that in case your views of duty did not accord with his own convictions it was his purpose to fill your place by another appointment. Even ignoring the existence of a positive understanding between us, these conclusions were plainly deducible from our various conversations. It is certain, however, that even under these circumstances you did not offer

*See p. 615.

to return the place to my possession, but, according to your own statement, placed yourself in a position where, could I have anticipated your action, I would have been compelled to ask of you, as I was compelled to ask of your predecessor in the War Department, a letter of resignation, or else to resort to the more disagreeable expedient of suspending you by a successor.

As stated in your letter, the nomination of Governor Cox, of Ohio, for the office of Secretary of War was suggested to me. His appointment as Mr. Stanton's successor was urged in your name, and it was said that his selection would save further embarrassment. I did not think that in the selection of a Cabinet officer I should be trammeled by such considerations. I was prepared to take the responsibility of deciding the question in accordance with my ideas of constitutional duty, and, having determined upon a course which I deemed right and proper, was anxious to learn the steps you would take should the possession of the War Department be demanded by Mr. Stanton. Had your action been in conformity to the understanding between us, I do not believe that the embarrassment would have attained its present proportions or that the probability of its repetition would have been so great.

I know that, with a view to an early termination of a state of affairs so detrimental to the public interests, you voluntarily offered, both on Wednesday, the 15th instant, and on the succeeding Sunday, to call upon Mr. Stanton and urge upon him that the good of the service required his resignation. I confess that I considered your proposal as a sort of reparation for the failure on your part to act in accordance with an understanding more than once repeated, which I thought had received your full assent, and under which you could have returned to me the office which I had conferred upon you, thus saving yourself from embarrassment and leaving the responsibility where it properly belonged—with the President, who is accountable for the faithful execution of the laws.

I have not yet been informed by you whether, as twice proposed by yourself, you have called upon Mr. Stanton and made an effort to induce him voluntarily to retire from the War Department.

You conclude your communication with a reference to our conversation at the meeting of the Cabinet held on Tuesday, the 14th instant. In your account of what then occurred you say that after the President had given his version of our previous conversations you stated them substantially as given in your letter; that you in no wise admitted the correctness of his statement of them, "though, to soften the evident contradiction my statement gave, I said (alluding to our first conversation on the subject) the President might have understood me the way he said, namely, that I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstatement. I made no such promise."

My recollection of what then transpired is diametrically the reverse of your narration. In the presence of the Cabinet I asked you—

First. If, in a conversation which took place shortly after your appointment as Secretary of War *ad interim*, you did not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide any judicial proceedings that might follow nonconcurrence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension, or, should you wish not to become involved in such a controversy, to put me in the same position with respect to the office as I occupied previous to your appointment, by returning it to me in time to anticipate such action by the Senate. This you admitted.

Second. I then asked you if, at our conference on the preceding Saturday, I had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested you to state what you intended to do, and, further, if in reply to that inquiry you had not referred to our former conversations, saying that from them I understood your position, and that your action would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached. To these questions you also replied in the affirmative.

Third. I next asked if at the conclusion of our interview on Saturday it was not understood that we were to have another conference on Monday before final action

by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton. You replied that such was the understanding, but that you did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday you had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman and were occupied with "many little matters," and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day. What relevancy General Sherman's visit to me on Monday had with the purpose for which you were then to have called I am at a loss to perceive, as he certainly did not inform me whether you had determined to retain possession of the office or to afford me an opportunity to appoint a successor in advance of any attempted reinstatement of Mr. Stanton.

This account of what passed between us at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th instant widely differs from that contained in your communication, for it shows that instead of having "stated our conversations as given in the letter" which has made this reply necessary you admitted that my recital of them was entirely accurate. Sincerely anxious, however, to be correct in my statements, I have to-day read this narration of what occurred on the 14th instant to the members of the Cabinet who were then present. They, without exception, agree in its accuracy.

It is only necessary to add that on Wednesday morning, the 15th instant, you called on me, in company with Lieutenant-General Sherman. After some preliminary conversation, you remarked that an article in the National Intelligencer of that date did you much injustice. I replied that I had not read the Intelligencer of that morning. You then first told me that it was your intention to urge Mr. Stanton to resign his office.

After you had withdrawn I carefully read the article of which you had spoken, and found that its statements of the understanding between us were substantially correct. On the 17th I caused it to be read to four of the five members of the Cabinet who were present at our conference on the 14th, and they concurred in the general accuracy of its statements respecting our conversation upon that occasion.

In reply to your communication, I have deemed it proper, in order to prevent further misunderstanding, to make this simple recital of facts.

Very respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

General Grant to the President.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., February 3, 1868.

His Excellency A. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 31st ultimo,* in answer to mine of the 28th ultimo.† After a careful reading and comparison of it with the article in the National Intelligencer of the 15th ultimo and the article over the initials J. B. S. in the New York World of the 27th ultimo, purporting to be based upon your statement and that of the members of your Cabinet therein named, I find it to be but a reiteration, only somewhat more in detail, of the "many and gross misrepresentations" contained in these articles, and which my statement of the facts set forth in my letter of the 28th ultimo† was intended to correct; and I here reassert the correctness of my statements in that letter, anything in yours in reply to it to the contrary notwithstanding.

I confess my surprise that the Cabinet officers referred to should so greatly misapprehend the facts in the matter of admissions alleged to have been made by me at the Cabinet meeting of the 14th ultimo as to suffer their names to be made the

*See pp. 615-618. †See pp. 613-615.

basis of the charges in the newspaper article referred to, or agree in the accuracy, as you affirm they do, of your account of what occurred at that meeting.

You know that we parted on Saturday, the 11th ultimo, without any promise on my part, either express or implied, to the effect that I would hold on to the office of Secretary of War *ad interim* against the action of the Senate, or, declining to do so myself, would surrender it to you before such action was had, or that I would see you again at any fixed time on the subject.

The performance of the promises alleged by you to have been made by me would have involved a resistance to law and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton.

From our conversations and my written protest of August 1, 1867, against the removal of Mr. Stanton, you must have known that my greatest objection to his removal or suspension was the fear that someone would be appointed in his stead who would, by opposition to the laws relating to the restoration of the Southern States to their proper relations to the Government, embarrass the Army in the performance of duties especially imposed upon it by these laws; and it was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the office of Secretary of War *ad interim*, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by my withholding it from him in opposition to law, or, not doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would, as the statement and assumptions in your communication plainly indicate was sought. And it was to avoid this same danger, as well as to relieve you from the personal embarrassment in which Mr. Stanton's reinstatement would place you, that I urged the appointment of Governor Cox, believing that it would be agreeable to you and also to Mr. Stanton, satisfied as I was that it was the good of the country, and not the office, the latter desired.

On the 15th ultimo, in presence of General Sherman, I stated to you that I thought Mr. Stanton would resign, but did not say that I would advise him to do so. On the 18th I did agree with General Sherman to go and advise him to that course, and on the 19th I had an interview alone with Mr. Stanton, which led me to the conclusion that any advice to him of the kind would be useless, and I so informed General Sherman.

Before I consented to advise Mr. Stanton to resign, I understood from him, in a conversation on the subject immediately after his reinstatement, that it was his opinion that the act of Congress entitled "An act temporarily to supply vacancies in the Executive Departments in certain cases," approved February 20, 1863, was repealed by subsequent legislation, which materially influenced my action. Previous to this time I had had no doubt that the law of 1863 was still in force, and, notwithstanding my action, a fuller examination of the law leaves a question in my mind whether it is or is not repealed. This being the case, I could not now advise his resignation, lest the same danger I apprehended on his first removal might follow.

The course you would have it understood I agreed to pursue was in violation of law and without orders from you, while the course I did pursue, and which I never doubted you fully understood, was in accordance with law and not in disobedience of any orders of my superior.

And now, Mr. President, when my honor as a soldier and integrity as a man have been so violently assailed, pardon me for saying that I can but regard this whole matter, from the beginning to the end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of law, for which you hesitated to assume the responsibility in orders, and thus to destroy my character before the country. I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion by your recent orders directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War, my superior and your subordinate, without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am to disobey.

With the assurance, Mr. President, that nothing less than a vindication of my personal honor and character could have induced this correspondence on my part,

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *General.*

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War for his information, and to be made a part of correspondence previously furnished on same subject.

U. S. GRANT, *General.*

WASHINGTON, *February 17, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 19th of December last, calling for correspondence and information in relation to Russian America, I transmit reports and accompanying documents from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 18, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 17th of January last, calling for information in regard to the execution of the treaty of 1858 with China, for the settlement of claims, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State and the papers which accompany it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 19, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 26th November, 1867, requesting a list of all pardons "granted since the 14th day of April, 1865, to any person or persons charged with or convicted of making or passing counterfeit money, or having counterfeit money or tools or instruments for making the same in his or their possession, or charged with or convicted of the crime of forgery or criminal alteration of papers, accounts, or other documents, or of the crime of perjury, and that such list be accompanied by a particular statement in each case of the reasons or grounds of the pardon, with a disclosure of the names of persons, if any, who recommended or advised the same."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 19, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with a resolution adopted by the Senate on the 2d day of December last, requesting "a full list of the names of all persons par-

doned by the President since May 1, 1865, who have been convicted of counterfeiting United States bonds, greenbacks, national-bank currency, fractional currency, or the coin of the United States, with the date of issuing each pardon, reasons for issuing it, and by whom recommended."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 20, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 18th of December last, requesting information in regard to the island of San Juan, on Puget Sound, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 20, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

With reference to the convention between Denmark and the United States concluded on the 24th of October last, I transmit to the Senate a copy in translation of a note of the 19th instant addressed to the Secretary of State by His Danish Majesty's chargé d'affaires, announcing the ratification of the convention by the Government of Denmark and stating his readiness to proceed with the customary exchange of ratifications.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 21, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Chief of the Engineer Corps of the Army, accompanied by a report, in reference to ship canals around the Falls of the Ohio River, called for by the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 21, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

On the 12th day of August, 1867, by virtue of the power and authority vested in the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, I suspended Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War.

In further exercise of the power and authority so vested in the President, I have this day removed Mr. Stanton from office and designated the Adjutant-General of the Army to act as Secretary of War *ad interim.*

Copies of the communications upon this subject addressed to Mr. Stanton and the Adjutant-General are herewith transmitted for the information of the Senate.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 22, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I have received a copy of the resolution adopted by the Senate on the 21st instant, as follows:

> Whereas the Senate have received and considered the communication of the President stating that he had removed Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, and had designated the Adjutant-General of the Army to act as Secretary of War *ad interim:* Therefore,
>
> *Resolved by the Senate of the United States*, That under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office *ad interim.*

This resolution is confined to the power of the President to remove the Secretary of War and to designate another officer to perform the duties of the office *ad interim*, and by its preamble is made expressly applicable to the removal of Mr. Stanton and the designation to act *ad interim* of the Adjutant-General of the Army. Without, therefore, attempting to discuss the general power of removal as to all officers, upon which subject no expression of opinion is contained in the resolution, I shall confine myself to the question as thus limited—the power to remove the Secretary of War.

It is declared in the resolution—

> That under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office *ad interim.*

As to the question of power under the Constitution, I do not propose at present to enter upon its discussion.

The uniform practice from the beginning of the Government, as established by every President who has exercised the office, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have settled the question in favor of the power of the President to remove all officers excepting a class holding appointments of a judicial character. No practice nor any decision has ever excepted a Secretary of War from this general power of the President to make removals from office.

It is only necessary, then, that I should refer to the power of the Executive, under the laws of the United States, to remove from office a Secretary of War. The resolution denies that under these laws this power has any existence. In other words, it affirms that no such authority is recognized or given by the statutes of the country.

What, then, are the laws of the United States which deny the President the power to remove that officer? I know but two laws which bear upon this question. The first in order of time is the act of August 7, 1789, creating the Department of War, which, after providing for a Secretary as its principal officer, proceeds as follows:

> SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That there shall be in the said Department an inferior officer, to be appointed by the said principal officer, to be employed therein

as he shall deem proper, and to be called the chief clerk in the Department of War, and who, whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy, shall during such vacancy have the charge and custody of all records, books, and papers appertaining to the said Department.

It is clear that this act, passed by a Congress many of whose members participated in the formation of the Constitution, so far from denying the power of the President to remove the Secretary of War, recognizes it as existing in the Executive alone, without the concurrence of the Senate or of any other department of the Government. Furthermore, this act does not purport to confer the power by legislative authority, nor in fact was there any other existing legislation through which it was bestowed upon the Executive. The recognition of the power by this act is therefore complete as a recognition under the Constitution itself, for there was no other source or authority from which it could be derived.

The other act which refers to this question is that regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, passed by Congress on the 2d day of March, 1867. The first section of that act is in the following words:

That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: *Provided*, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The fourth section of the same act restricts the term of offices to the limit prescribed by the law creating them.

That part of the first section which precedes the proviso declares that every person holding a civil office to which he has been or may be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed. It purports to take from the Executive, during the fixed time established for the tenure of the office, the independent power of removal, and to require for such removal the concurrent action of the President and the Senate.

The proviso that follows proceeds to fix the term of office of the seven heads of Departments, whose tenure never had been defined before, by prescribing that they "shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

Thus, as to these enumerated officers, the proviso takes from the President the power of removal except with the advice and consent of the Senate. By its terms, however, before he can be deprived of the power to

displace them it must appear that he himself has appointed them. It is only in that case that they have any tenure of office or any independent right to hold during the term of the President and for one month after the cessation of his official functions. The proviso, therefore, gives no tenure of office to any one of these officers who has been appointed by a former President beyond one month after the accession of his successor.

In the case of Mr. Stanton, the only appointment under which he held the office of Secretary of War was that conferred upon him by my immediate predecessor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. He has never held from me any appointment as the head of the War Department. Whatever right he had to hold the office was derived from that original appointment and my own sufferance. The law was not intended to protect such an incumbent of the War Department by taking from the President the power to remove him. This, in my judgment, is perfectly clear, and the law itself admits of no other just construction. We find in all that portion of the first section which precedes the proviso that as to civil officers generally the President is deprived of the power of removal, and it is plain that if there had been no proviso that power would just as clearly have been taken from him so far as it applies to the seven heads of Departments. But for reasons which were no doubt satisfactory to Congress these principal officers were specially provided for, and as to them the express and only requirement is that the President who has appointed them shall not without the advice and consent of the Senate remove them from office. The consequence is that as to my Cabinet, embracing the seven officers designated in the first section, the act takes from me the power, without the concurrence of the Senate, to remove any one of them that I have appointed, but it does not protect such of them as I did not appoint, nor give to them any tenure of office beyond my pleasure.

An examination of this act, then, shows that while in one part of the section provision is made for officers generally, in another clause there is a class of officers, designated by their official titles, who are excepted from the general terms of the law, and in reference to whom a clear distinction is made as to the general power of removal limited in the first clause of the section.

This distinction is that as to such of these enumerated officers as hold under the appointment of the President the power of removal can only be exercised by him with the consent of the Senate, while as to those who have not been appointed by him there is no like denial of his power to displace them. It would be a violation of the plain meaning of this enactment to place Mr. Stanton upon the same footing as those heads of Departments who have been appointed by myself. As to him, this law gives him no tenure of office. The members of my Cabinet who have been appointed by me are by this act entitled to hold for one month after the term of my office shall cease; but Mr. Stanton could not, against the wishes of my successor, hold a moment thereafter. If he were permitted

by that successor to hold for the first two weeks, would that successor have no power to remove him? But the power of my successor over him could be no greater than my own. If my successor would have the power to remove Mr. Stanton after permitting him to remain a period of two weeks, because he was not appointed by him, but by his predecessor, I, who have tolerated Mr. Stanton for more than two years, certainly have the same right to remove him, and upon the same ground, namely, that he was not appointed by me, but by my predecessor.

Under this construction of the tenure-of-office act, I have never doubted my power to remove Mr. Stanton.

Whether the act were constitutional or not, it was always my opinion that it did not secure him from removal. I was, however, aware that there were doubts as to the construction of the law, and from the first I deemed it desirable that at the earliest possible moment those doubts should be settled and the true construction of the act fixed by decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. My order of suspension in August last was intended to place the case in such a position as would make a resort to a judicial decision both necessary and proper. My understanding and wishes, however, under that order of suspension were frustrated, and the late order for Mr. Stanton's removal was a further step toward the accomplishment of that purpose.

I repeat that my own convictions as to the true construction of the law and as to its constitutionality were well settled and were sustained by every member of my Cabinet, including Mr. Stanton himself. Upon the question of constitutionality, each one in turn deliberately advised me that the tenure-of-office act was unconstitutional. Upon the question whether, as to those members who were appointed by my predecessor, that act took from me the power to remove them, one of those members emphatically stated in the presence of the others sitting in Cabinet that they did not come within the provisions of the act, and it was no protection to them. No one dissented from this construction, and I understood them all to acquiesce in its correctness. In a matter of such grave consequence I was not disposed to rest upon my own opinions, though fortified by my constitutional advisers. I have therefore sought to bring the question at as early a day as possible before the Supreme Court of the United States for final and authoritative decision.

In respect to so much of the resolution as relates to the designation of an officer to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, I have only to say that I have exercised this power under the provisions of the first section of the act of February 13, 1795, which, so far as they are applicable to vacancies caused by removals, I understand to be still in force.

The legislation upon the subject of *ad interim* appointments in the Executive Departments stands, as to the War Office, as follows:

The second section of the act of the 7th of August, 1789, makes provision for a vacancy in the very case of a removal of the head of the War

Department, and upon such a vacancy gives the charge and custody of the records, books, and papers to the chief clerk. Next, by the act of the 8th of May, 1792, section 8, it is provided that in case of a vacancy occasioned by death, absence from the seat of Government, or sickness of the head of the War Department the President may authorize a person to perform the duties of the office until a successor is appointed or the disability removed. The act, it will be observed, does not provide for the case of a vacancy caused by removal. Then, by the first section of the act of February 13, 1795, it is provided that in case of any vacancy the President may appoint a person to perform the duties while the vacancy exists.

These acts are followed by that of the 20th of February, 1863, by the first section of which provision is again made for a vacancy caused by death, resignation, absence from the seat of Government, or sickness of the head of any Executive Department of the Government, and upon the occurrence of such a vacancy power is given to the President—

> to authorize the head of any other Executive Department, or other officer in either of said Departments whose appointment is vested in the President, at his discretion, to perform the duties of the said respective offices until a successor be appointed or until such absence or inability by sickness shall cease: *Provided*, That no one vacancy shall be supplied in manner aforesaid for a longer term than six months.

This law, with some modifications, reenacts the act of 1792, and provides, as did that act, for the sort of vacancies so to be filled; but, like the act of 1792, it makes no provision for a vacancy occasioned by removal. It has reference altogether to vacancies arising from other causes.

According to my construction of the act of 1863, while it impliedly repeals the act of 1792 regulating the vacancies therein described, it has no bearing whatever upon so much of the act of 1795 as applies to a vacancy caused by removal. The act of 1795 therefore furnishes the rule for a vacancy occasioned by removal—one of the vacancies expressly referred to in the act of the 7th of August, 1789, creating the Department of War. Certainly there is no express repeal by the act of 1863 of the act of 1795. The repeal, if there is any, is by implication, and can only be admitted so far as there is a clear inconsistency between the two acts. The act of 1795 is inconsistent with that of 1863 as to a vacancy occasioned by death, resignation, absence, or sickness, but not at all inconsistent as to a vacancy caused by removal.

It is assuredly proper that the President should have the same power to fill temporarily a vacancy occasioned by removal as he has to supply a place made vacant by death or the expiration of a term. If, for instance, the incumbent of an office should be found to be wholly unfit to exercise its functions, and the public service should require his immediate expulsion, a remedy should exist and be at once applied, and time be allowed the President to select and appoint a successor, as is permitted him in case of a vacancy caused by death or the termination of an official term.

The necessity, therefore, for an *ad interim* appointment is just as great, and, indeed, may be greater in cases of removal than in any others. Before it be held, therefore, that the power given by the act of 1795 in cases of removal is abrogated by succeeding legislation an express repeal ought to appear. So wholesome a power should certainly not be taken away by loose implication.

It may be, however, that in this, as in other cases of implied repeal, doubts may arise. It is confessedly one of the most subtle and debatable questions which arise in the construction of statutes. If upon such a question I have fallen into an erroneous construction, I submit whether it should be characterized as a violation of official duty and of law.

I have deemed it proper, in vindication of the course which I have considered it my duty to take, to place before the Senate the reasons upon which I have based my action. Although I have been advised by every member of my Cabinet that the entire tenure-of-office act is unconstitutional, and therefore void, and although I have expressly concurred in that opinion in the veto message which I had the honor to submit to Congress when I returned the bill for reconsideration, I have refrained from making a removal of any officer contrary to the provisions of the law, and have only exercised that power in the case of Mr. Stanton, which, in my judgment, did not come within its provisions. I have endeavored to proceed with the greatest circumspection, and have acted only in an extreme and exceptional case, carefully following the course which I have marked out for myself as a general rule, faithfully to execute all laws, though passed over my objections on the score of constitutionality. In the present instance I have appealed, or sought to appeal, to that final arbiter fixed by the Constitution for the determination of all such questions. To this course I have been impelled by the solemn obligations which rest upon me to sustain inviolate the powers of the high office committed to my hands.

Whatever may be the consequences merely personal to myself, I could not allow them to prevail against a public duty so clear to my own mind, and so imperative. If what was possible had been certain, if I had been fully advised when I removed Mr. Stanton that in thus defending the trust committed to my hands my own removal was sure to follow, I could not have hesitated. Actuated by public considerations of the highest character, I earnestly protest against the resolution of the Senate which charges me in what I have done with a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 25, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In further answer of the resolution of the Senate of the 13th of January last, relative to the appointment of the Hon. Anson Burlingame to a

diplomatic or other mission by the Emperor of China, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the communication which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 26, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the General Commanding the Army of the United States, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 4th instant, requesting copies of all instructions relating to the Third Military District issued to General Pope and General Meade.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 4, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 17th February ultimo, concerning the alleged interference of the United States consul at Rome in the late difficulty in Italy, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, containing the information called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 5, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit a report of this date from the Secretary of State, and the accompanying papers, in regard to the revolution in the Dominican Republic.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 5, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 21st of February last, in relation to the abduction of one Allan Macdonald from Canada, I transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, accompanied by the papers relating to that subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 5, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 7th of January last, in relation to the claim of the late Benjamin W. Perkins against the Russian Government, I transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 6, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate the accompanying report * of the Secretary of State, in answer to their resolution of the 13th January.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 10, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the King of Prussia, in the name of the North German Confederation, for the purpose of regulating the citizenship of those persons who emigrate from the Confederation to this country and from the United States to the North German Confederation.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In further answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the last two years, I transmit a continuation of the report from the Secretary of State upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 14, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 27th of January last, in relation to the arrest and trial of the Rev. John McMahon, Robert B. Lynch, and John Warren by the Government of Great Britain, and requesting to be informed what action has been taken by this Government in maintaining the rights of American citizens abroad, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a copy of the papers called for by that resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 18, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty made on the 2d day of March, 1868, by and between Nathaniel G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs; Alexander C. Hunt, governor ~~and *ex officio* superintendent of~~ Indian affairs of Colorado Territory, and Kit Carson, on the part of the United States, and the representatives of

* Relating to a claim, under the act of Congress of August 18, 1856, of citizens of the United States to guano on Alta Vela, an island in the vicinity of Santo Domingo.

the Tabeguache, Muache, Capote, Weeminuche, Yampa, Grand River, and Uintah bands of Ute Indians.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 17th instant and the papers therein referred to are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 24, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention, signed on the 23d instant, for the surrender of criminals, between the United States and the Government of Italy.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 24, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report* and accompanying documents, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to a resolution of the 9th instant, the accompanying report† from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report and accompanying document,‡ in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th ultimo.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th ultimo, relating to the report of Mr. Cowdin, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State and the document§ to which it refers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

*Relating to unexpended appropriations for contingent expenses of foreign intercourse; amount remaining on deposit with Baring Brothers & Co. September 30, 1867, etc.

†Declining to transmit copies of correspondence, negotiations, and treaties with German States since January 1, 1868, relative to the rights of naturalized citizens.

‡Statement of amounts paid for legal services by the Department of State during each year since 1860, with names of persons to whom paid.

§Report of Elliot C. Cowdin, United States commissioner to the Paris Exposition of 1867, on silk and silk manufactures.

WASHINGTON, *April 2, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in further answer to their resolution of the 9th ultimo, the accompanying report* from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *April 2, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In further reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 19th of December, 1867, calling for correspondence and information in relation to Russian America, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *April 3, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and the papers accompanying it, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 10th of February last, requesting information relative to the imprisonment and destruction of the property of Antonio Pelletier by the people and authorities of Hayti.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *April 13, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 5th of February last, calling for the correspondence upon the subject of the murder by the inhabitants of the island of Formosa of the ship's company of the American bark *Rover*, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State and a report from the Secretary of the Navy, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *April 18, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 14th of April instant, calling for information relative to any application by any party for exclusive privileges in connection with hunting, trading, and the fisheries in Alaska, I transmit herewith the report of the Secretary of State on the subject, with its accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

*Transmitting correspondence pertaining to the convention of February 22, 1868, with the North German Confederation, relative to naturalization.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 22, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 28th ultimo, requesting information as to the number and designations of military departments formed since the 1st day of August, 1867, and as to the statute or other authority under which they have been established, I transmit a report from the Adjutant-General's Office showing the organization since that date of the Department of Alaska and the Military Division of the Atlantic.

The orders issued by me upon this subject are in accordance with long-established usage and hitherto unquestioned authority. This will be readily seen from the accompanying report, which shows that, employing the authority vested by the Constitution in the President as Commander in Chief of the Army, it has been customary for my predecessors to create such military divisions and departments as from time to time they deemed advisable.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *April 27, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I submit a report of the Secretary of State, concerning the naturalization treaty recently negotiated between the United States and North Germany.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 5, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents, which I deem it proper to state are all the papers* that have been submitted to the President relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the States of South Carolina and Arkansas.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *May 6, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in further answer to their resolution of the 14th of April last, the accompanying report† from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 8, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith reports from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Navy, prepared in compliance with a resolution

*Constitutions of South Carolina and Arkansas.

†Relating to application for exclusive privileges in connection with hunting, trading, and the fisheries in Alaska.

of the House of Representatives of the 12th of December last, requesting information respecting the sale of public vessels since the close of the rebellion. No report upon the subject has yet been received from the Department of War.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *May 9, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 14th ultimo, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.*

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *May 9, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith reports from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General, prepared in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 17th December last, requesting information in reference to the seizure and confiscation of property. No report upon this subject has yet been received by me from the War Department.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
May 11, 1868.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents,† which embrace all the papers that have been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the States of North Carolina and Louisiana.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *May 15, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 8th instant, a report‡ from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

*Report of Freeman H. Morse, United States consul at London, on "The Foreign Maritime Commerce of the United States: Its Past, Present, and Future," etc.

†Constitutions of North Carolina and Louisiana.

‡Relating to the detention, at the request of the House of Representatives, of the ironclad monitors *Oneoto* and *Catawba*, purchased from the United States by Swift & Co., and supposed to be intended for the Government of Peru, then at war with a power friendly to the United States.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 18, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying document,* which is the only paper which has been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which it refers in the State of Georgia.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *May 23, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State, with accompaniments, in relation to recent events in the Empire of Japan.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 27, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress the accompanying documents,† which are the only papers which have been submitted to me relating to the proceedings to which they refer in the State of Florida.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *May 29, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on the 26th instant, making inquiries relative to a naval force at Hayti.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *June 2, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I communicate, for the information of the Senate, in confidence, a report of the Secretary of State, accompanied by a copy of a dispatch recently received from the acting consul of the United States at San Jose, Costa Rica.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *June 2, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I communicate, for the consideration of the Senate, a report from the Secretary of State, accompanied by a copy of a dispatch recently received from the acting United States consul in charge of the legation at San Jose, Costa Rica.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

*Constitution of Georgia.

†Letter from the president of the constitutional convention of Florida, transmitting a copy of the constitution of that State.

WASHINGTON, *June 5, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In further answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 25th of November, 1867, calling for information in relation to the trial and conviction of American citizens in Great Britain and Ireland for the last two years, I transmit the accompanying report from the Secretary of State upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *June 8, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 28th ultimo, I transmit herewith a communication from the Postmaster-General, with a copy of the correspondence recently had with the authorities of Great Britain in relation to a new postal treaty.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 10, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 1st instant, I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Interior, in reference to a treaty now being negotiated between the Great and Little Osage Indians and the special Indian commissioners acting on the part of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 13, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith submit to the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded on the 27th ultimo between commissioners on the part of the United States and the Great and Little Osage tribe of Indians of Kansas, together with a communication from the Secretary of the Interior suggesting an amendment to the fourteenth article, and a copy of the report of the commissioners.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 15, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Interior, made in reply to the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 13th instant.

The treaty recently concluded with the Great and Little Osage Indians, to which the accompanying report refers, was submitted to the Senate prior to the receipt of the resolution of the House upon the subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *June 19, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to its ratification, a treaty between the United States and His Majesty the King of Bavaria, signed at Munich on the 26th ultimo, concerning the citizenship of persons emigrating from Bavaria to the United States and from the United States to the Kingdom of Bavaria. I transmit also a copy of the letter of the United States minister communicating the treaty, of the protocol which accompanied it, and a trauslation of the Bavarian military law referred to in the latter paper.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 20, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith transmit to the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded at Fort Sumner, N. Mex., on the 1st instant, between Lieutenant-General W. T. Sherman and Colonel Samuel F. Tappan, on the part of the United States, and the chiefs and headmen of the Navajo Indians, on the part of the latter. I also transmit a communication upon the subject from the Secretary of the Interior, with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *June 22, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Seuate, in answer to their resolution of the 28th ultimo, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers.*

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *June 23, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 15th instant, upon the subject of Messrs. Warren and Costello, who have been convicted and sentenced to penal imprisonment in Great Britain.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *June 23, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a copy of a dispatch addressed to the Department of State by the consul of the United States at Bangkok, Siam, dated

*Correspondence relative to the act of Congress of March 27, 1867, prohibiting persons in the diplomatic service of the United States from wearing any uniform or official costume not previously authorized by Congress.

December 31, 1867, with a view to its consideration and the ratification thereof, of the modification proposed by the royal counselors of the Kingdom of Siam in Article I of the general regulations which form a part of the treaty between the United States and that Kingdom concluded May 29, 1856, of which a printed copy is also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *June 29, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a copy of a dispatch from the United States consul at Elsinore, and of an instruction from the Secretary of State to the United States minister at Copenhagen, relative to an alleged practice of the Danish authorities to banish convicts to this country. The expediency of making it a penal offense to bring such persons to the United States is submitted to your consideration.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 2, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State of the 2d instant, together with accompanying papers.*

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *July 7, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded at Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, on the 7th of May, 1868, between the United States and the chiefs and headmen of the Crow Indians of Montana, and a treaty concluded at Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, on the 10th of May, 1868, between the United States and the chiefs and headmen of the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapahoe tribes of Indians.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior suggesting amendments to said treaties, and the papers to which he refers in his communication, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *July 7, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty made and concluded at Ottawa, Kans., on the 1st day of June,

* Petitions of merchants and shipowners of New York and Boston relative to the detention, at the request of the House of Representatives, of the ironclad monitors *Oneoto* and *Catawba*, purchased from the United States by Swift & Co., and supposed to be intended for the Government of Peru, then at war with a power friendly to the United States.

1868, between the United States and the Swan Creek and Black River Chippewas and the Munsee or Christian Indians of the State of Kansas.

Accompanying the treaty is a letter from the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 30th ultimo, together with the papers therein designated.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 9, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, additional articles to the treaty between the United States and His Majesty the Emperor of China of the 18th June, 1858, signed in this city on the 4th instant by the plenipotentiaries of the parties.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 10, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States and the Mexican Republic, signed in this city by the plenipotentiaries of the parties on the 4th instant, providing for an adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States on the Mexican Government and of Mexican citizens on the Government of the United States.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 10, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

Referring to my message to the Senate of the 23d of May last, I herewith transmit a further report from the Secretary of State, with an accompanying document, relative to late occurrences in Japan.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 14, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State, inclosing a list of the States of the Union whose legislatures have ratified the proposed fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and also a copy of the resolutions of ratification, as called for in the Senate's resolution of the 9th instant, together with a copy of the respective resolutions of the legislatures of Ohio and New Jersey purporting to rescind the resolutions of ratification of said amendment which had previously been ~~adopted~~ by the legislatures of these two States, respectively, or to withdraw their consent to the same.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 15, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I hereby transmit to Congress a report, with the accompanying papers, received from the Secretary of State, in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "An act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the United States," approved August 18, 1856.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 15, 1868.*

To the Congress of the United States:

I submit herewith a correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr. Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, minister resident of the United States in Japan. It seems to show the importance of an amendment of the law of the United States prohibiting the cooly trade.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 17, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by him to-day, purporting to be a resolution ratifying on the part of the State of Louisiana the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 18, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a paper received by me on the 18th instant, purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the State of South Carolina, ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *July 18, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

Experience has fully demonstrated the wisdom of the framers of the Federal Constitution. Under all circumstances the result of their labors was as near an approximation to perfection as was compatible with the fallibility of man. Such being the estimation in which the Constitution

is and has ever been held by our countrymen, it is not surprising that any proposition for its alteration or amendment should be received with reluctance and distrust. While this sentiment deserves commendation and encouragement as a useful preventive of unnecessary attempt to change its provisions, it must be conceded that time has developed imperfections and omissions in the Constitution, the reformation of which has been demanded by the best interests of the country. Some of these have been remedied in the manner provided in the Constitution itself. There are others which, although heretofore brought to the attention of the people, have never been so presented as to enable the popular judgment to determine whether they should be corrected by means of additional amendments. My object in this communication is to suggest certain defects in the Constitution which seem to me to require correction, and to recommend that the judgment of the people be taken on the amendments proposed.

The first of the defects to which I desire to direct attention is in that clause of the Constitution which provides for the election of President and Vice-President through the intervention of electors, and not by an immediate vote of the people. The importance of so amending this clause as to secure to the people the election of President and Vice-President by their direct votes was urged with great earnestness and ability by President Jackson in his first annual message, and the recommendation was repeated in five of his subsequent communications to Congress, extending through the eight years of his Administration. In his message of 1829 he said:

> To the people belongs the right of electing their Chief Magistrate; it was never designed that their choice should in any case be defeated, either by the intervention of electoral colleges or by the agency confided, under certain contingencies, to the House of Representatives.

He then proceeded to state the objections to an election of President by the House of Representatives, the most important of which was that the choice of a clear majority of the people might be easily defeated. He then closed the argument with the following communication:

> I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitntion as may remove all intermediate ageucy in the election of the President and Vice-President. The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each State its present relative weight in the election, and a failure in the first attempt may be provided for by confining the second to a choice between the two highest candidates. In connection with such an amendment it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a single term of either four or six years. If, however, it should not be adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying for office the Representatives in Congress on whom such an election may have devolved would not be proper.

Although this recommendation was repeated with undiminished earnestness in several of his succeeding messages, yet the proposed amendment was never adopted and submitted to the people by Congress. The danger of a defeat of the people's choice in an election by the House of

Representatives remains unprovided for in the Constitution, and would be greatly increased if the House of Representatives should assume the power arbitrarily to reject the votes of a State which might not be cast in conformity with the wishes of the majority in that body.

But if President Jackson failed to secure the amendment to the Constitution which he urged so persistently, his arguments contributed largely to the formation of party organizations, which have effectually avoided the contingency of an election by the House of Representatives. These organizations, first by a resort to the caucus system of nominating candidates, and afterwards to State and national conventions, have been successful in so limiting the number of candidates as to escape the danger of an election by the House of Representatives.

It is clear, however, that in thus limiting the number of candidates the true object and spirit of the Constitution have been evaded and defeated. It is an essential feature in our republican system of government that every citizen possessing the constitutional qualifications has a right to become a candidate for the office of President and Vice-President, and that every qualified elector has a right to cast his vote for any citizen whom he may regard as worthy of these offices. But under the party organizations which have prevailed for years these asserted rights of the people have been as effectually cut off and destroyed as if the Constitution itself had inhibited their exercise.

The danger of a defeat of the popular choice in an election by the House of Representatives is no greater than in an election made nominally by the people themselves, when by the laws of party organizations and by the constitutional provisions requiring the people to vote for electors instead of for the President or Vice-President it is made impracticable for any citizen to be a candidate except through the process of a party nomination, and for any voter to cast his suffrage for any other person than one thus brought forward through the manipulations of a nominating convention. It is thus apparent that by means of party organizations that provision of the Constitution which requires the election of President and Vice-President to be made through the electoral colleges has been made instrumental and potential in defeating the great object of conferring the choice of these officers upon the people. It may be conceded that party organizations are inseparable from republican government, and that when formed and managed in subordination to the Constitution they may be valuable safeguards of popular liberty; but when they are perverted to purposes of bad ambition they are liable to become the dangerous instruments of overthrowing the Constitution itself. Strongly impressed with the truth of these views, I feel called upon by an imperative sense of duty to revive substantially the recommendation so often and so earnestly made by President Jackson, and to urge that the amendment to the Constitution herewith presented, or some similar proposition, may be submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection.

Recent events have shown the necessity of an amendment to the Constitution distinctly defining the persons who shall discharge the duties of President of the United States in the event of a vacancy in that office by the death, resignation, or removal of both the President and Vice-President. It is clear that this should be fixed by the Constitution, and not be left to repealable enactments of doubtful constitutionality. It occurs to me that in the event of a vacancy in the office of President by the death, resignation, disability, or removal of both the President and Vice-President the duties of the office should devolve upon an officer of the executive department of the Government, rather than one connected with the legislative or judicial departments. The objections to designating either the President *pro tempore* of the Senate or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, especially in the event of a vacancy produced by removal, are so obvious and so unanswerable that they need not be stated in detail. It is enough to state that they are both interested in producing a vacancy, and, according to the provisions of the Constitution, are members of the tribunal by whose decree a vacancy may be produced.

Under such circumstances the impropriety of designating either of these officers to succeed the President so removed is palpable. The framers of the Constitution, when they referred to Congress the settlement of the succession to the office of President in the event of a vacancy in the offices of both President and Vice-President, did not, in my opinion, contemplate the designation of any other than an officer of the executive department, on whom, in such a contingency, the powers and duties of the President should devolve. Until recently the contingency has been remote, and serious attention has not been called to the manifest incongruity between the provisions of the Constitution on this subject and the act of Congress of 1792. Having, however, been brought almost face to face with this important question, it seems an eminently proper time for us to make the legislation conform to the language, intent, and theory of the Constitution, and thus place the executive department beyond the reach of usurpation, and remove from the legislative and judicial departments every temptation to combine for the absorption of all the powers of government.

It has occurred to me that in the event of such a vacancy the duties of President would devolve most appropriately upon some one of the heads of the several Executive Departments, and under this conviction I present for your consideration an amendment to the Constitution on this subject, with the recommendation that it be submitted to the people for their action.

Experience seems to have established the necessity of an amendment of that clause of the Constitution which provides for the election of Senators to Congress by the legislatures of the several States. It would be more consistent with the genius of our form of government if the Senators were chosen directly by the people of the several States. The objections to the election of Senators by the legislatures are so palpable that I deem

it unnecessary to do more than submit the proposition for such an amendment, with the recommendation that it be opened to the people for their judgment.

It is strongly impressed on my mind that the tenure of office by the judiciary of the United States during good behavior for life is incompatible with the spirit of republican government, and in this opinion I am fully sustained by the evidence of popular judgment upon this subject in the different States of the Union.

I therefore deem it my duty to recommend an amendment to the Constitution by which the terms of the judicial officers would be limited to a period of years, and I herewith present it in the hope that Congress will submit it to the people for their decision.

The foregoing views have long been entertained by me. In 1845, in the House of Representatives, and afterwards, in 1860, in the Senate of the United States, I submitted substantially the same propositions as those to which the attention of Congress is herein invited. Time, observation, and experience have confirmed these convictions; and, as a matter of public duty and a deep sense of my constitutional obligation "to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as I deem necessary and expedient," I submit the accompanying propositions, and urge their adoption and submission to the judgment of the people.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

JOINT RESOLUTION proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Whereas the fifth article of the Constitution of the United States provides for amendments thereto in the manner following, viz:

"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: *Provided*, That no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate:"

Therefore,

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (*two-thirds of both Houses concurring*), That the following amendments to the Constitution of the United States be proposed to the legislatures of the several States, which, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution:

"That hereafter the President and Vice-President of the United States shall be chosen for the term of six years, by the people of the respective States, in the manner following: Each State shall be divided by the legislature thereof in districts, equal in number to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in the Congress of the United States; the said districts to be composed of contiguous territory, and to contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of persons entitled to be represented under the Constitution, and to be laid off for

the first time immediately after the ratification of this amendment; that on the first Thursday in August in the year 18—, and on the same day every sixth year thereafter, the citizens of each State who possess the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures shall meet within their respective districts and vote for a President and Vice-President of the United States; and the person receiving the greatest number of votes for President and the one receiving the greatest number of votes for Vice-President in each district shall be holden to have received one vote, which fact shall be immediately certified by the governor of the State to each of the Senators in Congress from such State and to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Congress of the United States shall be in session on the second Monday in October in the year 18—, and on the same day in every sixth year thereafter; and the President of the Senate, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, shall open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be President, if such number be equal to a majority of the whole number of votes given; but if no person have such majority, then a second election shall be held on the first Thursday in the month of December then next ensuing between the persons having the two highest numbers for the office of President, which second election shall be conducted, the result certified, and the votes counted in the same manner as in the first, and the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be President. But if two or more persons shall have received the greatest and an equal number of votes at the second election, then the person who shall have received the greatest number of votes in the greatest number of States shall be President. The person having the greatest number of votes for Vice-President at the first election shall be Vice-President, if such number be equal to a majority of the whole number of votes given; and if no person have such majority, then a second election shall take place between the persons having the two highest numbers on the same day that the second election is held for President, and the person having the highest number of the votes for Vice-President shall be Vice-President. But if there should happen to be an equality of votes between the persons so voted for at the second election, then the person having the greatest number of votes in the greatest number of States shall be Vice-President. But when a second election shall be necessary in the case of Vice-President and not necessary in the case of President, then the Senate shall choose a Vice-President from the persons having the two highest numbers in the first election, as now prescribed in the Constitution: *Provided*, That after the ratification of this amendment to the Constitution the President and Vice-President shall hold their offices, respectively, for the term of six years, and that no President or Vice-President shall be eligible for reelection to a second term."

SEC. 2. *And be it further resolved*, That Article II, section 1, paragraph 6, of the Constitution of the United States shall be amended so as to read as follows:

"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and in the case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice-President, the powers and duties of said office shall devolve on the Secretary of State for the time being, and after this officer, in case of vacancy in that or other Department, and in the order in which they are named, on the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Secretary of War, on the Secretary of the Navy, on the Secretary of the Interior, on the Postmaster-General, and on the Attorney-General; and such officer, on whom the powers and duties of President shall devolve in accordance with the foregoing provisions, shall then act as President until the disability shall be removed or a President shall be elected, as is or may be provided for by law."

SEC. 3. *And be it further resolved*, That Article I, section 3, be amended by striking out the word "legislature," and inserting in lieu thereof the following words,

viz: "Persons qualified to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the legislature," so as to make the third section of said article, when ratified by three-fourths of the States, read as follows, to wit:

"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the persons qualified to vote for the members of the most numerous branch of the legislature thereof, for six years, and each Senator shall have one vote."

SEC. 4. *And be it further resolved*, That Article III, section 1, be amended by striking out the words "good behavior," and inserting the following words, viz: "the term of twelve years." And further, that said article and section be amended by adding the following thereto, viz: "And it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, within twelve months after the ratification of this amendment by three-fourths of all the States, as provided by the Constitution of the United States, to divide the whole number of judges, as near as may be practicable, into three classes. The seats of the judges of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the fourth year from such classification, of the second class at the expiration of the eighth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the twelfth year, so that one-third may be chosen every fourth year thereafter."

The article as amended will read as follows:

ARTICLE III.

SEC. 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress from time to time may ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during the term of twelve years, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office; and it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, within twelve months after the ratification of this amendment by three-fourths of all the States, as provided by the Constitution of the United States, to divide the whole number of judges, as near as may be practicable, into three classes. The seats of the judges of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the fourth year from such classification; of the second class, at the expiration of the eighth year; and of the third class, at the expiration of the twelfth year, so that one-third may be chosen every fourth year thereafter.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *July 18, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with the resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 13th instant, requesting "copies of all instructions, records, and correspondence connected with the commission authorized to negotiate the late treaty with the Great and Little Osage Indians, and copies of all propositions made to said commission from railroad corporations or by individuals," I transmit the accompanying communications from the Secretary of the Interior, together with the papers to which they have reference.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 20, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 9th instant, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating a copy of a

paper received by me this day, purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the State of Alabama ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States known as Article XIV.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 24, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, inclosing a report of a board of naval officers appointed in pursuance of an act of Congress approved May 19, 1868, to select suitable locations for powder magazines.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 27, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 24th instant, the accompanying report* from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

VETO MESSAGES.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 25, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I have considered, with such care as the pressure of other duties has permitted, a bill entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to amend the judiciary act, passed the 24th of September, 1789.'" Not being able to approve all of its provisions, I herewith return it to the Senate, in which House it originated, with a brief statement of my objections.

The first section of the bill meets my approbation, as, for the purpose of protecting the rights of property from the erroneous decision of inferior judicial tribunals, it provides means for obtaining uniformity, by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, in cases which have now become very numerous and of much public interest, and in which such remedy is not now allowed. The second section, however, takes away the right of appeal to that court in cases which involve the life and liberty of the citizen, and leaves them exposed to the judgment of numerous inferior tribunals. It is apparent that the two sections were

*Relating to absence from his post of the consul at Panama.

conceived in a very different spirit, and I regret that my objections to one impose upon me the necessity of withholding my sanction from the other.

I can not give my assent to a measure which proposes to deprive any person "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States" from the right of appeal to the highest judicial authority known to our Government. To "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" is one of the declared objects of the Federal Constitution. To assure these, guaranties are provided in the same instrument, as well against "unreasonable searches and seizures" as against the suspensions of "the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, * * * unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it." It was doubtless to afford the people the means of protecting and enforcing these inestimable privileges that the jurisdiction which this bill proposes to take away was conferred upon the Supreme Court of the nation. The act conferring that jurisdiction was approved on the 5th day of February, 1867, with a full knowledge of the motives that prompted its passage, and because it was believed to be necessary and right. Nothing has since occurred to disprove the wisdom and justness of the measures, and to modify it as now proposed would be to lessen the protection of the citizen from the exercise of arbitrary power and to weaken the safeguards of life and liberty, which can never be made too secure against illegal encroachments.

The bill not only prohibits the adjudication by the Supreme Court of cases in which appeals may hereafter be taken, but interdicts its jurisdiction on appeals which have already been made to that high judicial body. If, therefore, it should become a law, it will by its retroactive operation wrest from the citizen a remedy which he enjoyed at the time of his appeal. It will thus operate most harshly upon those who believe that justice has been denied them in the inferior courts.

The legislation proposed in the second section, it seems to me, is not in harmony with the spirit and intention of the Constitution. It can not fail to affect most injuriously the just equipoise of our system of Government, for it establishes a precedent which, if followed, may eventually sweep away every check on arbitrary and unconstitutional legislation. Thus far during the existence of the Government the Supreme Court of the United States has been viewed by the people as the true expounder of their Constitution, and in the most violent party conflicts its judgments and decrees have always been sought and deferred to with confidence and respect. In public estimation it combines judicial wisdom and impartiality in a greater degree than any other authority known to the Constitution, and any act which may be construed into or mistaken for ~~an~~ attempt to prevent ~~or~~ evade its ~~decision~~ on a ~~question~~ which affects the liberty of the citizens and agitates the country can not fail to be attended with unpropitious consequences. It will be justly held by a large portion of the people as an admission of the unconstitutionality of

the act on which its judgment may be forbidden or forestalled, and may interfere with that willing acquiescence in its provisions which is necessary for the harmonious and efficient execution of any law.

For these reasons, thus briefly and imperfectly stated, and for others, of which want of time forbids the enumeration, I deem it my duty to withhold my assent from this bill, and to return it for the reconsideration of Congress.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 20, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I return without my signature a bill entitled "An act to admit the State of Arkansas to representation in Congress."

The approval of this bill would be an admission on the part of the Executive that the "Act for the more efficient government of the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto were proper and constitutional. My opinion, however, in reference to those measures has undergone no change, but, on the contrary, has been strengthened by the results which have attended their execution. Even were this not the case, I could not consent to a bill which is based upon the assumption either that by an act of rebellion of a portion of its people the State of Arkansas seceded from the Union, or that Congress may at its pleasure expel or exclude a State from the Union, or interrupt its relations with the Government by arbitrarily depriving it of representation in the Senate and House of Representatives. If Arkansas is a State not in the Union, this bill does not admit it as a State into the Union. If, on the other hand, Arkansas is a State in the Union, no legislation is necessary to declare it entitled "to representation in Congress as one of the States of the Union." The Constitution already declares that "each State shall have at least one Representative;" that the Senate "shall be composed of two Senators from each State," and "that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."

That instrument also makes each House "the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members," and therefore all that is now necessary to restore Arkansas in all its constitutional relations to the Government is a decision by each House upon the eligibility of those who, presenting their credentials, claim seats in the respective Houses of Congress. This is the plain and simple plan of the Constitution; and believing that had it been pursued when Congress assembled in the month of December, 1865, the restoration of the States would long since have been completed, I once again earnestly recommend that it be adopted by each House in preference to legislation, which I respectfully submit is not only of at least doubtful constitutionality, and therefore unwise and dangerous as a precedent, but is unnecessary, not so effective in its operation as the mode prescribed by the Constitution,

involves additional delay, and from its terms may be taken rather as applicable to a Territory about to be admitted as one of the United States than to a State which has occupied a place in the Union for upward of a quarter of a century.

The bill declares the State of Arkansas entitled and admitted to representation in Congress as one of the States of the Union upon the following fundamental condition:

> That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to vote who are entitled to vote by the constitution herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State: *Provided*, That any alteration of said constitution, prospective in its effect, may be made in regard to the time and place of residence of voters.

I have been unable to find in the Constitution of the United States any warrant for the exercise of the authority thus claimed by Congress. In assuming the power to impose a "fundamental condition" upon a State which has been duly "admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever," Congress asserts a right to enter a State as it may a Territory, and to regulate the highest prerogative of a free people—the elective franchise. This question is reserved by the Constitution to the States themselves, and to concede to Congress the power to regulate the subject would be to reverse the fundamental principle of the Republic and to place in the hands of the Federal Government, which is the creature of the States, the sovereignty which justly belongs to the States or the people—the true source of all political power, by whom our Federal system was created and to whose will it is subordinate.

The bill fails to provide in what manner the State of Arkansas is to signify its acceptance of the "fundamental condition" which Congress endeavors to make unalterable and irrevocable. Nor does it prescribe the penalty to be imposed should the people of the State amend or change the particular portions of the constitution which it is one of the purposes of the bill to perpetuate, but as to the consequences of such action leaves them in uncertainty and doubt. When the circumstances under which this constitution has been brought to the attention of Congress are considered, it is not unreasonable to suppose that efforts will be made to modify its provisions, and especially those in respect to which this measure prohibits any alteration. It is seriously questioned whether the constitution has been ratified by a majority of the persons who, under the act of March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto, were entitled to registration and to vote upon that issue. Section 10 of the schedule provides that—

> No person disqualified from voting or registering under this constitution shall vote for candidates for any office, nor shall be permitted to vote for the ratification or rejection of the constitution at the polls herein authorized.

Assumed to be in force before its adoption, in disregard of the law of Congress, the constitution undertakes to impose upon the elector other and further conditions. The fifth section of the eighth article provides that "all persons, before registering or voting," must take and subscribe an oath which, among others, contains the following clause:

> That I accept the civil and political equality of all men, and agree not to attempt to deprive any person or persons, on account of race, color, or previous condition, of any political or civil right, privilege, or immunity enjoyed by any other class of men.

It is well known that a very large portion of the electors in all the States, if not a large majority of all of them, do not believe in or accept the political equality of Indians, Mongolians, or negroes with the race to which they belong. If the voters in many of the States of the North and West were required to take such an oath as a test of their qualification, there is reason to believe that a majority of them would remain from the polls rather than comply with its degrading conditions. How far and to what extent this test oath prevented the registration of those who were qualified under the laws of Congress it is not possible to know, but that such was its effect, at least sufficient to overcome the small and doubtful majority in favor of this constitution, there can be no reasonable doubt. Should the people of Arkansas, therefore, desiring to regulate the elective franchise so as to make it conform to the constitutions of a large proportion of the States of the North and West, modify the provisions referred to in the "fundamental condition," what is to be the consequence? Is it intended that a denial of representation shall follow? And if so, may we not dread, at some future day, a recurrence of the troubles which have so long agitated the country? Would it not be the part of wisdom to take for our guide the Federal Constitution, rather than resort to measures which, looking only to the present, may in a few years renew, in an aggravated form, the strife and bitterness caused by legislation which has proved to be so ill timed and unfortunate?

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 25, 1868.

To the House of Representatives:

In returning to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, a bill entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," I do not deem it necessary to state at length the reasons which constrain me to withhold my approval. I will not, therefore, undertake at this time to reopen the discussion upon the grave constitutional questions involved in the act of March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto, in pursuance of which it is claimed, in the preamble to this bill, these States have framed and adopted constitutions of State government.

Nor will I repeat the objections contained in my message of the 20th instant, returning without my signature the bill to admit to representation the State of Arkansas, and which are equally applicable to the pending measure.

Like the act recently passed in reference to Arkansas, this bill supersedes the plain and simple mode prescribed by the Constitution for the admission to seats in the respective Houses of Senators and Representatives from the several States. It assumes authority over six States of the Union which has never been delegated to Congress, or is even warranted by previous unconstitutional legislation upon the subject of restoration. It imposes conditions which are in derogation of the equal rights of the States, and is founded upon a theory which is subversive of the fundamental principles of the Government. In the case of Alabama it violates the plighted faith of Congress by forcing upon that State a constitution which was rejected by the people, according to the express terms of an act of Congress requiring that a majority of the registered electors should vote upon the question of its ratification.

For these objections, and many others that might be presented, I can not approve this bill, and therefore return it for the action of Congress required in such cases by the Federal Constitution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
July 20, 1868.

To the Senate of the United States:

I have given to the joint resolution entitled "A resolution excluding from the electoral college the votes of States lately in rebellion which shall not have been reorganized" as careful examination as I have been able to bestow upon the subject during the few days that have intervened since the measure was submitted for my approval.

Feeling constrained to withhold my consent, I herewith return the resolution to the Senate, in which House it originated, with a brief statement of the reasons which have induced my action. This joint resolution is based upon the assumption that some of the States whose inhabitants were lately in rebellion are not now entitled to representation in Congress and participation in the election of President and Vice-President of the United States.

Having heretofore had occasion to give in detail my reasons for dissenting from this view, it is not necessary at this time to repeat them. It is sufficient to state that I continue strong in my conviction that the acts of secession, by which a number of the States sought to dissolve their connection with the other States and to subvert the Union, being unauthorized by the Constitution and in direct violation thereof, were from the beginning absolutely null and void. It follows necessarily that

when the rebellion terminated the several States which had attempted to secede continued to be States in the Union, and all that was required to enable them to resume their relations to the Union was that they should adopt the measures necessary to their practical restoration as States. Such measures were adopted, and the legitimate result was that those States, having conformed to all the requirements of the Constitution, resumed their former relations, and became entitled to the exercise of all the rights guaranteed to them by its provisions.

The joint resolution under consideration, however, seems to assume that by the insurrectionary acts of their respective inhabitants those States forfeited their rights as such, and can never again exercise them except upon readmission into the Union on the terms prescribed by Congress. If this position be correct, it follows that they were taken out of the Union by virtue of their acts of secession, and hence that the war waged upon them was illegal and unconstitutional. We would thus be placed in this inconsistent attitude, that while the war was commenced and carried on upon the distinct ground that the Southern States, being component parts of the Union, were in rebellion against the lawful authority of the United States, upon its termination we resort to a policy of reconstruction which assumes that it was not in fact a rebellion, but that the war was waged for the conquest of territories assumed to be outside of the constitutional Union.

The mode and manner of receiving and counting the electoral votes for President and Vice-President of the United States are in plain and simple terms prescribed by the Constitution. That instrument imperatively requires that "the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted." Congress has, therefore, no power, under the Constitution, to receive the electoral votes or reject them. The whole power is exhausted when, in the presence of the two Houses, the votes are counted and the result declared. In this respect the power and duty of the President of the Senate are, under the Constitution, purely ministerial. When, therefore, the joint resolution declares that no electoral votes shall be received or counted from States that since the 4th of March, 1867, have not "adopted a constitution of State government under which a State government shall have organized," a power is assumed which is nowhere delegated to Congress, unless upon the assumption that the State governments organized prior to the 4th of March, 1867, were illegal and void.

The joint resolution, by implication at least, concedes that these States were States by virtue of their organization prior to the 4th of March, 1867, but denies to them the right to vote in the election of President and Vice-President of the United States. It follows either that this assumption of power is wholly unauthorized by the Constitution or that the States so excluded from voting were out of the Union by reason

of the rebellion, and have never been legitimately restored. Being fully satisfied that they were never out of the Union, and that their relations thereto have been legally and constitutionally restored, I am forced to the conclusion that the joint resolution, which deprives them of the right to have their votes for President and Vice-President received and counted, is in conflict with the Constitution, and that Congress has no more power to reject their votes than those of the States which have been uniformly loyal to the Federal Union.

It is worthy of remark that if the States whose inhabitants were recently in rebellion were legally and constitutionally organized and restored to their rights prior to the 4th of March, 1867, as I am satisfied they were, the only legitimate authority under which the election for President and Vice-President can be held therein must be derived from the governments instituted before that period. It clearly follows that all the State governments organized in those States under act of Congress for that purpose, and under military control, are illegitimate and of no validity whatever; and in that view the votes cast in those States for President and Vice-President, in pursuance of acts passed since the 4th of March, 1867, and in obedience to the so-called reconstruction acts of Congress, can not be legally received and counted, while the only votes in those States that can be legally cast and counted will be those cast in pursuance of the laws in force in the several States prior to the legislation by Congress upon the subject of reconstruction.

I can not refrain from directing your special attention to the declaration contained in the joint resolution, that "none of the States whose inhabitants were lately in rebellion shall be entitled to representation in the electoral college," etc. If it is meant by this declaration that no State is to be allowed to vote for President and Vice-President *all* of whose inhabitants were engaged in the late rebellion, it is apparent that no one of the States will be excluded from voting, since it is well known that in every Southern State there were many inhabitants who not only did not participate in the rebellion, but who actually took part in the suppression, or refrained from giving it any aid or countenance. I therefore conclude that the true meaning of the joint resolution is that no State a *portion* of whose inhabitants were engaged in the rebellion shall be permitted to participate in the Presidential election, except upon the terms and conditions therein prescribed.

Assuming this to be the true construction of the resolution, the inquiry becomes pertinent, May those Northern States a portion of whose inhabitants were actually in the rebellion be prevented, at the discretion of Congress, from having their electoral votes counted? It is well known that a portion of the inhabitants of New York and a portion of the inhabitants of Virginia were alike engaged in the rebellion; yet it is equally well known that Virginia, as well as New York, was at all times during the war recognized by the Federal Government as a State in the Union — so

clearly that upon the termination of hostilities it was not even deemed necessary for her restoration that a provisional governor should be appointed; yet, according to this joint resolution, the people of Virginia, unless they comply with the terms it prescribes, are denied the right of voting for President, while the people of New York, a portion of the inhabitants of which State were also in rebellion, are permitted to have their electoral votes counted without undergoing the process of reconstruction prescribed for Virginia. New York is no more a State than Virginia; the one is as much entitled to representation in the electoral college as the other. If Congress has the power to deprive Virginia of this right, it can exercise the same authority with respect to New York or any other of the States. Thus the result of the Presidential election may be controlled and determined by Congress, and the people be deprived of their right under the Constitution to choose a President and Vice-President of the United States.

If Congress were to provide by law that the votes of none of the States should be received and counted if cast for a candidate who differed in political sentiment with a majority of the two Houses, such legislation would at once be condemned by the country as an unconstitutional and revolutionary usurpation of power. It would, however, be exceedingly difficult to find in the Constitution any more authority for the passage of the joint resolution under consideration than for an enactment looking directly to the rejection of all votes not in accordance with the political preferences of a majority of Congress. No power exists in the Constitution authorizing the joint resolution or the supposed law—the only difference being that one would be more palpably unconstitutional and revolutionary than the other. Both would rest upon the radical error that Congress has the power to prescribe terms and conditions to the right of the people of the States to cast their votes for President and Vice-President.

For the reasons thus indicated I am constrained to return the joint resolution to the Senate for such further action thereon as Congress may deem necessary.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *July 25, 1868*

To the Senate of the United States:

Believing that a bill entitled "An act relating to the Freedmen's Bureau, and providing for its discontinuance," interferes with the appointing power conferred by the Constitution upon the Executive, and for other reasons, which at this late period of the session time will not permit me to state, I herewith return it to the Senate, in which House it originated, without my approval.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

PROCLAMATIONS.

By the President of the United States of America.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas in the month of July, A. D. 1861, in accepting the condition of civil war which was brought about by insurrection and rebellion in several of the States which constitute the United States, the two Houses of Congress did solemnly declare that that war was not waged on the part of the Government in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor for any purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States, but only to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired, and that so soon as those objects should be accomplished the war on the part of the Government should cease; and

Whereas the President of the United States has heretofore, in the spirit of that declaration and with the view of securing for it ultimate and complete effect, set forth several proclamations offering amnesty and pardon to persons who had been or were concerned in the aforenamed rebellion, which proclamations, however, were attended with prudential reservations and exceptions then deemed necessary and proper, and which proclamations were respectively issued on the 8th day of December, 1863, on the 26th day of March, 1864, on the 29th day of May, 1865, and on the 7th day of September, 1867; and

Whereas the said lamentable civil war has long since altogether ceased, with an acknowledgment by all the States of the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and of the Government thereunder, and there no longer exists any reasonable ground to apprehend a renewal of the said civil war, or any foreign interference, or any unlawful resistance by any portion of the people of any of the States to the Constitution and laws of the United States; and

Whereas it is desirable to reduce the standing army and to bring to a speedy termination military occupation, martial law, military tribunals, abridgment of the freedom of speech and of the press, and suspension of the privilege of *habeas corpus* and of the right of trial by jury, such encroachments upon our free institutions in time of peace being dangerous to public liberty, incompatible with the individual rights of the citizen, contrary to the genius and spirit of our republican form of government, and exhaustive of the national resources; and

Whereas it is believed that amnesty and pardon will tend to secure a complete and universal establishment and prevalence of municipal law

and order in conformity with the Constitution of the United States, and to remove all appearances or presumptions of a retaliatory or vindictive policy on the part of the Government attended by unnecessary disqualifications, pains, penalties, confiscations, and disfranchisements, and, on the contrary, to promote and procure complete fraternal reconciliation among the whole people, with due submission to the Constitution and laws:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do, by virtue of the Constitution and in the name of the people of the United States, hereby proclaim and declare, unconditionally and without reservation, to all and to every person who, directly or indirectly, participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, excepting such person or persons as may be under presentment or indictment in any court of the United States having competent jurisdiction upon a charge of treason or other felony, a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States or of adhering to their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and except also as to any property of which any person may have been legally divested under the laws of the United States.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

[SEAL.] Done at the city of Washington, the 4th day of July, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, *Secretary of State.*

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," passed on the 25th day of June, 1868, it is declared that it is made the duty of the President, within ten days after receiving official information of the ratification by the legislature of either of said States of a proposed amendment to the Constitution known as article fourteen, to issue a proclamation announcing that fact; and

Whereas the said act seems to be prospective; and

Whereas a paper purporting to be a resolution of the legislature of Florida adopting the amendment of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of the Constitution of the United States was received at the Department of State on the 16th of June, 1868, prior to the passage of the act of Congress referred to, which paper is attested by the names of Horatio

Jenkins, jr., as president *pro tempore* of the senate, and W. W. Moore as speaker of the assembly, and of William L. Apthoop, as secretary of the senate, and William Forsyth Bynum, as clerk of the assembly, and which paper was transmitted to the Secretary of State in a letter dated Executive Office, Tallahassee, Fla., June 10, 1868, from Harrison Reed, who therein signs himself governor; and

Whereas on the 6th day of July, 1868, a paper was received by the President, which paper, being addressed to the President, bears date of the 4th day of July, 1868, and was transmitted by and under the name of W. W. Holden, who therein writes himself governor of the State of North Carolina, which paper certifies that the said proposed amendment, known as article fourteen, did pass the senate and house of representatives of the general assembly of North Carolina on the 2d day of July instant, and is attested by the names of John H. Boner, or Bower, as secretary of the house of representatives, and T. A. Byrnes, as secretary of the senate; and its ratification on the 4th of July, 1868, is attested by Tod R. Caldwell, as lieutenant-governor, president of the senate, and Jo. W. Holden, as speaker house of representatives:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, in compliance with and execution of the act of Congress aforesaid, do issue this proclamation, announcing the fact of the ratification of the said amendment by the legislature of the State of North Carolina in the manner hereinbefore set forth.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed.

[SEAL.] Done at the city of Washington, this 11th day of July, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, *Secretary of State.*

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," passed the 25th day of June, 1868, it is declared that it is made the duty of the President, within ten days after receiving official information of the ratification by the legislature of either of said States of a proposed amendment to the Constitution known as article fourteen, to issue a proclamation announcing that fact; and

Whereas on the 18th day of July, 1868, a letter was received by the President, which letter, being addressed to the President, bears date of July 15, 1868, and was transmitted by and under the name of R. K. Scott,

who therein writes himself governor of South Carolina, in which letter was inclosed and received at the same time by the President a paper purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the general assembly of the State of South Carolina ratifying the said proposed amendment, and also purporting to have passed the two said houses, respectively, on the 7th and 9th of July, 1868, and to have been approved by the said R. K. Scott, as governor of said State, on the 15th of July, 1868, which circumstances are attested by the signatures of D. T. Corbin, as president *pro tempore* of the senate, and of F. J. Moses, jr., as speaker of the house of representatives of said State, and of the said R. K. Scott, as governor:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, in compliance with and execution of the act of Congress aforesaid, do issue this my proclamation, announcing the fact of the ratification of the said amendment by the legislature of the State of South Carolina in the manner hereinbefore set forth.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed.

[SEAL.] Done at the city of Washington, this 18th day of July, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD. *Secretary of State.*

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," passed on the 25th day of June, 1868, it is declared that it is made the duty of the President, within ten days after receiving official information of the ratification by the legislature of either of said States of a proposed amendment to the Constitution known as article fourteen, to issue a proclamation announcing that fact; and

Whereas a paper was received at the Department of State on the 17th day of July, 1868, which paper, bearing date of the 9th day of July, 1868, purports to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the State of Louisiana in general assembly convened ratifying the aforesaid amendment, and is attested by the signature of George E. Bovee, as secretary of state, under a seal purporting to be the seal of the State of Louisiana:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, in compliance with and execution of the act of Congress before mentioned, do issue this my proclamation, announcing

the fact of the ratification of the said amendment by the legislature of the State of Louisiana in the manner hereinbefore set forth.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed.

[SEAL.] Done at the city of Washington, this 18th day of July, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, *Secretary of State.*

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," passed the 25th day of June, 1868, it is declared that it is made the duty of the President, within ten days after receiving official information of the ratification by the legislature of either of said States of a proposed amendment to the Constitution known as article fourteen, to issue a proclamation announcing that fact; and

Whereas a letter was received this day by the President, which letter, being addressed to the President, bears date of July 16, 1868, and was transmitted by and under the name of William H. Smith, who therein writes himself governor of Alabama, in which letter was inclosed and received at the same time by the President a paper purporting to be a resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the general assembly of the State of Alabama ratifying the said proposed amendment, which paper is attested by the signature of Charles A. Miller, as secretary of state, under a seal purporting to be the seal of the State of Alabama, and bears the date of approval of July 13, 1868, by William H. Smith, as governor of said State:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, in compliance with and execution of the act of Congress before mentioned, do issue this my proclamation, announcing the fact of the ratification of the said amendment by the legislature of the State of Alabama in the manner hereinbefore set forth.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed.

[SEAL.] Done at the city of Washington, this 20th day of July, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, *Secretary of State:*

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," passed the 25th day of June, 1868, it is declared that it is made the duty of the President, within ten days after receiving official information of the ratification by the legislature of either of said States of a proposed amendment to the Constitution known as article fourteen, to issue a proclamation announcing that fact; and

Whereas a paper was received at the Department of State this 27th day of July, 1868, purporting to be a joint resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the general assembly of the State of Georgia, ratifying the said proposed amendment and also purporting to have passed the two said houses, respectively, on the 21st of July, 1868, and to have been approved by Rufus B. Bullock, who therein signs himself governor of Georgia, which paper is also attested by the signatures of Benjamin Conley, as president of the senate, and R. L. McWhorters, as speaker of the house of representatives, and is further attested by the signatures of A. E. Marshall, as secretary of the senate, and M. A. Hardin, as clerk of the house of representatives:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, in compliance with and execution of the act of Congress before mentioned, do issue this my proclamation, announcing the fact of the ratification of the said amendment by the legislature of the State of Georgia in the manner hereinbefore set forth.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed.

[SEAL.] Done at the city of Washington, this 27th day of July, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, *Secretary of State.*

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

In the year which is now drawing to its end the art, the skill, and the labor of the people of the United States have been employed with greater diligence and vigor and on broader fields than ever before, and the fruits of the earth have been gathered into the granary and the storehouse in marvelous abundance. Our highways have been lengthened, and new and prolific regions have been occupied. We are permitted to hope that long-protracted political and sectional dissensions are at no distant day to give place to returning harmony and fraternal affection throughout the Republic. Many foreign states have entered into liberal agreements

with us, while nations which are far off and which heretofore have been unsocial and exclusive have become our friends.

The annual period of rest, which we have reached in health and tranquillity, and which is crowned with so many blessings, is by universal consent a convenient and suitable one for cultivating personal piety and practicing public devotion.

I therefore recommend that Thursday, the 26th day of November next, be set apart and observed by all the people of the United States as a day for public praise, thanksgiving, and prayer to the Almighty Creator and Divine Ruler of the Universe, by whose ever-watchful, merciful, and gracious providence alone states and nations, no less than families and individual men, do live and move and have their being.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

[SEAL.] Done at the city of Washington, this 12th day of October, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, *Secretary of State.*

EXECUTIVE ORDERS.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

EXECUTIVE ORDER.

WASHINGTON, *December 17, 1867.*

It is desired and advised that all communications in writing intended for the executive department of this Government and relating to public business of whatever kind, including suggestions for legislation, claims, contracts, employment, appointments, and removals from office, and pardons, be transmitted directly in the first instance to the head of the Department to which the care of the subject-matter of the communication properly belongs. This regulation has become necessary for the more convenient, punctual, and regular dispatch of the public business.

By order of the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 104.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, December 28, 1867.

By direction of the President of the United States, the following orders are made:

I. Brevet Major-General E. O. C. Ord will turn over the command of

the Fourth Military District to Brevet Major-General A. C. Gillem, and proceed to San Francisco, Cal., to take command of the Department of California.

II. On being relieved by Brevet Major-General Ord, Brevet Major-General Irvin McDowell will proceed to Vicksburg, Miss., and relieve General Gillem in command of the Fourth Military District.

III. Brevet Major-General John Pope is hereby relieved of the command of the Third Military District, and will report without delay at the Headquarters of the Army for further orders, turning over his command to the next senior officer until the arrival of his successor.

IV. Major-General George G. Meade is assigned to the command of the Third Military District, and will assume it without delay. The Department of the East will be commanded by the senior officer now on duty in it until a commander is named by the President.

V. The officers assigned in the foregoing orders to command of military districts will exercise therein any and all powers conferred by acts of Congress upon district commanders, and also any and all powers pertaining to military-department commanders.

* * * * * * *

By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 10.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, February 12, 1868.

The following orders are published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., February 12, 1868.

General U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: You will please issue an order creating a military division, to be called the Military Division of the Atlantic, to be composed of the Department of the Lakes, the Department of the East, and the Department of Washington, and to be commanded by Lieutenant-General William T. Sherman, with his headquarters at Washington.

Until further orders from the President, you will assign no officer to the permanent command of the Military Division of the Missouri.

Respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

Major-General P. H. Sheridan, the senior officer in the Military Division of the Missouri, will temporarily perform the duties of commander of

the Military Division of the Missouri, in addition to his duties of department commander.

By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby removed from office as Secretary for the Department of War, and your functions as such will terminate upon the receipt of this communication.

You will transfer to Brevet Major-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of the Army, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and charge.

Respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.

Brevet Major-General LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C.

SIR: The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from office as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, and will immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

Respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 17.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, March 28, 1868.

By direction of the President of the United States, Major-General W. S. Hancock is relieved from command of the Fifth Military District and assigned to command of the Military Division of the Atlantic, created by General Orders, No. 10, of February 12, 1868.

By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., May 28, 1868.

The chairman of the committee of arrangements having requested that an opportunity may be given to those employed in the several Executive Departments of the Government to unite with their fellow-citizens in paying a fitting tribute to the memory of the brave men whose remains repose in the national cemeteries, the President directs that as far as may be consistent with law and the public interests persons who desire to participate in the ceremonies be permitted to absent themselves from their duties on Saturday, the 30th instant.

By order of the President:

WM. G. MOORE, *Secretary.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., June 1, 1868.

Major-General John M. Schofield having been appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, Secretary for the Department of War, is hereby relieved from the command of the First Military District, created by the act of Congress passed March 2, 1867.

Brevet Major-General George Stoneman is hereby assigned, according to his brevet rank of major-general, to the command of the said First District and of the Military Department of Virginia.

The Secretary of War will please give the necessary instructions to carry this order into effect.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 25.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, June 3, 1868.

I. The following order of the President has been received from the War Department:

WASHINGTON, *June 2, 1868.*

The President with deep regret announces to the people of the United States the decease, at Wheatland, Pa., on the 1st instant, of his honored predecessor James Buchanan.

This event will occasion mourning in the nation for the loss of an eminent citizen and honored public servant.

As a mark of respect for his memory, it is ordered that the Executive Departments be immediately placed in mourning and all business be suspended on the day of the funeral.

It is further ordered that the War and Navy Departments cause suitable military and naval honors to be paid on this occasion to the memory of the illustrious dead.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

II. In compliance with the instructions of the President and of the Secretary of War, on the day after the receipt of this order at each military post the troops will be paraded at 10 o'clock a. m. and the order read to them, after which all labors for the day will cease.

The national flag will be displayed at half-staff.

At dawn of day thirteen guns will be fired, and afterwards, at intervals of thirty minutes between the rising and setting sun, a single gun, and at the close of the day a national salute of thirty-seven guns.

The officers of the Army will wear crape on the left arm and on their swords and the colors of the several regiments will be put in mourning for the period of six months.

By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDER.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 3, 1868.

The death of ex-President James Buchanan is announced in the following order of the President of the United States:

[For order see preceding page.]

In pursuance of the foregoing order, it is hereby directed that thirty minute guns be fired at each of the navy-yards and naval stations on Thursday, the 4th instant, the day designated for the funeral of the late ex-President Buchanan, commencing at noon, and on board the flagships in each squadron upon the day after the receipt of this order. The flags at the several navy-yards, naval stations, and marine barracks will be placed at half-mast until after the funeral, and on board all naval vessels in commission upon the day after this order is received.

GIDEON WELLES, *Secretary of the Navy.*

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 33.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, June 30, 1868.

By direction of the President of the United States, the following orders are made:

I. Brevet Major-General Irvin McDowell is relieved from the command of the Fourth Military District, and will report in person, without delay, at the War Department.

II. Brevet Major-General Alvan C. Gillem is assigned to the command of the Fourth Military District, and will assume it without delay.

By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 44.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, July 13, 1868.

By direction of the President, Brigadier and Brevet Major-General Irvin McDowell is assigned to the command of the Department of the East.

The headquarters of the department will be transferred from Philadelphia to New York City.

By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 55.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, July 28, 1868.

The following orders from the War Department, which have been approved by the President, are published for the information and government of the Army and of all concerned:

The commanding generals of the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Military Districts having officially reported that the States of Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida have fully complied with the acts of Congress known as the reconstruction acts, including the act passed June 22, 1868, entitled "An act to admit the State of Arkansas to representation in Congress," and the act passed June 25, 1868, entitled "An act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress," and that, consequently, so much of the act of March 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto as provides for the organization of military districts, subject to the military authority of the United States, as therein provided, has become inoperative in said States, and that the commanding generals have ceased to exercise in said States the military powers conferred by said acts of Congress: Therefore the following changes will be made in the organization and command of military districts and geographical departments:

I. The Second and Third Military Districts having ceased to exist, the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida will constitute the Department of the South, Major-General George G. Meade to command. Headquarters at Atlanta, Ga.

II. The Fourth Military District will now consist only of the State of Mississippi, and will continue to be commanded by Brevet Major-General A. C. Gillem.

III. The Fifth Military District will now consist of the State of Texas, and will be commanded by Brevet Major-General J. J. Reynolds. Headquarters at Austin, Tex.

IV. The States of Louisiana and Arkansas will constitute the Department of Louisiana. Brevet Major-General L. H. Rousseau is assigned to the command. Headquarters at New Orleans, La. Until the arrival of General Rousseau at New Orleans, Brevet Major-General Buchanan will command the Department.

V. Brevet Major-General George Crook is assigned, according to his brevet of major-general, to command the Department of the Columbia, in place of Rousseau, relieved.

VI. Brevet Major-General E. R. S. Canby is reassigned to command the Department of Washington.

* * * * * * *

By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Under and in pursuance of the authority vested in the President of the United States by the provisions of the second section of the act of Congress approved on the 27th day of July, 1868, entitled "An act to extend the laws of the United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation over the territory ceded to the United States by Russia, to establish a collection district therein, and for other purposes," the port of Sitka, in said Territory, is hereby constituted and established as the port of entry for the collection district of Alaska provided for by said act; and under and in pursuance of the authority vested in him by the fourth section of said act the importation and use of firearms, ammunition, and distilled spirits into and within the said Territory, or any portion thereof, except as hereinafter provided, is entirely prohibited, under the pains and penalties specified in said last-named section: *Provided, however*, That under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, in accordance with law, such articles may, in limited quantities, be shipped coastwise from United States ports on the Pacific coast to said port of Sitka, and to that port only in said Territory, on the shipper giving bonds to the collector of customs at the port of shipment, conditioned that such articles will on their arrival at Sitka be delivered to the collector of customs, or the person there acting as such, to remain in his possession and under his control until sold or disposed of to such persons as the military or other chief authority in said Territory may specially designate in permits for that purpose signed by himself ~~or a~~ subordinate duly authorized by him.

Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of August, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON, *President.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, NO. 219.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, September 12, 1868.

* * * * * * *

18. By direction of the President, Brevet Major-General L. H. Rousseau, brigadier-general, commanding Department of Louisiana, is hereby assigned to duty according to his brevet rank of major-general. This order to take effect when General Rousseau assumes command.

19. By direction of the President, paragraph 12 of Special Orders, No. 70, May 23, 1868, from this office, assigning Brevet Major-General R. C. Buchanan, colonel First United States Infantry, to duty according to his brevet rank of major-general, is hereby revoked, and he is hereby assigned to duty according to his brevet rank of brigadier-general, in order that he may command the District of Louisiana. This order to take effect when General Rousseau assumes command of the Department of Louisiana.

By command of General Grant:

J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 82.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, October 10, 1868.

The following order has been received from the President, and by his direction is published to the Army:

The following provisions from the Constitution and laws of the United States in relation to the election of a President and Vice-President of the United States, together with an act of Congress prohibiting all persons engaged in the military and naval service from interfering in any general or special election in any State, are published for the information and government of all concerned:

[Extract from Article II, section 1, Constitution of the United States.]

The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.

[Extract from Article XII, amendment to the Constitution of the United States.]

The electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State

with themselves. They shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the 4th day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.

[Extract from "An act relative to the election of a President and Vice-President of the United States, and declaring the officer who shall act as President in case of vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice-President," approved March 1, 1792.]

SEC. 1. *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That * * * electors shall be appointed in each State for the election of a President and Vice-President of the United States * * * in every fourth year succeeding the last election, which electors shall be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which the several States may by law be entitled at the time when the President and Vice-President thus to be chosen should come into office: *Provided always*, That where no apportionment of Representatives shall have been made after any enumeration at the time of choosing electors, then the number of electors shall be according to the existing apportionment of Senators and Representatives.

["An act to establish a uniform time for holding elections for electors of President and Vice-President in all the States of the Union," approved January 23, 1845.]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the electors of President and Vice-President shall be appointed in each State on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in the month of November of the year in which they are to be appointed: *Provided*, That each State may by law provide for the filling of any vacancy or vacancies which may occur in its college of electors when such college meets to give its electoral vote: *And provided also*, When any State shall have held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and shall fail to make a choice on the day aforesaid, then the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such manner as the State shall by law provide.

[Extracts from "An act relative to the election of a President and Vice-President of the United States, and declaring the officer who shall act as President in case of vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice-President," approved March 1, 1792.]

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That the electors shall meet and give their votes on the said first Wednesday in December, at such place in each State as shall be directed by the legislature thereof; and the electors in each State shall make and sign three certificates of all the votes by them given, and shall seal up the same, certifying on each that a list of the votes of such State for President and Vice-President is contained therein, and shall, by writing under their hands or under the hands of a majority of them, appoint a person to take charge of and deliver to the President

of the Senate, at the seat of Government, before the first Wednesday in January then next ensuing, one of the said certificates; and the said electors shall forthwith forward by the post-office to the President of the Senate, at the seat of Government, one other of the said certificates, and shall forthwith cause the other of the said certificates to be delivered to the judge of that district in which the said electors shall assemble.

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted*, That the executive authority of each State shall cause three lists of the names of the electors of such State to be made and certified, and to be delivered to the electors on or before the said first Wednesday in December, and the said electors shall annex one of the said lists to each of the lists of their votes.

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That if a list of votes from any State shall not have been received at the seat of Government on the said first Wednesday in January, that then the Secretary of State shall send a special messenger to the district judge in whose custody such list shall have been lodged, who shall forthwith transmit the same to the seat of Government.

SEC. 5. *And be it further enacted*, That Congress shall be in session on the second Wednesday in February, 1793, and on the second Wednesday in February succeeding every meeting of the electors, and the said certificates, or so many of them as shall have been received, shall then be opened, the votes counted, and the persons who shall fill the offices of President and Vice-President ascertained and declared agreeably to the Constitution.

SEC. 6. *And be it further enacted*, That in case there shall be no President of the Senate at the seat of Government on the arrival of the persons intrusted with the list of the votes of the electors, then such persons shall deliver the lists of votes in their custody into the office of the Secretary of State, to be safely kept and delivered over as soon as may be to the President of the Senate.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 8. *And be it further enacted*, That if any person appointed to deliver the votes of the electors to the President of the Senate shall, after accepting of his appointment, neglect to perform the services required of him by this act, he shall forfeit the sum of $1,000.

[Extract from "An act making compensation to the persons appointed by the electors to deliver the votes for President and Vice-President," approved February 11, 1825.]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the person appointed by the electors to deliver to the President of the Senate a list of the votes for President and Vice-President shall be allowed, on delivery of said list, 25 cents for every mile of the estimated distance by the most usual route from the place of meeting of the electors to the seat of Government of the United States, going and returning.

[Extract from "An act relative to the election of a President and Vice-President of the United States, and declaring the officer who shall act as President in case of vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice-President," approved March 1, 1792.]

SEC. 12. *And be it further enacted*, That the term of four years for which a President and Vice-President shall be elected shall in all cases commence on the 4th day of March next succeeding the day on which the votes of the electors shall have been given.

["An act to prevent officers of the Army and Navy, and other persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States, from interfering in elections in the States," approved February 25, 1865.]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it shall not be lawful for any military or naval officer of the United States, or other person engaged in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, to order, bring, keep, or have under his authority or

control any troops or armed men at the place where any general or special election is held in any State of the United States of America, unless it shall be necessary to repel the armed enemies of the United States or to keep the peace at the polls. And that it shall not be lawful for any officer of the Army or Navy of the United States to prescribe or fix, or attempt to prescribe or fix, by proclamation, order, or otherwise, the qualifications of voters in any State of the United States of America, or in any manner to interfere with the freedom of any election in any State or with the exercise of the free right of suffrage in any State of the United States. Any officer of the Army or Navy of the United States, or other person engaged in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, who violates this section of this act shall for every such offense be liable to indictment as for a misdemeanor in any court of the United States having jurisdiction to hear, try, and determine cases of misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding $5,000 and suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than three months nor more than five years, at the discretion of the court trying the same; and any person convicted as aforesaid shall, moreover, be disqualified from holding any office of honor, profit, or trust under the Government of the United States: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent any officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines from exercising the right of suffrage in any election district to which he may belong, if otherwise qualified according to the laws of the State in which he shall offer to vote.

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That any officer or person in the military or naval service of the United States who shall order or advise, or who shall, directly or indirectly, by force, threat, menace, intimidation, or otherwise, prevent or attempt to prevent any qualified voter of any State of the United States of America from freely exercising the right of suffrage at any general or special election in any State of the United States, or who shall in like manner compel or attempt to compel any officer of an election in any such State to receive a vote from a person not legally qualified to vote, or who shall impose or attempt to impose any rules or regulations for conducting such election different from those prescribed by law, or interfere in any manner with any officer of said election in the discharge of his duties, shall for any such offense be liable to indictment as for a misdemeanor in any court of the United States having jurisdiction to hear, try, and determine cases of misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall pay a fine of not exceeding $5,000 and suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, at the discretion of the court trying the same; and any person convicted as aforesaid shall, moreover, be disqualified from holding any office of honor, profit, or trust under the Government of the United States.

By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, November 4, 1868.

By direction of the President, Brevet Major-General E. R. S. Canby is hereby assigned to the command of the Fifth Military District, created by the act of Congress of March 2, 1867, and of the Military Department of Texas, consisting of the State of Texas. He will, without unnecessary delay, turn over his present command to the next officer in rank and proceed to the command to which he is hereby assigned, and on assuming the same will, when necessary to a faithful execution of the laws, exercise any and all powers conferred by acts of Congress upon district

commanders and any and all authority pertaining to officers in command of military departments.

Brevet Major-General J. J. Reynolds is hereby relieved from the command of the Fifth Military District.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Secretary of War.

FOURTH ANNUAL MESSAGE.

WASHINGTON, *December 9, 1868.*

Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:

Upon the reassembling of Congress it again becomes my duty to call your attention to the state of the Union and to its continued disorganized condition under the various laws which have been passed upon the subject of reconstruction.

It may be safely assumed as an axiom in the government of states that the greatest wrongs inflicted upon a people are caused by unjust and arbitrary legislation, or by the unrelenting decrees of despotic rulers, and that the timely revocation of injurious and oppressive measures is the greatest good that can be conferred upon a nation. The legislator or ruler who has the wisdom and magnanimity to retrace his steps when convinced of error will sooner or later be rewarded with the respect and gratitude of an intelligent and patriotic people.

Our own history, although embracing a period less than a century, affords abundant proof that most, if not all, of our domestic troubles are directly traceable to violations of the organic law and excessive legislation. The most striking illustrations of this fact are furnished by the enactments of the past three years upon the question of reconstruction. After a fair trial they have substantially failed and proved pernicious in their results, and there seems to be no good reason why they should longer remain upon the statute book. States to which the Constitution guarantees a republican form of government have been reduced to military dependencies, in each of which the people have been made subject to the arbitrary will of the commanding general. Although the Constitution requires that each State shall be represented in Congress, Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas are yet excluded from the two Houses, and, contrary to the express provisions of that instrument, were denied participation in the recent election for a President and Vice-President of the United States. The attempt to place the white population under the domination of persons of color in the South has impaired, if not destroyed, the kindly relations that had previously existed between them; and mutual distrust has engendered a feeling of animosity which, leading in some instances to collision and bloodshed, has prevented that cooperation between the two

races so essential to the success of industrial enterprise in the Southern States. Nor have the inhabitants of those States alone suffered from the disturbed condition of affairs growing out of these Congressional enactments. The entire Union has been agitated by grave apprehensions of troubles which might again involve the peace of the nation; its interests have been injuriously affected by the derangement of business and labor, and the consequent want of prosperity throughout that portion of the country.

The Federal Constitution—the *magna charta* of American rights, under whose wise and salutary provisions we have successfully conducted all our domestic and foreign affairs, sustained ourselves in peace and in war, and become a great nation among the powers of the earth—must assuredly be now adequate to the settlement of questions growing out of the civil war, waged alone for its vindication. This great fact is made most manifest by the condition of the country when Congress assembled in the month of December, 1865. Civil strife had ceased, the spirit of rebellion had spent its entire force, in the Southern States the people had warmed into national life, and throughout the whole country a healthy reaction in public sentiment had taken place. By the application of the simple yet effective provisions of the Constitution the executive department, with the voluntary aid of the States, had brought the work of restoration as near completion as was within the scope of its authority, and the nation was encouraged by the prospect of an early and satisfactory adjustment of all its difficulties. Congress, however, intervened, and, refusing to perfect the work so nearly consummated, declined to admit members from the unrepresented States, adopted a series of measures which arrested the progress of restoration, frustrated all that had been so successfully accomplished, and, after three years of agitation and strife, has left the country further from the attainment of union and fraternal feeling than at the inception of the Congressional plan of reconstruction. It needs no argument to show that legislation which has produced such baneful consequences should be abrogated, or else made to conform to the genuine principles of republican government.

Under the influence of party passion and sectional prejudice, other acts have been passed not warranted by the Constitution. Congress has already been made familiar with my views respecting the "tenure-of-office bill." Experience has proved that its repeal is demanded by the best interests of the country, and that while it remains in force the President can not enjoin that rigid accountability of public officers so essential to an honest and efficient execution of the laws. Its revocation would enable the executive department to exercise the power of appointment and removal in accordance with the original design of the Federal Constitution.

The act of March 2, 1867, making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes, contains

provisions which interfere with the President's constitutional functions as Commander in Chief of the Army and deny to States of the Union the right to protect themselves by means of their own militia. These provisions should be at once annulled; for while the first might, in times of great emergency, seriously embarrass the Executive in efforts to employ and direct the common strength of the nation for its protection and preservation, the other is contrary to the express declaration of the Constitution that "a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

It is believed that the repeal of all such laws would be accepted by the American people as at least a partial return to the fundamental principles of the Government, and an indication that hereafter the Constitution is to be made the nation's safe and unerring guide. They can be productive of no permanent benefit to the country, and should not be permitted to stand as so many monuments of the deficient wisdom which has characterized our recent legislation.

The condition of our finances demands the early and earnest consideration of Congress. Compared with the growth of our population, the public expenditures have reached an amount unprecedented in our history.

The population of the United States in 1790 was nearly 4,000,000 people. Increasing each decade about 33 per cent, it reached in 1860 31,000,000, an increase of 700 per cent on the population in 1790. In 1869 it is estimated that it will reach 38,000,000, or an increase of 868 per cent in seventy-nine years.

The annual expenditures of the Federal Government in 1791 were $4,200,000; in 1820, $18,200,000; in 1850, forty-one millions; in 1860, sixty-three millions; in 1865, nearly thirteen hundred millions; and in 1869 it is estimated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in his last annual report, that they will be three hundred and seventy-two millions.

By comparing the public disbursements of 1869, as estimated, with those of 1791, it will be seen that the increase of expenditure since the beginning of the Government has been 8,618 per cent, while the increase of the population for the same period was only 868 per cent. Again, the expenses of the Government in 1860, the year of peace immediately preceding the war, were only sixty-three millions, while in 1869, the year of peace three years after the war, it is estimated they will be three hundred and seventy-two millions, an increase of 489 per cent, while the increase of population was only 21 per cent for the same period.

These statistics further show that in 1791 the annual national expenses, compared with the population, were little more than $1 per capita, and in 1860 but $2 per capita; while in 1869 they will reach the extravagant sum of $9.78 per capita.

It will be observed that all these statements refer to and exhibit the disbursements of peace periods. It may, therefore, be of interest to com-

pare the expenditures of the three war periods—the war with Great Britain, the Mexican War, and the War of the Rebellion.

In 1814 the annual expenses incident to the War of 1812 reached their highest amount—about thirty-one millions—while our population slightly exceeded 8,000,000, showing an expenditure of only $3.80 per capita. In 1847 the expenditures growing out of the war with Mexico reached fifty-five millions, and the population about 21,000,000, giving only $2.60 per capita for the war expenses of that year. In 1865 the expenditures called for by the rebellion reached the vast amount of twelve hundred and ninety millions, which, compared with a population of 34,000,000, gives $38.20 per capita.

From the 4th day of March, 1789, to the 30th of June, 1861, the entire expenditures of the Government were $1,700,000,000. During that period we were engaged in wars with Great Britain and Mexico, and were involved in hostilities with powerful Indian tribes; Louisiana was purchased from France at a cost of $15,000,000; Florida was ceded to us by Spain for five millions; California was acquired from Mexico for fifteen millions, and the territory of New Mexico was obtained from Texas for the sum of ten millions. Early in 1861 the War of the Rebellion commenced; and from the 1st of July of that year to the 30th of June, 1865, the public expenditures reached the enormous aggregate of thirty-three hundred millions. Three years of peace have intervened, and during that time the disbursements of the Government have successively been five hundred and twenty millions, three hundred and forty-six millions, and three hundred and ninety-three millions. Adding to these amounts three hundred and seventy-two millions, estimated as necessary for the fiscal year ending the 30th of June, 1869, we obtain a total expenditure of $1,600,000,000 during the four years immediately succeeding the war, or nearly as much as was expended during the seventy-two years that preceded the rebellion and embraced the extraordinary expenditures already named.

These startling facts clearly illustrate the necessity of retrenchment in all branches of the public service. Abuses which were tolerated during the war for the preservation of the nation will not be endured by the people, now that profound peace prevails. The receipts from internal revenues and customs have during the past three years gradually diminished, and the continuance of useless and extravagant expenditures will involve us in national bankruptcy, or else make inevitable an increase of taxes, already too onerous and in many respects obnoxious on account of their inquisitorial character. One hundred millions annually are expended for the military force, a large portion of which is employed in the execution of laws both unnecessary and unconstitutional; one hundred and fifty millions are required each year to pay the interest on the public debt; an army of taxgatherers impoverishes the nation, and public agents, placed by Congress beyond the control of the Executive, divert from their

legitimate purposes large sums of money which they collect from the people in the name of the Government. Judicious legislation and prudent economy can alone remedy defects and avert evils which, if suffered to exist, can not fail to diminish confidence in the public councils and weaken the attachment and respect of the people toward their political institutions. Without proper care the small balance which it is estimated will remain in the Treasury at the close of the present fiscal year will not be realized, and additional millions be added to a debt which is now enumerated by billions.

It is shown by the able and comprehensive report of the Secretary of the Treasury that the receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, were $405,638,083, and that the expenditures for the same period were $377,340,284, leaving in the Treasury a surplus of $28,297,798. It is estimated that the receipts during the present fiscal year, ending June 30, 1869, will be $341,392,868 and the expenditures $336,152,470, showing a small balance of $5,240,398 in favor of the Government. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1870, it is estimated that the receipts will amount to $327,000,000 and the expenditures to $303,000,000, leaving an estimated surplus of $24,000,000.

It becomes proper in this connection to make a brief reference to our public indebtedness, which has accumulated with such alarming rapidity and assumed such colossal proportions.

In 1789, when the Government commenced operations under the Federal Constitution, it was burdened with an indebtedness of $75,000,000, created during the War of the Revolution. This amount had been reduced to $45,000,000 when, in 1812, war was declared against Great Britain. The three years' struggle that followed largely increased the national obligations, and in 1816 they had attained the sum of $127,000,000. Wise and economical legislation, however, enabled the Government to pay the entire amount within a period of twenty years, and the extinguishment of the national debt filled the land with rejoicing and was one of the great events of President Jackson's Administration. After its redemption a large fund remained in the Treasury, which was deposited for safe-keeping with the several States, on condition that it should be returned when required by the public wants. In 1849—the year after the termination of an expensive war with Mexico—we found ourselves involved in a debt of $64,000,000; and this was the amount owed by the Government in 1860, just prior to the outbreak of the rebellion. In the spring of 1861 our civil war commenced. Each year of its continuance made an enormous addition to the debt; and when, in the spring of 1865, the nation successfully emerged from the conflict, the obligations of the Government had reached the immense sum of $2,873,992,909. The Secretary of the Treasury shows that on the 1st day of November, 1867, this amount had been reduced to $2,491,504,450; but at the same time his report exhibits an increase during the past year of $35,625,102,

for the debt on the 1st day of November last is stated to have been $2,527,129,552. It is estimated by the Secretary that the returns for the past month will add to our liabilities the further sum of $11,000,000, making a total increase during thirteen months of $46,500,000.

In my message to Congress December 4, 1865, it was suggested that a policy should be devised which, without being oppressive to the people, would at once begin to effect a reduction of the debt, and, if persisted in, discharge it fully within a definite number of years. The Secretary of the Treasury forcibly recommends legislation of this character, and justly urges that the longer it is deferred the more difficult must become its accomplishment. We should follow the wise precedents established in 1789 and 1816, and without further delay make provision for the payment of our obligations at as early a period as may be practicable. The fruits of their labors should be enjoyed by our citizens rather than used to build up and sustain moneyed monopolies in our own and other lands. Our foreign debt is already computed by the Secretary of the Treasury at $850,000,000; citizens of foreign countries receive interest upon a large portion of our securities, and American taxpayers are made to contribute large sums for their support. The idea that such a debt is to become permanent should be at all times discarded as involving taxation too heavy to be borne, and payment once in every sixteen years, at the present rate of interest, of an amount equal to the original sum. This vast debt, if permitted to become permanent and increasing, must eventually be gathered into the hands of a few, and enable them to exert a dangerous and controlling power in the affairs of the Government. The borrowers would become servants to the lenders, the lenders the masters of the people. We now pride ourselves upon having given freedom to 4,000,000 of the colored race; it will then be our shame that 40,000,000 of people, by their own toleration of usurpation and profligacy, have suffered themselves to become enslaved, and merely exchanged slave owners for new taskmasters in the shape of bondholders and taxgatherers. Besides, permanent debts pertain to monarchical governments, and, tending to monopolies, perpetuities, and class legislation, are totally irreconcilable with free institutions. Introduced into our republican system, they would gradually but surely sap its foundations, eventually subvert our governmental fabric, and erect upon its ruins a moneyed aristocracy. It is our sacred duty to transmit unimpaired to our posterity the blessings of liberty which were bequeathed to us by the founders of the Republic, and by our example teach those who are to follow us carefully to avoid the dangers which threaten a free and independent people.

Various plans have been proposed for the payment of the public debt. However they may have varied as to the time and mode in which it should be redeemed, there seems to be a general concurrence as to the propriety and justness of a reduction in the present rate of interest. The

Secretary of the Treasury in his report recommends 5 per cent; Congress, in a bill passed prior to adjournment on the 27th of July last, agreed upon 4 and 4½ per cent; while by many 3 per cent has been held to be an amply sufficient return for the investment. The general impression as to the exorbitancy of the existing rate of interest has led to an inquiry in the public mind respecting the consideration which the Government has actually received for its bonds, and the conclusion is becoming prevalent that the amount which it obtained was in real money three or four hundred per cent less than the obligations which it issued in return. It can not be denied that we are paying an extravagant percentage for the use of the money borrowed, which was paper currency, greatly depreciated below the value of coin. This fact is made apparent when we consider that bondholders receive from the Treasury upon each dollar they own in Government securities 6 per cent in gold, which is nearly or quite equal to 9 per cent in currency; that the bonds are then converted into capital for the national banks, upon which those institutions issue their circulation, bearing 6 per cent interest; and that they are exempt from taxation by the Government and the States, and thereby enhanced 2 per cent in the hands of the holders. We thus have an aggregate of 17 per cent which may be received upon each dollar by the owners of Government securities. A system that produces such results is justly regarded as favoring a few at the expense of the many, and has led to the further inquiry whether our bondholders, in view of the large profits which they have enjoyed, would themselves be averse to a settlement of our indebtedness upon a plan which would yield them a fair remuneration and at the same time be just to the taxpayers of the nation. Our national credit should be sacredly observed, but in making provision for our creditors we should not forget what is due to the masses of the people. It may be assumed that the holders of our securities have already received upon their bonds a larger amount than their original investment, measured by a gold standard. Upon this statement of facts it would seem but just and equitable that the 6 per cent interest now paid by the Government should be applied to the reduction of the principal in semi-annual installments, which in sixteen years and eight months would liquidate the entire national debt. Six per cent in gold would at present rates be equal to 9 per cent in currency, and equivalent to the payment of the debt one and a half times in a fraction less than seventeen years. This, in connection with all the other advantages derived from their investment, would afford to the public creditors a fair and liberal compensation for the use of their capital, and with this they should be satisfied. The lessons of the past admonish the lender that it is not well to be overanxious in exacting from the borrower rigid compliance with the letter of the bond.

If provision be made for the payment of the indebtedness of the Government in the manner suggested, our nation will rapidly recover its wonted

prosperity. Its interests require that some measure should be taken to release the large amount of capital invested in the securities of the Government. It is not now merely unproductive, but in taxation annually consumes $150,000,000, which would otherwise be used by our enterprising people in adding to the wealth of the nation. Our commerce, which at one time successfully rivaled that of the great maritime powers, has rapidly diminished, and our industrial interests are in a depressed and languishing condition. The development of our inexhaustible resources is checked, and the fertile fields of the South are becoming waste for want of means to till them. With the release of capital, new life would be infused into the paralyzed energies of our people and activity and vigor imparted to every branch of industry. Our people need encouragement in their efforts to recover from the effects of the rebellion and of injudicious legislation, and it should be the aim of the Government to stimulate them by the prospect of an early release from the burdens which impede their prosperity. If we can not take the burdens from their shoulders, we should at least manifest a willingness to help to bear them.

In referring to the condition of the circulating medium, I shall merely reiterate substantially that portion of my last annual message which relates to that subject.

The proportion which the currency of any country should bear to the whole value of the annual produce circulated by its means is a question upon which political economists have not agreed. Nor can it be controlled by legislation, but must be left to the irrevocable laws which everywhere regulate commerce and trade. The circulating medium will ever irresistibly flow to those points where it is in greatest demand. The law of demand and supply is as unerring as that which regulates the tides of the ocean; and, indeed, currency, like the tides, has its ebbs and flows throughout the commercial world.

At the beginning of the rebellion the bank-note circulation of the country amounted to not much more than $200,000,000; now the circulation of national-bank notes and those known as "legal-tenders" is nearly seven hundred millions. While it is urged by some that this amount should be increased, others contend that a decided reduction is absolutely essential to the best interests of the country. In view of these diverse opinions, it may be well to ascertain the real value of our paper issues when compared with a metallic or convertible currency. For this purpose let us inquire how much gold and silver could be purchased by the seven hundred millions of paper money now in circulation. Probably not more than half the amount of the latter; showing that when our paper currency is compared with gold and silver its commercial value is compressed into three hundred and fifty millions. This striking fact makes it the obvious duty of the Government, as early as may be consistent with the principles of sound political economy, to take such measures as will enable the holders of its notes and those of the national banks to

convert them, without loss, into specie or its equivalent. A reduction of our paper circulating medium need not necessarily follow. This, however, would depend upon the law of demand and supply, though it should be borne in mind that by making legal-tender and bank notes convertible into coin or its equivalent their present specie value in the hands of their holders would be enhanced 100 per cent.

Legislation for the accomplishment of a result so desirable is demanded by the highest public considerations. The Constitution contemplates that the circulating medium of the country shall be uniform in quality and value. At the time of the formation of that instrument the country had just emerged from the War of the Revolution, and was suffering from the effects of a redundant aud worthless paper currency. The sages of that period were anxious to protect their posterity from the evils which they themselves had experienced. Hence in providing a circulating medium they conferred upon Congress the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof, at the same time prohibiting the States from making anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts.

The anomalous condition of our currency is in striking contrast with that which was originally designed. Our circulation now embraces, first, notes of the national banks, which are made receivable for all dues to the Government, excluding imposts, and by all its creditors, excepting in payment of interest upon its bonds and the securities themselves; second, legal tender, issued by the United States, and which the law requires shall be received as well in payment of all debts between citizens as of all Government dues, excepting imposts; and, third, gold and silver coin. By the operation of our present system of finance, however, the metallic currency, when collected, is reserved only for one class of Government creditors, who, holding its bonds, semiannually receive their interest in coin from the National Treasury. There is no reason which will be accepted as satisfactory by the people why those who defend us on the land and protect us on the sea; the pensioner upon the gratitude of the nation, bearing the scars and wounds received while in its service; the public servants in the various departments of the Government; the farmer who supplies the soldiers of the Army and the sailors of the Navy; the artisan who toils in the nation's workshops, or the mechanics and laborers who build its edifices and construct its forts and vessels of war, should, in payment of their just and hard-earned dues, receive depreciated paper, while another class of their countrymen, no more deserving, are paid in coin of gold and silver. Equal and exact justice requires that all the creditors of the Government should be paid in a currency possessing a uniform value. This can only be accomplished by the restoration of the currency to the standard established by the Constitution, and by this means we would remove a discrimination which may, if it has not already done so, create a prejudice that may become deep-rooted and widespread and imperil the national credit.

The feasibility of making our currency correspond with the constitutional standard may be seen by reference to a few facts derived from our commercial statistics.

The aggregate product of precious metals in the United States from 1849 to 1867 amounted to $1,174,000,000, while for the same period the net exports of specie were $741,000,000. This shows an excess of product over net exports of $433,000,000. There are in the Treasury $103,407,985 in coin; in circulation in the States on the Pacific Coast about $40,000,000, and a few millions in the national and other banks—in all less than $160,000,000. Taking into consideration the specie in the country prior to 1849 and that produced since 1867, and we have more than $300,000,000 not accounted for by exportation or by returns of the Treasury, and therefore most probably remaining in the country.

These are important facts, and show how completely the inferior currency will supersede the better, forcing it from circulation among the masses and causing it to be exported as a mere article of trade, to add to the money capital of foreign lands. They show the necessity of retiring our paper money, that the return of gold and silver to the avenues of trade may be invited and a demand created which will cause the retention at home of at least so much of the productions of our rich and inexhaustible gold-bearing fields as may be sufficient for purposes of circulation. It is unreasonable to expect a return to a sound currency so long as the Government and banks, by continuing to issue irredeemable notes, fill the channels of circulation with depreciated paper. Notwithstanding a coinage by our mints since 1849 of $874,000,000, the people are now strangers to the currency which was designed for their use and benefit, and specimens of the precious metals bearing the national device are seldom seen, except when produced to gratify the interest excited by their novelty. If depreciated paper is to be continued as the permanent currency of the country, and all our coin is to become a mere article of traffic and speculation, to the enhancement in price of all that is indispensable to the comfort of the people, it would be wise economy to abolish our mints, thus saving the nation the care and expense incident to such establishments, and let our precious metals be exported in bullion. The time has come, however, when the Government and national banks should be required to take the most efficient steps and make all necessary arrangements for a resumption of specie payments. Let specie payments once be earnestly inaugurated by the Government and banks, and the value of the paper circulation would directly approximate a specie standard.

Specie payments having been resumed by the Government and banks, all notes or bills of paper issued by either of a less denomination than $20 should by law be excluded from circulation, so that the people may have the benefit and convenience of a gold and silver currency which in all their business transactions will be uniform in value at home and abroad.

Every man of property or industry, every man who desires to preserve what he honestly possesses or to obtain what he can honestly earn, has a direct interest in maintaining a safe circulating medium—such a medium as shall be real and substantial, not liable to vibrate with opinions, not subject to be blown up or blown down by the breath of speculation, but to be made stable and secure. A disordered currency is one of the greatest political evils. It undermines the virtues necessary for the support of the social system and encourages propensities destructive of its happiness; it wars against industry, frugality, and economy, and it fosters the evil spirits of extravagance and speculation.

It has been asserted by one of our profound and most gifted statesmen that—

Of all the contrivances for cheating the laboring classes of mankind, none has been more effectual than that which deludes them with paper money. This is the most effectual of inventions to fertilize the rich man's fields by the sweat of the poor man's brow. Ordinary tyranny, oppression, excessive taxation—these bear lightly on the happiness of the mass of the community compared with a fraudulent currency and the robberies committed by depreciated paper. Our own history has recorded for our instruction enough, and more than enough, of the demoralizing tendency, the injustice, and the intolerable oppression on the virtuous and well-disposed of a degraded paper currency authorized by law or in any way countenanced by government.

It is one of the most successful devices, in times of peace or war, of expansions or revulsions, to accomplish the transfer of all the precious metals from the great mass of the people into the hands of the few, where they are hoarded in secret places or deposited under bolts and bars, while the people are left to endure all the inconvenience, sacrifice, and demoralization resulting from the use of depreciated and worthless paper.

The Secretary of the Interior in his report gives valuable information in reference to the interests confided to the supervision of his Department, and reviews the operations of the Land Office, Pension Office, Patent Office, and Indian Bureau.

During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, 6,655,700 acres of public land were disposed of. The entire cash receipts of the General Land Office for the same period were $1,632,745, being greater by $284,883 than the amount realized from the same sources during the previous year. The entries under the homestead law cover 2,328,923 acres, nearly one-fourth of which was taken under the act of June 21, 1866, which applies only to the States of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Florida.

On the 30th of June, 1868, 169,643 names were borne on the pension rolls, and during the year ending on that day the total amount paid for pensions, including the expenses of disbursement, was $24,010,982, being $5,391,025 greater than that expended for like purposes during the preceding year.

During the year ending the 30th of September last the expenses of the

Patent Office exceeded the receipts by $171, and, including reissues and designs, 14,153 patents were issued.

Treaties with various Indian tribes have been concluded, and will be submitted to the Senate for its constitutional action. I cordially sanction the stipulations which provide for reserving lands for the various tribes, where they may be encouraged to abandon their nomadic habits and engage in agricultural and industrial pursuits. This policy, inaugurated many years since, has met with signal success whenever it has been pursued in good faith and with becoming liberality by the United States. The necessity for extending it as far as practicable in our relations with the aboriginal population is greater now than at any preceding period. Whilst we furnish subsistence and instruction to the Indians and guarantee the undisturbed enjoyment of their treaty rights, we should habitually insist upon the faithful observance of their agreement to remain within their respective reservations. This is the only mode by which collisions with other tribes and with the whites can be avoided and the safety of our frontier settlements secured.

The companies constructing the railway from Omaha to Sacramento have been most energetically engaged in prosecuting the work, and it is believed that the line will be completed before the expiration of the next fiscal year. The 6 per cent bonds issued to these companies amounted on the 5th instant to $44,337,000, and additional work had been performed to the extent of $3,200,000.

The Secretary of the Interior in August last invited my attention to the report of a Government director of the Union Pacific Railroad Company who had been specially instructed to examine the location, construction, and equipment of their road. I submitted for the opinion of the Attorney-General certain questions in regard to the authority of the Executive which arose upon this report and those which had from time to time been presented by the commissioners appointed to inspect each successive section of the work. After carefully considering the law of the case, he affirmed the right of the Executive to order, if necessary, a thorough revision of the entire road. Commissioners were thereupon appointed to examine this and other lines, and have recently submitted a statement of their investigations, of which the report of the Secretary of the Interior furnishes specific information.

The report of the Secretary of War contains information of interest and importance respecting the several bureaus of the War Department and the operations of the Army. The strength of our military force on the 30th of September last was 48,000 men, and it is computed that by the 1st of January next this number will be decreased to 43,000. It is the opinion of the Secretary of War that within the next year a considerable diminution of the infantry force may be made without detriment to the interests of the country; and in view of the great expense attending the military

peace establishment and the absolute necessity of retrenchment wherever it can be applied, it is hoped that Congress will sanction the reduction which his report recommends. While in 1860 sixteen thousand three hundred men cost the nation $16,472,000, the sum of $65,682,000 is estimated as necessary for the support of the Army during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1870. The estimates of the War Department for the last two fiscal years were, for 1867, $33,814,461, and for 1868 $25,205,669. The actual expenditures during the same periods were, respectively, $95,224,415 and $123,246,648. The estimate submitted in December last for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1869, was $77,124,707; the expenditures for the first quarter, ending the 30th of September last, were $27,219,117, and the Secretary of the Treasury gives $66,000,000 as the amount which will probably be required during the remaining three quarters, if there should be no reduction of the Army—making its aggregate cost for the year considerably in excess of ninety-three millions. The difference between the estimates and expenditures for the three fiscal years which have been named is thus shown to be $175,545,343 for this single branch of the public service.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy exhibits the operations of that Department and of the Navy during the year. A considerable reduction of the force has been effected. There are 42 vessels, carrying 411 guns, in the six squadrons which are established in different parts of the world. Three of these vessels are returning to the United States and 4 are used as storeships, leaving the actual cruising force 35 vessels, carrying 356 guns. The total number of vessels in the Navy is 206, mounting 1,743 guns. Eighty-one vessels of every description are in use, armed with 696 guns. The number of enlisted men in the service, including apprentices, has been reduced to 8,500. An increase of navy-yard facilities is recommended as a measure which will in the event of war be promotive of economy and security. A more thorough and systematic survey of the North Pacific Ocean is advised in view of our recent acquisitions, our expanding commerce, and the increasing intercourse between the Pacific States and Asia. The naval pension fund, which consists of a moiety of the avails of prizes captured during the war, amounts to $14,000,000. Exception is taken to the act of 23d July last, which reduces the interest on the fund loaned to the Government by the Secretary, as trustee, to 3 per cent instead of 6 per cent, which was originally stipulated when the investment was made. An amendment of the pension laws is suggested to remedy omissions and defects in existing enactments. The expenditures of the Department during the last fiscal year were $20,120,394, and the estimates for the coming year amount to $20,993,414.

The Postmaster-General's report furnishes a full and clear exhibit of the operations and condition of the postal service. The ordinary postal revenue for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, was $16,292,600, and the total expenditures, embracing all the service for which special

appropriations have been made by Congress, amounted to $22,730,592, showing an excess of expenditures of $6,437,991. Deducting from the expenditures the sum of $1,896,525, the amount of appropriations for ocean-steamship and other special service, the excess of expenditures was $4,541,466. By using an unexpended balance in the Treasury of $3,800,000 the actual sum for which a special appropriation is required to meet the deficiency is $741,466. The causes which produced this large excess of expenditure over revenue were the restoration of service in the late insurgent States and the putting into operation of new service established by acts of Congress, which amounted within the last two years and a half to about 48,700 miles—equal to more than one-third of the whole amount of the service at the close of the war. New postal conventions with Great Britain, North Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy, respectively, have been carried into effect. Under their provisions important improvements have resulted in reduced rates of international postage and enlarged mail facilities with European countries. The cost of the United States transatlantic ocean mail service since January 1, 1868, has been largely lessened under the operation of these new conventions, a reduction of over one-half having been effected under the new arrangements for ocean mail steamship service which went into effect on that date. The attention of Congress is invited to the practical suggestions and recommendations made in his report by the Postmaster-General.

No important question has occurred during the last year in our accustomed cordial and friendly intercourse with Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, France, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Rome, Greece, Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Liberia, Morocco, Tripoli, Tunis, Muscat, Siam, Borneo, and Madagascar.

Cordial relations have also been maintained with the Argentine and the Oriental Republics. The expressed wish of Congress that our national good offices might be tendered to those Republics, and also to Brazil and Paraguay, for bringing to an end the calamitous war which has so long been raging in the valley of the La Plata, has been assiduously complied with and kindly acknowledged by all the belligerents. That important negotiation, however, has thus far been without result.

Charles A. Washburn, late United States minister to Paraguay, having resigned, and being desirous to return to the United States, the rear-admiral commanding the South Atlantic Squadron was early directed to send a ship of war to Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay, to receive Mr. Washburn and his family and remove them from a situation which was represented to be endangered by faction and foreign war. The Brazilian commander of the allied invading forces refused permission to the *Wasp* to pass through the blockading forces, and that vessel returned to its accustomed anchorage. Remonstrance having been made against this

refusal, it was promptly overruled, and the *Wasp* therefore resumed her errand, received Mr. Washburn and his family, and conveyed them to a safe and convenient seaport. In the meantime an excited controversy had arisen between the President of Paraguay and the late United States minister, which, it is understood, grew out of his proceedings in giving asylum in the United States legation to alleged enemies of that Republic. The question of the right to give asylum is one always difficult and often productive of great embarrassment. In states well organized and established, foreign powers refuse either to concede or exercise that right, except as to persons actually belonging to the diplomatic service. On the other hand, all such powers insist upon exercising the right of asylum in states where the law of nations is not fully acknowledged, respected, and obeyed.

The President of Paraguay is understood to have opposed to Mr. Washburn's proceedings the injurious and very improbable charge of personal complicity in insurrection and treason. The correspondence, however, has not yet reached the United States.

Mr. Washburn, in connection with this controversy, represents that two United States citizens attached to the legation were arbitrarily seized at his side, when leaving the capital of Paraguay, committed to prison, and there subjected to torture for the purpose of procuring confessions of their own criminality and testimony to support the President's allegations against the United States minister. Mr. McMahon, the newly appointed minister to Paraguay, having reached the La Plata, has been instructed to proceed without delay to Asuncion, there to investigate the whole subject. The rear-admiral commanding the United States South Atlantic Squadron has been directed to attend the new minister with a proper naval force to sustain such just demands as the occasion may require, and to vindicate the rights of the United States citizens referred to and of any others who may be exposed to danger in the theater of war. With these exceptions, friendly relations have been maintained between the United States and Brazil and Paraguay.

Our relations during the past year with Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile have become especially friendly and cordial. Spain and the Republics of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador have expressed their willingness to accept the mediation of the United States for terminating the war upon the South Pacific coast. Chile has not finally declared upon the question. In the meantime the conflict has practically exhausted itself, since no belligerent or hostile movement has been made by either party during the last two years, and there are no indications of a present purpose to resume hostilities on either side. Great Britain and France have cordially seconded our proposition of mediation, and I do not forego the hope that it may soon be accepted by all the belligerents and lead to a secure establishment of peace and friendly relations between the Spanish American Republics of the Pacific and Spain—a result which would be attended

with common benefits to the belligerents and much advantage to all commercial nations. I communicate, for the consideration of Congress, a correspondence which shows that the Bolivian Republic has established the extremely liberal principle of receiving into its citizenship any citizen of the United States, or of any other of the American Republics, upon the simple condition of voluntary registry.

The correspondence herewith submitted will be found painfully replete with accounts of the ruin and wretchedness produced by recent earthquakes, of unparalleled severity, in the Republics of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The diplomatic agents and naval officers of the United States who were present in those countries at the time of those disasters furnished all the relief in their power to the sufferers, and were promptly rewarded with grateful and touching acknowledgments by the Congress of Peru. An appeal to the charity of our fellow-citizens has been answered by much liberality. In this connection I submit an appeal which has been made by the Swiss Republic, whose Government and institutions are kindred to our own, in behalf of its inhabitants, who are suffering extreme destitution, produced by recent devastating inundations.

Our relations with Mexico during the year have been marked by an increasing growth of mutual confidence. The Mexican Government has not yet acted upon the three treaties celebrated here last summer for establishing the rights of naturalized citizens upon a liberal and just basis, for regulating consular powers, and for the adjustment of mutual claims.

All commercial nations, as well as all friends of republican institutions, have occasion to regret the frequent local disturbances which occur in some of the constituent States of Colombia. Nothing has occurred, however, to affect the harmony and cordial friendship which have for several years existed between that youthful and vigorous Republic and our own.

Negotiations are pending with a view to the survey and construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien, under the auspices of the United States. I hope to be able to submit the results of that negotiation to the Senate during its present session.

The very liberal treaty which was entered into last year by the United States and Nicaragua has been ratified by the latter Republic.

Costa Rica, with the earnestness of a sincerely friendly neighbor, solicits a reciprocity of trade, which I commend to the consideration of Congress.

The convention created by treaty between the United States and Venezuela in July, 1865, for the mutual adjustment of claims, has been held, and its decisions have been received at the Department of State. The heretofore-recognized Government of the United States of Venezuela has been subverted. A provisional government having been instituted under circumstances which promise durability, it has been formally recognized.

I have been reluctantly obliged to ask explanation and satisfaction for national injuries committed by the President of Hayti. The political

and social condition of the Republics of Hayti and St. Domingo is very unsatisfactory and painful. The abolition of slavery, which has been carried into effect throughout the island of St. Domingo and the entire West Indies, except the Spanish islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, has been followed by a profound popular conviction of the rightfulness of republican institutions and an intense desire to secure them. The attempt, however, to establish republics there encounters many obstacles, most of which may be supposed to result from long-indulged habits of colonial supineness and dependence upon European monarchical powers. While the United States have on all occasions professed a decided unwillingness that any part of this continent or of its adjacent islands shall be made a theater for a new establishment of monarchical power, too little has been done by us, on the other hand, to attach the communities by which we are surrounded to our own country, or to lend even a moral support to the efforts they are so resolutely and so constantly making to secure republican institutions for themselves. It is indeed a question of grave consideration whether our recent and present example is not calculated to check the growth and expansion of free principles, and make those communities distrust, if not dread, a government which at will consigns to military domination States that are integral parts of our Federal Union, and, while ready to resist any attempts by other nations to extend to this hemisphere the monarchical institutions of Europe, assumes to establish over a large portion of its people a rule more absolute, harsh, and tyrannical than any known to civilized powers.

The acquisition of Alaska was made with the view of extending national jurisdiction and republican principles in the American hemisphere. Believing that a further step could be taken in the same direction, I last year entered into a treaty with the King of Denmark for the purchase of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John, on the best terms then attainable, and with the express consent of the people of those islands. This treaty still remains under consideration in the Senate. A new convention has been entered into with Denmark, enlarging the time fixed for final ratification of the original treaty.

Comprehensive national policy would seem to sanction the acquisition and incorporation into our Federal Union of the several adjacent continental and insular communities as speedily as it can be done peacefully, lawfully, and without any violation of national justice, faith, or honor. Foreign possession or control of those communities has hitherto hindered the growth and impaired the influence of the United States. Chronic revolution and anarchy there would be equally injurious. Each one of them, when firmly established as an independent republic, or when incorporated into the United States, would be a new source of strength and power. Conforming my Administration to these principles, I have on no occasion lent support or toleration to unlawful expeditions set on foot upon the plea of republican propagandism or of national extension or

aggrandizement. The necessity, however, of repressing such unlawful movements clearly indicates the duty which rests upon us of adapting our legislative action to the new circumstances of a decline of European monarchical power and influence and the increase of American republican ideas, interests, and sympathies.

It can not be long before it will become necessary for this Government to lend some effective aid to the solution of the political and social problems which are continually kept before the world by the two Republics of the island of St. Domingo, and which are now disclosing themselves more distinctly than heretofore in the island of Cuba. The subject is commended to your consideration with all the more earnestness because I am satisfied that the time has arrived when even so direct a proceeding as a proposition for an annexation of the two Republics of the island of St. Domingo would not only receive the consent of the people interested, but would also give satisfaction to all other foreign nations.

I am aware that upon the question of further extending our possessions it is apprehended by some that our political system can not successfully be applied to an area more extended than our continent; but the conviction is rapidly gaining ground in the American mind that with the increased facilities for intercommunication between all portions of the earth the principles of free government, as embraced in our Constitution, if faithfully maintained and carried out, would prove of sufficient strength and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influence the civilized nations of the world.

The attention of the Senate and of Congress is again respectfully invited to the treaty for the establishment of commercial reciprocity with the Hawaiian Kingdom entered into last year, and already ratified by that Government. The attitude of the United States toward these islands is not very different from that in which they stand toward the West Indies. It is known and felt by the Hawaiian Government and people that their Government and institutions are feeble and precarious; that the United States, being so near a neighbor, would be unwilling to see the islands pass under foreign control. Their prosperity is continually disturbed by expectations and alarms of unfriendly political proceedings, as well from the United States as from other foreign powers. A reciprocity treaty, while it could not materially diminish the revenues of the United States, would be a guaranty of the good will and forbearance of all nations until the people of the islands shall of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission into the Union.

The Emperor of Russia has acceded to the treaty negotiated here in January last for the security of trade-marks in the interest of manufacturers and commerce. I have invited his attention to the importance of establishing, now while it seems easy and practicable, a fair and equal regulation of the vast fisheries belonging to the two nations in the waters of the North Pacific Ocean.

The two treaties between the United States and Italy for the regulation of consular powers and the extradition of criminals, negotiated and ratified here during the last session of Congress, have been accepted and confirmed by the Italian Government. A liberal consular convention which has been negotiated with Belgium will be submitted to the Senate. The very important treaties which were negotiated between the United States and North Germany and Bavaria for the regulation of the rights of naturalized citizens have been duly ratified and exchanged, and similar treaties have been entered into with the Kingdoms of Belgium and Wurtemberg and with the Grand Duchies of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. I hope soon to be able to submit equally satisfactory conventions of the same character now in the course of negotiation with the respective Governments of Spain, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire.

Examination of claims against the United States by the Hudsons Bay Company and the Puget Sound Agricultural Company, on account of certain possessory rights in the State of Oregon and Territory of Washington, alleged by those companies in virtue of provisions of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain of June 15, 1846, has been diligently prosecuted, under the direction of the joint international commission to which they were submitted for adjudication by treaty between the two Governments of July 1, 1863, and will, it is expected, be concluded at an early day.

No practical regulation concerning colonial trade and the fisheries can be accomplished by treaty between the United States and Great Britain until Congress shall have expressed their judgment concerning the principles involved. Three other questions, however, between the United States and Great Britain remain open for adjustment. These are the mutual rights of naturalized citizens, the boundary question involving the title to the island of San Juan, on the Pacific coast, and mutual claims arising since the year 1853 of the citizens and subjects of the two countries for injuries and depredations committed under the authority of their respective Governments. Negotiations upon these subjects are pending, and I am not without hope of being able to lay before the Senate, for its consideration during the present session, protocols calculated to bring to an end these justly exciting and long-existing controversies.

We are not advised of the action of the Chinese Government upon the liberal and auspicious treaty which was recently celebrated with its plenipotentiaries at this capital.

Japan remains a theater of civil war, marked by religious incidents and political severities peculiar to that long-isolated Empire. The Executive has hitherto maintained strict neutrality among the belligerents, and acknowledges with pleasure that it has been frankly and fully sustained in that course by the enlightened concurrence and cooperation of the other treaty powers, namely, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, North Germany, and Italy.

Spain having recently undergone a revolution marked by extraordinary unanimity and preservation of order, the provisional government established at Madrid has been recognized, and the friendly intercourse which has so long happily existed between the two countries remains unchanged.

I renew the recommendation contained in my communication to Congress dated the 18th July last—a copy of which accompanies this message—that the judgment of the people should be taken on the propriety of so amending the Federal Constitution that it shall provide—

First. For an election of President and Vice-President by a direct vote of the people, instead of through the agency of electors, and making them ineligible for reelection to a second term.

Second. For a distinct designation of the person who shall discharge the duties of President in the event of a vacancy in that office by the death, resignation, or removal of both the President and Vice-President.

Third. For the election of Senators of the United States directly by the people of the several States, instead of by the legislatures; and

Fourth. For the limitation to a period of years of the terms of Federal judges.

Profoundly impressed with the propriety of making these important modifications in the Constitution, I respectfully submit them for the early and mature consideration of Congress. We should, as far as possible, remove all pretext for violations of the organic law, by remedying such imperfections as time and experience may develop, ever remembering that "the constitution which at any time exists until changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people is sacredly obligatory upon all."

In the performance of a duty imposed upon me by the Constitution, I have thus communicated to Congress information of the state of the Union and recommended for their consideration such measures as have seemed to me necessary and expedient. If carried into effect, they will hasten the accomplishment of the great and beneficent purposes for which the Constitution was ordained, and which it comprehensively states were "to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." In Congress are vested all legislative powers, and upon them devolves the responsibility as well for framing unwise and excessive laws as for neglecting to devise and adopt measures absolutely demanded by the wants of the country. Let us earnestly hope that before the expiration of our respective terms of service, now rapidly drawing to a close, an all-wise Providence will so guide our counsels as to strengthen and preserve the Federal Union, inspire reverence for the Constitution, restore prosperity and happiness to our whole people, and promote "on earth peace, good will toward men."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

SPECIAL MESSAGES.

WASHINGTON, *December 8, 1868.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit a copy of a note of the 24th of November last addressed to the Secretary of State by the minister of Great Britain, communicating a decree of the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York ordering the payment of certain sums to the defendants in a suit against the English schooner *Sibyl*, libeled as a prize of war. It is requisite for the fulfillment of the decree that an appropriation of the sums specified therein should be made by Congress. The appropriation is recommended accordingly.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 11, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 7th instant, relating to the correspondence with the American minister at London concerning the so-called *Alabama* claims, I transmit a report on the subject from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 16, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 14th December instant, I transmit the accompanying report* of the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 16, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 14th instant, requesting the correspondence which has taken place between the United States minister at Brazil and Rear-Admiral Davis touching the disposition of the American squadron at Rio Janeiro and the Paraguay difficulties, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State upon that subject.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 16, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 8th instant, concerning recent transactions in the region of the La Plata affecting the political

*Relating to the sending of a commissioner from the United States to Spain.

relations of the United States with Paraguay, the Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Brazil, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a copy of the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *December 18, 1868.*

To the House of Representatives:

I herewith communicate a report of the Secretary of the Interior, in answer to a resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 16th instant, making inquiries in reference to the Union Pacific Railroad and requesting the transmission of the report of the special commissioners appointed to examine the construction and equipment of the road.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 4, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in compliance with the request contained in its resolution of the 15th ultimo, a report from the Secretary of State, communicating information in regard to the action of the mixed commission for the adjustment of claims by citizens of the United States against the Government of Venezuela.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 4, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers, in relation to the resolution of Congress approved July 20, 1867, "declaring sympathy with the suffering people of Crete."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

[The same message was sent to the Senate.]

WASHINGTON, *January 4, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, an additional article to the convention of the 24th of October, 1867, between the United States and His Majesty the King of Denmark.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 5, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States and His Hawaiian Majesty,

signed in this city on the 28th day of July last, stipulating for an extension of the period for the exchange of the ratifications of the convention between the same parties on the subject of commercial reciprocity.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 7, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 16th of December last, a report* from the Secretary of State of the 6th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 8, 1869.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

In conformity with the requirements of the sixth section of the act of the 22d of June, 1860, to carry into effect provisions of the treaty with China and certain other Oriental nations, I transmit to Congress a copy of eight rules agreed upon between the Chinese Imperial Government and the minister of the United States and those of other foreign powers accredited to that Government, for conducting the proceedings of the joint tribunal in cases of confiscation and fines for breaches of the revenue laws of that Empire. These rules, which are accompanied by correspondence between our minister and Secretary of State on the subject, are commended to the consideration of Congress with a view to their approval.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 8, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 17th ultimo, a report† from the Secretary of State, with an accompanying paper.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States and Belgium upon the subject of naturalization, which was signed at Brussels on the 16th of November last.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

*Giving reasons why reductions in the number of officers and employees and in the salaries and expenses of the Department of State should not be made.

†Relating to the exercise or claim by United States consuls in Japan of judicial powers in cases arising between American citizens and citizens or subjects of any foreign nation other than Japan, etc.

WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States and Belgium concerning the rights, privileges, and immunities of consuls in the two countries, signed at Brussels on the 5th ultimo.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, an additional article of the treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and Belgium of the 17th of July, 1858, which was signed at Brussels on the 20th ultimo.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit a copy of a convention between the United States and Peru, signed at Lima on the 4th of last month, stipulating for a mixed commission for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the two countries. An extract from that part of the dispatch of the minister of the United States at Lima which accompanied the copy referred to, and which relates to it, is also transmitted. It will be seen from this extract that it is desirable that the decision of the Senate upon the instrument should be given as early as may be convenient. It is consequently recommended for consideration with a view to ratification.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
January 13, 1869.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded at Washington, D. C., August 13, 1868, between the United States and the Nez Perce tribe of Indians, which treaty is supplemental to and amendatory of the treaty concluded with said tribe June 9, 1863. A communication from the Secretary of the Interior of the 12th instant, inclosing a copy of a report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 11th instant, is also herewith transmitted.*

ANDREW JOHNSON.

* NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE CLERK OF THE SENATE.—"The communication from the Secretary of the Interior and this report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs did not accompany the above communication from the President."

WASHINGTON, *January 14, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of War, together with the original papers accompanying the same, submitted in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 5th instant, requesting such information as is furnished by the files of the War Department in relation to the erection of fortifications at Lawrence, Kans., in 1864 and 1865.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the opinion of the Senate as to the expediency of concluding a convention based thereupon, a protocol, signed at London on the 9th of October last, for regulating the citizenship of citizens of the United States who have emigrated or who may emigrate from the United States to the British dominions, and of British subjects who have emigrated or who may emigrate from the British dominions to the United States of America.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a copy of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, signed yesterday at London, providing for the reference to an arbiter of the question of difference between the United States and Great Britain concerning the northwest line of water boundary between the United States and the British possessions in North America. It is expected that the original of the convention will be forwarded by the steamer which leaves Liverpool to-morrow. Circumstances, however, to which it is unnecessary to advert, in my judgment make it advisable to communicate to the Senate the copy referred to in advance of the arrival of the original instrument.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view of its ratification, a copy of a convention between the United States and Great Britain, signed yesterday at London, providing for the adjustment of all outstanding claims of the citizens and subjects of the parties, respectively. It is expected that the original of the convention will be forwarded by the steamer which leaves Liverpool to-morrow. Circumstances, how-

ever, to which it is unnecessary to advert, in my judgment make it advisable to communicate to the Senate the copy referred to in advance of the arrival of the original instrument.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 18, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

The resolution adopted on the 5th instant, requesting the President "to transmit to the Senate a copy of any proclamation of amnesty made by him since the last adjournment of Congress, and also to communicate to the Senate by what authority of law the same was made," has been received.

I accordingly transmit herewith a copy of a proclamation dated the 25th day of December last. The authority of law by which it was made is set forth in the proclamation itself, which expressly affirms that it was issued "by virtue of the power and authority in me vested by the Constitution, and in the name of the sovereign people of the United States," and proclaims and declares "unconditionally and without reservation, to all and to every person who, directly or indirectly, participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States, or of adhering to their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof."

The Federal Constitution is understood to be and is regarded by the Executive as the supreme law of the land. The second section of article second of that instrument provides that the President "shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." The proclamation of the 25th ultimo is in strict accordance with the judicial expositions of the authority thus conferred upon the Executive, and, as will be seen by reference to the accompanying papers, is in conformity with the precedent established by Washington in 1795, and followed by President Adams in 1800, Madison in 1815, and Lincoln in 1863, and by the present Executive in 1865, 1867, and 1868.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 20, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of War, made in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 19th ultimo, requesting information in reference to the payment of rent for the use of the building known as the Libby Prison, in the city of Richmond, Va.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 22, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, an additional article to the convention between the United States and His Majesty the King of Italy for regulating the jurisdiction of consuls.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 22, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, an additional article to the convention between the United States and His Majesty the King of Italy for the mutual extradition of criminals fugitives from justice.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *January 23, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for the constitutional action of that body, a treaty concluded at the council house on the Cattaraugus Reservation, in Erie County, N. Y., on the 4th day of December, 1868, by Walter R. Irwin, commissioner on the part of the United States, and the duly authorized representatives of the several tribes and bands of Indians residing in the State of New York. A copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 22d instant, and the papers therein referred to, in relation to the treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 26, 1869.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit for the consideration of Congress, in conformity with the requirements of the sixth section of the act of the 22d of June, 1860, a copy of certain regulations for the consular courts in China, prohibiting steamers sailing under the flag of the United States from using or passing through the Straw Shoe Channel on the river Yangtse, decreed by S. Wells Williams, chargé d'affaires, on the 1st of June, and promulgated by George F. Seward, consul-general at Shanghai, on the 25th of July, 1868, with the assent of five of the United States consuls in China, G. H. Colton Salter dissenting. His objections to the regulations are set forth in the accompanying copy of a communication of the 10th of October last, inclosed in Consul-General Seward's dispatch of the 14th of the same month to the Secretary of State, a copy of which is also transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 26, 1869.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents, in relation to the gold medal presented to Mr. George Peabody pursuant to the resolution of Congress of March 16, 1867.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 27, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 23d instant, the accompanying report * from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 27, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a communication from the Secretary of War, upon the subject of the resolution of the Senate of the 21st instant, requesting a copy of the report of Brevet Major-General William S. Harney upon the Sioux and other Indians congregated under treaties made with them by the special peace commission.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives without date, received at the Executive Mansion on the 10th of December, calling for correspondence in relation to the cases of Messrs. Costello and Warren, naturalized citizens of the United States imprisoned in Great Britain, a report from the Secretary of State and the papers to which it refers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *January 29, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its consideration in connection with the treaty with the New York Indians concluded November 4, 1868, which is now before that body for its constitutional action, an additional article of said treaty as an amendment.

A communication, dated the 28th instant, from the Secretary of the Interior, and a copy of a report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, explaining the object of the amendment, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

* Relating to buildings occupied in Washington by Departments of the Government.

WASHINGTON, *February 1, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives.

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 16th of December last, in relation to the arrest of American citizens in Paraguay, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 1, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In further answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 8th of December last, concerning recent transactions in the region of the La Plata affecting the political relations of the United States with Paraguay, the Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Brazil, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *February 2, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, two treaties made by the commissioners appointed under the act of Congress of 20th July, 1867, to establish peace with certain hostile tribes, viz:

A treaty concluded at Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, on the 29th April, 1868, with various bands of the Sioux or Dakota Nation of Indians.

A treaty concluded at Fort Bridger, Utah Territory, on the 3d day of July, 1868, with the Shoshone (eastern band) and Bannock Indians.

A communication from the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 2d instant, inclosing a copy of a letter to him from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 28th ultimo, together with the correspondence therein referred to, relating to said treaties, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 3, 1869.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit, for the consideration of Congress, a report from the Secretary of State, and the papers which accompany it, in relation to the encroachments of agents of the Hudsons Bay Company upon the trade and territory of Alaska.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *February 4, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for the constitutional action of that body thereon, the following treaties, concluded with various bands and

tribes of Indians by William I. Cullen, special agent for Indians in Montana, viz:

Treaty concluded at Fort Hawley on the 13th July, 1868, with the Gros Ventres.

Treaty concluded at Fort Hawley on the 15th July, 1868, with the River Crow Indians.

Treaty concluded at Fort Benton September 1, 1868, with the Blackfeet Nation (composed of the tribe of that name and the Blood and Piegan tribes).

Treaty with the mixed bands of Shoshones, Bannocks, and Sheepeaters, concluded at Virginia City September 24, 1868.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 3d instant, and the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated the 2d instant, explaining the provisions of the several treaties and suggesting an amendment of some of them, and submitting maps and papers connected with said treaties, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 4, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 23d January ultimo, I transmit a report* of the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a copy of the correspondence called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 8, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

Referring to my communications of the 16th of December, 1868, and of the 1st of February instant, addressed to the Senate in answer to the resolution of that body of the 8th of December last, concerning recent transactions in the region of the La Plata, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State and the papers which accompany it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 9, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 13th ultimo, requesting information as to expenditures by the northwestern boundary commission, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State on the subject, and the papers which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

* Relating to the claim of William T. Harris, a United States citizen, to property withheld by the Brazilian Government.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *February 9, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for the constitutional action of that body thereon, a treaty concluded on the 2d day of September, 1868, between the United States and the Creek Nation of Indians by their duly authorized delegates.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 8th instant, and a report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated the 6th instant, in relation to said treaty, are also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 11, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 21st ultimo, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers, in relation to the establishment of the Robert College at Constantinople.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 13, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for their action thereon, a mutual relinquishment of the agreement between the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Kansas, which agreement is appended to a treaty now before the Senate between the United States and the Swan Creek and Black River Chippewas and the Munsee or Christian Indians, concluded on the 1st of June, 1868.

A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 11th instant, together with the papers therein referred to, is also herewith transmitted.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 15, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit, for the consideration of the Senate with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States of America and the United States of Colombia for facilitating and securing the construction of a ship canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through the continental isthmus lying without the jurisdiction of the United States of Colombia, which instrument was signed at Bogota on the 14th instant.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *February 17, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith lay before the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty concluded on the 11th instant, in the city of Washington, between

the United States and the Sac and Fox Indians of the Missouri and the Iowa tribe of Indians. A letter of the Secretary of the Interior of the 16th instant, together with the letters therein referred to, accompany the treaty. For reasons stated in the accompanying communications, I request to withdraw from the Senate a treaty with the Sac and Fox Indians of the Missouri, concluded February 19, 1867, now pending before that body.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 17, 1869.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents, in relation to the gold medal presented to Mr. Cyrus W. Field pursuant to the resolution of Congress of March 2, 1867.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
February 17, 1869.

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith present, for the consideration of the Senate in connection with the treaty with the Brulé and other bands of Sioux Indians now pending before that body, a communication from the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 16th instant, and accompanying letters from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and P. H. Couger, United States Indian agent for the Yankton Sioux, requesting that the benefits of said treaty may be extended to the Yankton Sioux and all the bands and individuals of the Dakota Sioux.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 17, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 19th ultimo, relating to fisheries, a report from the Secretary of State and the documents which accompanied it.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
February 18, 1869.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for its constitutional action, a treaty concluded on the 13th instant between the United States and the Otoe and Missouria tribe of Indians, together with the accompanying papers.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 19, 1869.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a copy of a correspondence which has taken place between the Secretary of State and the minister of the United States at Paris, in relation to the use of passports by citizens of the United States in France.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 20, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives:

I transmit an additional report from the Secretary of State, representing that Messrs. Costello and Warren, citizens of the United States imprisoned in Ireland, have been released.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 23, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, on the subject of the resolution of the Senate of the 13th January last, requesting "that the President direct the Secretary of the Treasury to detail an officer to select from the public lands such permanent points upon the coast of Oregon, Washington Territory, and Alaska as in his judgment may be necessary for light-house purposes, in view of the future commercial necessity of the Pacific Coast, and to reserve the same for exclusive use of the United States."

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 23, 1869.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

Referring to my communication to Congress of the 26th ultimo, concerning a decree made by the United States chargé d'affaires in China, on 1st of June last, prohibiting steamers sailing under the flag of the United States from using or passing through the Straw Shoe Channel on the Yangtse River, I now transmit a copy of a dispatch of the 22d of August last, No. 25, from S. Wells Williams, esq., and of such of the papers accompanying it as were not contained in my former communication. I also transmit a copy of the reply of the 6th instant made by the Secretary of State to the above-named dispatch.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 24, 1869.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit to Congress a copy of a convention between the United States and the Mexican Republic, providing for the adjustment of the claims of citizens of either country against the other, signed on the 4th day of July last, and the ratifications of which were exchanged on the 1st instant.

It is recommended that such legislation as may be necessary to carry this convention into effect shall receive early consideration.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *March 1, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with the request of the Senate of the 27th ultimo, I return herewith their resolution of the 26th February, calling for a statement of internal-revenue stamps issued by the Government since the passage of the act approved July 1, 1862.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

VETO MESSAGES.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 13, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

The bill entitled "An act transferring the duties of trustees of colored schools of Washington and Georgetown" is herewith returned to the Senate, in which House it originated, without my approval.

The accompanying paper exhibits the fact that the legislation which the bill proposes is contrary to the wishes of the colored residents of Washington and Georgetown, and that they prefer that the schools for their children should be under the management of trustees selected by the Secretary of the Interior, whose term of office is for four years, rather than subject to the control of bodies whose tenure of office, depending merely upon political considerations, may be annually affected by the elections which take place in the two cities.

The colored people of Washington and Georgetown are at present not represented by a person of their own race in either of the boards of trustees of public schools appointed by the municipal authorities. Of the three trustees, however, who, under the act of July 11, 1862, compose the board of trustees of the schools for colored children, two are persons of color. The resolutions transmitted herewith show that they have performed their trust in a manner entirely satisfactory to the colored people of the two cities, and no good reason is known to the Executive why the duties which now devolve upon them should be transferred as proposed in the bill.

With these brief suggestions the bill is respectfully returned, and the consideration of Congress invited to the accompanying preamble and resolutions.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 22, 1869.*

To the House of Representatives:

The accompanying bill, entitled "An act regulating the duties on imported copper and copper ores," is, for the following reasons, returned,

without my approval, to the House of Representatives, in which branch of Congress it originated.

Its immediate effect will be to diminish the public receipts, for the object of the bill can not be accomplished without seriously affecting the importation of copper and copper ores, from which a considerable revenue is at present derived. While thus impairing the resources of the Government, it imposes an additional tax upon an already overburdened people, who should not be further impoverished that monopolies may be fostered and corporations enriched.

It is represented—and the declaration seems to be sustained by evidence—that the duties for which this bill provides are nearly or quite sufficient to prohibit the importation of certain foreign ores of copper. Its enactment, therefore, will prove detrimental to the shipping interests of the nation, and at the same time destroy the business, for many years successfully established, of smelting home ores in connection with a smaller amount of the imported articles. This business, it is credibly asserted, has heretofore yielded the larger share of the copper production of the country, and thus the industry which this legislation is designed to encourage is actually less than that which will be destroyed by the passage of this bill.

It seems also to be evident that the effect of this measure will be to enhance by 70 per cent the cost of blue vitriol—an article extensively used in dyeing and in the manufacture of printed and colored cloths. To produce such an augmentation in the price of this commodity will be to discriminate against other great branches of domestic industry, and by increasing their cost to expose them most unfairly to the effects of foreign competition Legislation can neither be wise nor just which seeks the welfare of a single interest at the expense and to the injury of many and varied interests at least equally important and equally deserving the consideration of Congress. Indeed, it is difficult to find any reason which will justify the interference of Government with any legitimate industry, except so far as may be rendered necessary by the requirements of the revenue. As has already been stated, however, the legislative intervention proposed in the present instance will diminish, not increase, the public receipts.

The enactment of such a law is urged as necessary for the relief of certain mining interests upon Lake Superior, which, it is alleged, are in a greatly depressed condition, and can only be sustained by an enhancement of the price of copper. If this result should follow the passage of the bill, a tax for the exclusive benefit of a single class would be imposed upon the consumers of copper throughout the entire country, not warranted by any need of the Government, and the avails of which would not in any degree find their way into the Treasury of the nation. If the miners of Lake Superior are in a condition of want, it can not be justly affirmed that the Government should extend charity to them in prefer-

ence to those of its citizens who in other portions of the country suffer in like manner from destitution. Least of all should the endeavor to aid them be based upon a method so uncertain and indirect as that contemplated by the bill, and which, moreover, proposes to continue the exercise of its benefaction through an indefinite period of years. It is, besides, reasonable to hope that positive suffering from want, if it really exists, will prove but temporary in a region where agricultural labor is so much in demand and so well compensated. A careful examination of the subject appears to show that the present low price of copper, which alone has induced any depression the mining interests of Lake Superior may have recently experienced, is due to causes which it is wholly impolitic, if not impracticable, to contravene by legislation. These causes are, in the main, an increase in the general supply of copper, owing to the discovery and working of remarkably productive mines and to a coincident restriction in the consumption and use of copper by the substitution of other and cheaper metals for industrial purposes. It is now sought to resist by artificial means the action of natural laws; to place the people of the United States, in respect to the enjoyment and use of an essential commodity, upon a different basis from other nations, and especially to compensate certain private and sectional interests for the changes and losses which are always incident to industrial progress.

Although providing for an increase of duties, the proposed law does not even come within the range of protection, in the fair acceptation of the term. It does not look to the fostering of a young and feeble interest with a view to the ultimate attainment of strength and the capacity of self-support. It appears to assume that the present inability for successful production is inherent and permanent, and is more likely to increase than to be gradually overcome; yet in spite of this it proposes, by the exercise of the lawmaking power, to sustain that interest and to impose it in hopeless perpetuity as a tax upon the competent and beneficent industries of the country.

The true method for the mining interests of Lake Superior to obtain relief, if relief is needed, is to endeavor to make their great natural resources fully available by reducing the cost of production. Special or class legislation can not remedy the evils which this bill is designed to meet. They can only be overcome by laws which will effect a wise, honest, and economical administration of the Government, a reestablishment of the specie standard of value, and an early adjustment of our system of State, municipal, and national taxation (especially the latter) upon the fundamental principle that all taxes, whether collected under the internal revenue or under a tariff, shall interfere as little as possible with the productive energies of the people.

The bill is therefore returned, in the belief that the true interests of the Government and of the people require that it should not become a law.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

PROCLAMATION.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas the President of the United States has heretofore set forth several proclamations offering amnesty and pardon to persons who had been or were concerned in the late rebellion against the lawful authority of the Government of the United States, which proclamations were severally issued on the 8th day of December, 1863, on the 26th day of March, 1864, on the 29th day of May, 1865, on the 7th day of September, 1867, and on the 4th day of July, in the present year; and

Whereas the authority of the Federal Government having been reestablished in all the States and Territories within the jurisdiction of the United States, it is believed that such prudential reservations and exceptions as at the dates of said several proclamations were deemed necessary and proper may now be wisely and justly relinquished, and that an universal amnesty and pardon for participation in said rebellion extended to all who have borne any part therein will tend to secure permanent peace, order, and prosperity throughout the land, and to renew and fully restore confidence and fraternal feeling among the whole people, and their respect for and attachment to the National Government, designed by its patriotic founders for the general good:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, by virtue of the power and authority in me vested by the Constitution and in the name of the sovereign people of the United States, do hereby proclaim and declare, unconditionally and without reservation, to all and to every person who, directly or indirectly, participated in the late insurrection or rebellion a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States or of adhering to their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof.

In testimony whereof I have signed these presents with my hand and have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

[SEAL.] Done at the city of Washington, the 25th day of December, A. D. 1868, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-third.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:

F. W. SEWARD,

Acting Secretary of State.

IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

On the 24th of February, 1868, the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States resolved to impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors, of which the Senate was apprised, and arrangements were made for the trial. On the 2d and 3d of March articles of impeachment were agreed upon by the House of Representatives, and on the 4th they were presented to the Senate by the managers on the part of the House, Mr. John A. Bingham, Mr. George S. Boutwell, Mr. James F. Wilson, Mr. Benjamin F. Butler, Mr. Thomas Williams, Mr. John A. Logan, and Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, who were accompanied by the House as a Committee of the Whole. The articles are as follows:

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNITED STATES,
March 2, 1868.

ARTICLES EXHIBITED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE NAME OF THEMSELVES AND ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, AGAINST ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THEIR IMPEACHMENT AGAINST HIM FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN OFFICE.

ARTICLE I. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, unmindful of the high duties of his office, of his oath of office, and of the requirement of the Constitution that he should take care that the laws be faithfully executed, did unlawfully and in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States issue an order in writing for the removal of Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, said Edwin M. Stanton having been theretofore duly appointed and commissioned, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, as such Secretary; and said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 12th day of August, A. D. 1867, and during the recess of said Senate, having suspended by his order Edwin M. Stanton from said office, and within twenty days after the first day of the next meeting of said Senate—that is to say, on the 12th day of December, in the year last aforesaid—having reported to said Senate such suspension, with the evidence and reasons for his action in the case and the name of the person designated to perform the duties of such office temporarily until the next meeting of the Senate; and said Senate

thereafterwards, on the 13th day of January, A. D. 1868, having duly considered the evidence and reasons reported by said Andrew Johnson for said suspension, and having refused to concur in said suspension, whereby and by force of the provisions of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, said Edwin M. Stanton did forthwith resume the functions of his office, whereof the said Andrew Johnson had then and there due notice; and said Edwin M. Stanton, by reason of the premises, on said 21st day of February, being lawfully entitled to hold said office of Secretary for the Department of War; which said order for the removal of said Edwin M. Stanton is in substance as follows; that is to say:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.

HON. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby removed from office as Secretary for the Department of War, and your functions as such will terminate upon the receipt of this communication.

You will transfer to Brevet Major-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of the Army, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and charge.

Respectfully, yours,

ANDREW JOHNSON.

which order was unlawfully issued with intent then and there to violate the act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, and with the further intent, contrary to the provisions of said act, in violation thereof, and contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, the said Senate then and there being in session, to remove said Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, the said Edwin M. Stanton being then and there Secretary for the Department of War, and being then and there in the due and lawful execution and discharge of the duties of said office; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ART. II. That on said 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office, of his oath of office, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the provisions of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, ~~1867, with~~out the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, said Senate then and there being in session, and without authority of law, did, with intent to violate the

Constitution of the United States and the act aforesaid, issue and deliver to one Lorenzo Thomas a letter of authority in substance as follows; that is to say:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.

Brevet Major-General LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C.

SIR: The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from office as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, and will immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

Respectfully, yours,
ANDREW JOHNSON.

then and there being no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ART. III. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office in this, that without authority of law, while the Senate of the United States was then and there in session, he did appoint one Lorenzo Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War *ad interim*, without the advice and consent of the Senate, and with intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, no vacancy having happened in said office of Secretary for the Department of War during the recess of the Senate, and no vacancy existing in said office at the time, and which said appointment, so made by said Andrew Johnson, of said Lorenzo Thomas, is in substance as follows; that is to say:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.

Brevet Major-General LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C.

SIR: The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from office as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, and will immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

Respectfully, yours,
ANDREW JOHNSON.

ART. IV. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and his oath of office, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other persons

to the House of Representatives unknown, with intent, by intimidation and threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then and there the Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed under the laws of the United States, from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, contrary to and in violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the provisions of an act entitled "An act to define and punish certain conspiracies," approved July 31, 1861; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high crime in office.

ART. V. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, and on divers other days and times in said year before the 2d day of March, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other persons to the House of Representatives unknown, to prevent and hinder the execution of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, and in pursuance of said conspiracy did unlawfully attempt to prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then and there being Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed and commissioned under the laws of the United States, from holding said office; whereby the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ART. VI. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas by force to seize, take, and possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, and then and there in the custody and charge of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary for said Department, contrary to the provisions of an act entitled "An act to define and punish certain conspiracies," approved July 31, 1861, and with intent to violate and disregard an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit a high crime in office.

ART. VII. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas with intent unlawfully to seize, take, and possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, in the custody and charge of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary for said Department, with intent to violate and disregard the act entitled "~~An act re~~gulating the tenure ~~of~~ certain civil ~~offices,~~" passed March 2, 1867; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit a high misdemeanor in office.

ART. VIII. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, with intent unlawfully to control the disbursement of the moneys appropriated for the military service and for the Department of War, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully, and contrary to the provisions of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and while the Senate was then and there in session, there being no vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and with intent to violate and disregard the act aforesaid, then and there issue and deliver to one Lorenzo Thomas a letter of authority, in writing, in substance as follows; that is to say:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.

Brevet Major-General LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C.

SIR: The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from office as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, and will immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.

Respectfully, yours,
ANDREW JOHNSON.

whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ART. IX. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 22d day of February, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, in disregard of the Constitution and the laws of the United States duly enacted, as Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States, did bring before himself then and there William H. Emory, a major-general by brevet in the Army of the United States, actually in command of the Department of Washington and the military forces thereof, and did then and there, as such Commander in Chief, declare to and instruct said Emory that part of a law of the United States, passed March 2, 1867, entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes," especially the second section thereof, which provides, among other things, that "all orders and instructions relating to military operations issued by the President or Secretary of War shall be issued through the General of the Army, and in case of his inability through the next in rank," was unconstitutional and in contravention of the commission of said Emory, and which said provision of law had been theretofore duly and legally promulgated by general order for the government and direction of the Army of the United States, as the said Andrew Johnson then and there well knew, with intent thereby to induce said Emory, in his official

capacity as commander of the Department of Washington, to violate the provisions of said act and to take and receive, act upon, and obey such orders as he, the said Andrew Johnson, might make and give, and which should not be issued through the General of the Army of the United States, according to the provisions of said act, and with the further intent thereby to enable him, the said Andrew Johnson, to prevent the execution of the act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, and to unlawfully prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then being Secretary for the Department of War, from holding said office and discharging the duties thereof; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

And the House of Representatives, by protestation, saving to themselves the liberty of exhibiting at any time hereafter any further articles or other accusation or impeachment against the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and also of replying to his answers which he shall make unto the articles herein preferred against him, and of offering proof to the same, and every part thereof, and to all and every other article, accusation, or impeachment which shall be exhibited by them, as the case shall require, *do demand* that the said Andrew Johnson may be put to answer the high crimes and misdemeanors in office herein charged against him, and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments may be thereupon had and given as may be agreeable to law and justice.

SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Attest:

EDWARD McPHERSON,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNITED STATES,
March 3, 1868.

The following additional articles of impeachment were agreed to, viz:

ART. X. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and the dignity and proprieties thereof, and of the harmony and courtesies which ought to exist and be maintained between the executive and legislative branches of the Government of the United States, designing and intending to set aside the rightful authority and powers of Congress, did attempt to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress of the United States and the several branches thereof, to impair and destroy the regard and respect of all the good people of the United States for the Congress and legislative power thereof (which all officers of the Government ought inviolably to preserve and maintain), and to excite the odium and resentment of all the good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by it duly and constitutionally enacted; and, in pursuance of his

said design and intent, openly and publicly, and before divers assemblages of the citizens of the United States, convened in divers parts thereof to meet and receive said Andrew Johnson as the Chief Magistrate of the United States, did, on the 18th day of August, A. D. 1866, and on divers other days and times, as well before as afterwards, make and deliver with a loud voice certain intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues, and did therein utter loud threats and bitter menaces, as well against Congress as the laws of the United States, duly enacted thereby, amid the cries, jeers, and laughter of the multitudes then assembled and in hearing, which are set forth in the several specifications hereinafter written in substance and effect; that is to say:

Specification first:—In this, that at Washington, in the District of Columbia, in the Executive Mansion, to a committee of citizens who called upon the President of the United States, speaking of and concerning the Congress of the United States, said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, heretofore, to wit, on the 18th day of August, A. D. 1866, did in a loud voice declare in substance and effect, among other things; that is to say:

So far as the executive department of the Government is concerned, the effort has been made to restore the Union, to heal the breach, to pour oil into the wounds which were consequent upon the struggle, and (to speak in common phrase) to prepare, as the learned and wise physician would, a plaster healing in character and coextensive with the wound. We thought and we think that we had partially succeeded; but as the work progresses, as reconstruction seemed to be taking place and the country was becoming reunited, we found a disturbing and marring element opposing us. In alluding to that element I shall go no further than your convention and the distinguished gentleman who has delivered to me the report of its proceedings. I shall make no reference to it that I do not believe the time and the occasion justify.

We have witnessed in one department of the Government every endeavor to prevent the restoration of peace, harmony, and union. We have seen hanging upon the verge of the Government, as it were, a body called, or which assumes to be, the Congress of the United States, while in fact it is a Congress of only a part of the States. We have seen this Congress pretend to be for the Union, when its every step and act tended to perpetuate disunion and make a disruption of the States inevitable. * * * We have seen Congress gradually encroach, step by step, upon constitutional rights, and violate, day after day and month after month, fundamental principles of the Government. We have seen a Congress that seemed to forget that there was a limit to the sphere and scope of legislation. We have seen a Congress in a minority assume to exercise power which, allowed to be consummated, would result in despotism or monarchy itself.

Specification second.—In this, that at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, heretofore, to wit, on the 3d day of September, A. D. 1866, before a public assemblage of citizens and others, said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, speaking of and concerning the Congress of the United States, did in a loud voice declare in substance and effect, among other things; that is to say:

I will tell you what I did do. I called upon your Congress that is trying to break up the Government.

* * * * * * *

In conclusion, besides that, Congress had taken much pains to poison their constituents against him. But what had Congress done? Have they done anything to restore the Union of these States? No. On the contrary, they have done everything to prevent it. And because he stood now where he did when the rebellion commenced, he had been denounced as a traitor. Who had run greater risks or made greater sacrifices than himself? But Congress, factious and domineering, had undertaken to poison the minds of the American people.

Specification third.—In this, that at St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, heretofore, to wit, on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1866, before a public assemblage of citizens and others, said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, speaking of and concerning the Congress of the United States, did in a loud voice declare in substance and effect, among other things; that is to say:

Go on. Perhaps if you had a word or two on the subject of New Orleans you might understand more about it than you do. And if you will go back—if you will go back and ascertain the cause of the riot at New Orleans, perhaps you will not be so prompt in calling out "New Orleans." If you will take up the riot at New Orleans and trace it back to its source or its immediate cause, you will find out who was responsible for the blood that was shed there. If you will take up the riot at New Orleans and trace it back to the Radical Congress, you will find that the riot at New Orleans was substantially planned. If you will take up the proceedings in their caucuses, you will understand that they there knew that a convention was to be called which was extinct by its power having expired; that it was said that the intention was that a new government was to be organized, and on the organization of that government the intention was to enfranchise one portion of the population, called the colored population, who had just been emancipated, and at the same time disfranchise white men. When you design to talk about New Orleans, you ought to understand what you are talking about. When you read the speeches that were made and take up the facts on the Friday and Saturday before that convention sat, you will there find that speeches were made, incendiary in their character, exciting that portion of the population—the black population—to arm themselves and prepare for the shedding of blood. You will also find that that convention did assemble, in violation of law, and the intention of that convention was to supersede the reorganized authorities in the State government of Louisiana, which had been recognized by the Government of the United States; and every man engaged in that rebellion in that convention, with the intention of superseding and upturning the civil government which had been recognized by the Government of the United States, I say that he was a traitor to the Constitution of the United States; and hence you find that another rebellion was commenced, *having its origin in the Radical Congress.*

* * * * * * *

So much for the New Orleans riot. And there was the cause and the origin of the blood that was shed; and every drop of blood that was shed is upon their skirts, and they are responsible for it. I could test this thing a little closer, but will not do it here to-night. But when you talk about the causes and consequences that resulted from proceedings of that kind, perhaps, as I have been introduced here, and you have provoked questions of this kind—though it does not provoke me—I will tell you a few wholesome things that have been done by this Radical Congress in connection with New Orleans and the extension of the elective franchise.

I know that I have been traduced and abused. I know it has come in advance of me, here as elsewhere, that I have attempted to exercise an arbitrary power in resisting laws that were intended to be forced upon the Government; that I had exer-

cised that power; that I had abandoned the party that elected me, and that I was a traitor, because I exercised the veto power in attempting and did arrest for a time a bill that was called a "Freedmen's Bureau" bill; yes, that I was a traitor. And I have been traduced, I have been slandered, I have been maligned, I have been called Judas Iscariot and all that. Now, my countrymen, here to-night, it is very easy to indulge in epithets; it is easy to call a man a Judas and cry out "traitor;" but when he is called upon to give arguments and facts he is very often found wanting. Judas Iscariot—Judas. There was a Judas, and he was one of the twelve apostles. Oh, yes; the twelve apostles had a Christ. The twelve apostles had a Christ, and he never could have had a Judas unless he had had twelve apostles. If I have played the Judas, who has been my Christ that I have played the Judas with? Was it Thad. Stevens? Was it Wendell Phillips? Was it Charles Sumner? These are the men that stop and compare themselves with the Savior, and everybody that differs with them in opinion, and to try to stay and arrest their diabolical and nefarious policy, is to be denounced as a Judas.

* * * * * * *

Well, let me say to you, if you will stand by me in this action, if you will stand by me in trying to give the people a fair chance—soldiers and citizens—to participate in these offices, God being willing I will kick them out. I will kick them out just as fast as I can.

Let me say to you in concluding that what I have said I intended to say. I was not provoked into this, and I care not for their menaces, the taunts and the jeers. I care not for threats. I do not intend to be bullied by my enemies nor overawed by my friends. But, God willing, with your help I will veto their measures whenever any of them come to me.

which said utterances, declarations, threats, and harangues, highly censurable in any, are peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in the Chief Magistrate of the United States, by means whereof said Andrew Johnson has brought the high office of the President of the United States into contempt, ridicule, and disgrace, to the great scandal of all good citizens; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did commit and was then and there guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ART. XI. That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the Constitution and laws of the United States, did heretofore, to wit, on the 18th day of August, A. D. 1866, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, by public speech, declare and affirm in substance that the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the Constitution to exercise legislative power under the same, but, on the contrary, was a Congress of only part of the States; thereby denying and intending to deny that the legislation of said Congress was valid or obligatory upon him, the said Andrew Johnson, except in so far as he saw fit to approve the same, and also thereby denying and intending to deny the power of the said Thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and in pursuance of said declaration the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, afterwards, to wit, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully, and in disregard of the requirement

of the Constitution that he should take care that the laws be faithfully executed, attempt to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising and contriving, and attempting to devise and contrive, means by which he should prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of the office of Secretary for the Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in the suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of said Edwin M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department of War, and also by further unlawfully devising and contriving, and attempting to devise and contrive, means then and there to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868 and for other purposes," approved March 2, 1867, and also to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867, whereby the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then, to wit, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1868, at the city of Washington, commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Attest:

EDWARD McPHERSON,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.

IN THE SENATE, *March 4, 1868.*

The President *pro tempore* laid before the Senate the following letter from the Hon. Salmon P. Chase, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:

WASHINGTON, *March 4, 1868.*

To the Senate of the United States:

Inasmuch as the sole power to try impeachments is vested by the Constitution in the Senate, and it is made the duty of the Chief Justice to preside when the President is on trial, I take the liberty of submitting, very respectfully, some observations in respect to the proper mode of proceeding upon the impeachment which has been preferred by the House of Representatives against the President now in office.

That when the Senate sits for the trial of an impeachment it sits as a court seems unquestionable.

That for the trial of an impeachment of the President this court must be constituted of the members of the Senate, with the Chief Justice presiding, seems equally unquestionable.

The Federalist is regarded as the highest contemporary authority on the construction of the Constitution, and in the sixty-fourth number the functions of the Senate "sitting in their judicial capacity as a court for the trial of impeachments" are examined.

In a paragraph explaining the reasons for not uniting "the Supreme Court with the Senate in the formation of the court of impeachments" it is observed that—

> To a certain extent the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of impeachments, as is proposed by the plan of the Convention, while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was, perhaps, the prudent mean.

This authority seems to leave no doubt upon either of the propositions just stated; and the statement of them will serve to introduce the question upon which I think it my duty to state the result of my reflections to the Senate, namely, At what period, in the case of an impeachment of the President, should the court of impeachment be organized under oath, as directed by the Constitution?

It will readily suggest itself to anyone who reflects upon the abilities and the learning in the law which distinguish so many Senators that besides the reason assigned in the Federalist there must have been still another for the provision requiring the Chief Justice to preside in the court of impeachment. Under the Constitution, in case of a vacancy in the office of President, the Vice-President succeeds, and it was doubtless thought prudent and befitting that the next in succession should not preside in a proceeding through which a vacancy might be created.

It is not doubted that the Senate, while sitting in its ordinary capacity, must necessarily receive from the House of Representatives some notice of its intention to impeach the President at its bar, but it does not seem to me an unwarranted opinion, in view of this constitutional provision, that the organization of the Senate as a court of impeachment, under the Constitution, should precede the actual announcement of the impeachment on the part of the House.

And it may perhaps be thought a still less unwarranted opinion that articles of impeachment should only be presented to a court of impeachment; that no summons or other process should issue except from the organized court, and that rules for the government of the proceedings of such a court should be framed only by the court itself.

I have found myself unable to come to any other conclusions than these. I can assign no reason for requiring the Senate to organize as a court under any other than its ordinary presiding officer for the latter proceedings upon an impeachment of the President which does not seem to me to apply equally to the earlier.

I am informed that the Senate has proceeded upon other views, and it is not my purpose to contest what its superior wisdom may have directed. All good citizens will fervently pray that no occasion may ever arise when the grave proceedings now in progress will be cited as a precedent; but it is not impossible that such an occasion may come.

Inasmuch, therefore, as the Constitution has charged the Chief Justice

with an important function in the trial of an impeachment of the President, it has seemed to me fitting and obligatory, where he is unable to concur in the views of the Senate concerning matters essential to the trial, that his respectful dissent should appear.

S. P. CHASE,
Chief Justice of the United States.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1868.

THE UNITED STATES *vs.* ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.

The Chief Justice of the United States entered the Senate Chamber and was conducted to the chair by the committee appointed by the Senate for that purpose.

The following oath was administered to the Chief Justice by Associate Justice Nelson, and by the Chief Justice to the members of the Senate:

I do solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, now pending, I will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws. So help me God.

FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1868.

THE UNITED STATES *vs.* ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.

To accord with the conviction of the Chief Justice* that the court should adopt its own rules, those adopted on March 2 by the Senate sitting in its legislative capacity were readopted by the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment. The rules are as follows:

RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS.

I. Whensoever the Senate shall receive notice from the House of Representatives that managers are appointed on their part to conduct an impeachment against any person, and are directed to carry articles of impeachment to the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate shall immediately inform the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to receive the managers for the purpose of exhibiting such articles of impeachment agreeably to said notice.

II. When the managers of an impeachment shall be introduced at the bar of the Senate and shall signify that they are ready to exhibit articles

* See letter from the Chief Justice, pp. 718–720.

of impeachment against any person, the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct the Sergeant-at-Arms to make proclamation, who shall, after making proclamation, repeat the following words, viz:

All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of imprisonment, while the House of Representatives is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States articles of impeachment against ——— ———.

after which the articles shall be exhibited; and then the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall inform the managers that the Senate will take proper order on the subject of the impeachment, of which due notice shall be given to the House of Representatives.

III. Upon such articles being presented to the Senate, the Senate shall, at 1 o'clock afternoon of the day (Sunday excepted) following such presentation, or sooner if so ordered by the Senate, proceed to the consideration of such articles, and shall continue in session from day to day (Sundays excepted) after the trial shall commence (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) until final judgment shall be rendered, and so much longer as may in its judgment be needful. Before proceeding to the consideration of the articles of impeachment the Presiding Officer shall administer the oath hereinafter provided to the members of the Senate then present, and to the other members of the Senate as they shall appear, whose duty it shall be to take the same.

IV. When the President of the United States, or the Vice-President of the United States upon whom the powers and duties of the office of President shall have devolved, shall be impeached, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States shall preside; and in a case requiring the said Chief Justice to preside notice shall be given to him by the Presiding Officer of the Senate of the time and place fixed for the consideration of the articles of impeachment as aforesaid, with a request to attend; and the said Chief Justice shall preside over the Senate during the consideration of said articles and upon the trial of the person impeached therein.

V. The Presiding Officer shall have power to make and issue, by himself or by the Secretary of the Senate, all orders, mandates, writs, and precepts authorized by these rules or by the Senate, and to make and enforce such other regulations and orders in the premises as the Senate may authorize or provide.

VI. The Senate shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to enforce obedience to its orders, mandates, writs, precepts, and judgments, to preserve order, and to punish in a summary way contempts of and disobedience to its authority, orders, mandates, writs, precepts, or judgments, and to make all lawful orders, rules, and regulations which it may deem essential or conducive to the ends of justice; and the Sergeant-at-Arms, under the direction of the Senate, may employ such aid and assistance as may be necessary to enforce, execute, and carry into effect the lawful orders, mandates, writs, and precepts of the Senate.

VII. The Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber, and the presiding officer upon the trial shall direct all the forms of proceeding while the Senate are sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment and all forms during the trial not otherwise specially provided for. The presiding officer may, in the first instance, submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions; but the same shall, on the demand of one-fifth of the members present, be decided by yeas and nays.

VIII. Upon the presentation of articles of impeachment and the organization of the Senate as hereinbefore provided, a writ of summons shall issue to the accused, reciting said articles and notifying him to appear before the Senate upon a day and at a place to be fixed by the Senate, and named in such writ, and file his answer to said articles of impeachment, and to stand to and abide the orders and judgments of the Senate thereon, which writ shall be served by such officer or person as shall be named in the precept thereof such number of days prior to the day fixed for such appearance as shall be named in such precept, either by the delivery of an attested copy thereof to the person accused or, if that can not conveniently be done, by leaving such copy at the last known place of abode of such person or at his usual place of business, in some conspicuous place therein; or, if such service shall be, in the judgment of the Senate, impracticable, notice to the accused to appear shall be given in such other manner, by publication or otherwise, as shall be deemed just; and if the writ aforesaid shall fail of service in the manner aforesaid, the proceedings shall not thereby abate, but further service may be made in such manner as the Senate shall direct. If the accused, after service, shall fail to appear, either in person or by attorney, on the day so fixed therefor as aforesaid, or, appearing, shall fail to file his answer to such articles of impeachment, the trial shall proceed, nevertheless, as upon a plea of not guilty. If a plea of guilty shall be entered, judgment may be entered thereon without further proceedings.

IX. At 12 o'clock and 30 minutes afternoon of the day appointed for the return of the summons against the person impeached the legislative and executive business of the Senate shall be suspended and the Secretary of the Senate shall administer an oath to the returning officer in the form following, viz:

> I, ——— ———, do solemnly swear that the return made by me upon the process issued on the —— day of ——— by the Senate of the United States against ——— ——— is truly made, and that I have performed such service as herein described. So help me God.

which oath shall be entered at large on the records.

X. The person impeached shall then be called to appear and answer the articles of impeachment against him. If he appear, or any person for him, the appearance shall be recorded, stating particularly if by himself or by agent or attorney, naming the person appearing and the capacity in

which he appears. If he do not appear, either personally or by agent or attorney, the same shall be recorded.

XI. At 12 o'clock and 30 minutes afternoon of the day appointed for the trial of an impeachment the legislative and executive business of the Senate shall be suspended and the Secretary shall give notice to the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to proceed upon the impeachment of ——— ———, in the Senate Chamber, which chamber is prepared with accommodations for the reception of the House of Representatives.

XII. The hour of the day at which the Senate shall sit upon the trial of an impeachment shall be (unless otherwise ordered) 12 o'clock m., and when the hour for such sitting shall arrive the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall so announce; and thereupon the presiding officer upon such trial shall cause proclamation to be made, and the business of the trial shall proceed. The adjournment of the Senate sitting in said trial shall not operate as an adjournment of the Senate, but on such adjournment the Senate shall resume the consideration of its legislative aud executive business.

XIII. The Secretary of the Senate shall record the proceedings in cases of impeachment as in the case of legislative proceedings, and the same shall be reported in the same manner as the legislative proceedings of the Senate.

XIV. Counsel for the parties shall be admitted to appear and be heard upon an impeachment.

XV. All motions made by the parties or their counsel shall be addressed to the presiding officer, and if he or any Senator shall require it they shall be committed to writing and read at the Secretary's table.

XVI. Witnesses shall be examined by one person on behalf of the party producing them and then cross-examined by one person on the other side.

XVII. If a Senator is called as a witness, he shall be sworn and give his testimony standing in his place.

XVIII. If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a witness, or to offer a motion or order (except a motion to adjourn), it shall be reduced to writing and put by the presiding officer.

XIX. At all times while the Senate is sitting upon the trial of an impeachment the doors of the Senate shall be kept open, unless the Senate shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its decisions.

XX. All preliminary or interlocutory questions and all motions shall be argued for not exceeding one hour on each side, unless the Senate shall by order extend the time.

XXI. The case on each side shall be opened by one person. The final argument on the merits may be made by two persons on each side (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, upon application for that purpose), and the argument shall be opened and closed on the part of the House of Representatives.

XXII. On the final question whether the impeachment is sustained the yeas and nays shall be taken on each article of impeachment separately, and if the impeachment shall not, upon any of the articles presented, be sustained by the votes of two-thirds of the members present a judgment of acquittal shall be entered; but if the person accused in such articles of impeachment shall be convicted upon any of said articles by the votes of two-thirds of the members present the Senate shall proceed to pronounce judgment, and a certified copy of such judgment shall be deposited in the office of the Secretary of State.

XXIII. All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, except when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case no member shall speak more than once on one question, and for not more than ten minutes on an interlocutory question, and for not more than fifteen minutes on the final question, unless by consent of the Senate, to be had without debate; but a motion to adjourn may be decided without the yeas and nays, unless they be demanded by one-fifth of the members present.

XXIV. Witnesses shall be sworn in the following form, viz:

You, ——— ———, do swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that the evidence you shall give in the case now depending between the United States and ——— ——— shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God.

which oath shall be administered by the Secretary or any other duly authorized person.

Form of subpœna to be issued on the application of the managers of the impeachment, or of the party impeached, or of his counsel:

To ——— ———, *greeting:*

You and each of you are hereby commanded to appear before the Senate of the United States on the —— day of ———, at the Senate Chamber, in the city of Washington, then and there to testify your knowledge in the cause which is before the Senate in which the House of Representatives have impeached ——— ———.

Fail not.

Witness ——— ———, and Presiding Officer of the Senate, at the city of Washington, this —— day of ———, A. D. ——, and of the Independence of the United States the ———.

Form of direction for the service of said subpœna:

The Senate of the United States to ——— ———, *greeting:*

You are hereby commanded to serve and return the within subpœna according to law.

Dated at Washington, this —— day of ———, A. D. ——, and of the Independence of the United States the ———.

——— ———,
Secretary of the Senate.

Form of oath to be administered to the members of the Senate sitting in the trial of impeachments:

I solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of ——— ———, now pending, I will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws. So help me God.

Form of summons to be issued and served upon the person impeached.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *ss:*
The Senate of the United States to ——— ———, *greeting:*

Whereas the House of Representatives of the United States of America did on the —— day of ——— exhibit to the Senate articles of impeachment against you, the said ——— ———, in the words following:

[Here insert the articles.]

And demand that you, the said ——— ———, should be put to answer the accusations as set forth in said articles, and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments might be thereupon had as are agreeable to law and justice:

You, the said ——— ———, are therefore hereby summoned to be and appear before the Senate of the United States of America, at their chamber, in the city of Washington, on the —— day of ———, at 12 o'clock and 30 minutes afternoon, then and there to answer to the said articles of impeachment, and then and there to abide by, obey, and perform such orders, directions, and judgments as the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Hereof you are not to fail.

Witness ——— ———, and Presiding Officer of the said Senate, at the city of Washington, this —— day of ———, A. D. ——, and of the Independence of the United States the ———.

Form of precept to be indorsed on said writ of summons:

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *ss:*
The Senate of the United States to ——— ———, *greeting:*

You are hereby commanded to deliver to and leave with ——— ———, if conveniently to be found, or, if not, to leave at his usual place of abode or at his usual place of business, in some conspicuous place, a true and attested copy of the within writ of summons, together with a like copy of this precept; and in whichsoever way you perform the service, let it be done at least —— days before the appearance day mentioned in said writ of summons.

Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept, with your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before the appearance day mentioned in the said writ of summons.

Witness ——— ———, and Presiding Officer of the Senate, at the city of Washington, this —— day of ———, A. D. ——, and of the Independence of the United States the ———.

All process shall be served by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate unless otherwise ordered by the court.

XXV. If the Senate shall at any time fail to sit for the consideration of articles of impeachment on the day or hour fixed therefor, the Senate may by an order, to be adopted without debate, fix a day and hour for resuming such consideration.

On March 31 Rule VII was amended to read as follows:

VII. The Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber, and the presiding officer on the trial shall direct all the forms of proceeding while the Senate are sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment, and all forms during the trial not otherwise specially provided for, and the presiding officer on the trial

may rule all questions of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless some member of the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision; or he may, at his option, in the first instance submit any such question to a vote of the members of the Senate.

On April 3 Rule VII was further amended by inserting at the end thereof the following:

Upon all such questions the vote shall be without a division, unless the yeas and nays be demanded by one-fifth of the members present, when the same shall be taken.

On March 13 Rule XXIII was amended to read as follows:

XXIII. All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, subject, however, to the operation of Rule VII, except when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case no member shall speak more than once on one question, and for not more than ten minutes on an interlocutory question, and for not more than fifteen minutes on the final question, unless by consent of the Senate, to be had without debate; but a motion to adjonrn may be decided without the yeas and nays, unless they be demanded by one-fifth of the members present.

On May 7 Rule XXIII was further amended by adding thereto the following:

The fifteen minutes herein allowed shall be for the whole deliberation on the final question, and not to the final question on each article of impeachment.

FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1868.

THE UNITED STATES *vs.* ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.

Mr. Henry Stanbery, in behalf of Andrew Johnson, the respondent, read the following paper:

In the matter of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE: I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, having been served with a summons to appear before this honorable court, sitting as a court of impeachment, to answer certain articles of impeachment found and presented against me by the honorable the House of Representatives of the United States, do hereby enter my appearance by my counsel, Henry Stanbery, Benjamin R. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts, and Thomas A. R. Nelson, who have my warrant and authority therefor, and who are instructed by me to ask of this honorable court a reasonable time for the preparation of my answer to said articles. After a careful examination of the articles of impeachment and consultation

with my counsel, I am satisfied that at least forty days will be necessary for the preparation of my answer, and I respectfully ask that it be allowed.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

Mr. Stanbery then submitted the following motion:

In the matter of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

Henry Stanbery, Benjamin R. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts, and Thomas A. R. Nelson, of counsel for the respondent, move the court for the allowance of forty days for the preparation of the answer to the articles of impeachment, and in support of the motion make the following professional statement:

The articles are eleven in number, involving many questions of law and fact. We have during the limited time and opportunity afforded us considered as far as possible the field of investigation which must be explored in the preparation of the answer, and the conclusion at which we have arrived is that with the utmost diligence the time we have asked is reasonable and necessary.

The precedents as to time for answer upon impeachments before the Senate to which we have had opportunity to refer are those of Judge Chase and Judge Peck.

In the case of Judge Chase time was allowed from the 3d of January until the 4th of February next succeeding to put in his answer—a period of thirty-two days; but in this case there were only eight articles, and Judge Chase had been for a year cognizant of most of the articles, and had been himself engaged in preparing to meet them.

In the case of Judge Peck there was but a single article. Judge Peck asked for time from the 10th to the 25th of May to put in his answer, and it was granted. It appears that Judge Peck had been long cognizant of the ground laid for his impeachment, and had been present before the committee of the House upon the examination of the witnesses, and had been permitted by the House of Representatives to present to that body an elaborate answer to the charges.

It is apparent that the President is fairly entitled to more time than was allowed in either of the foregoing cases. It is proper to add that the respondents in these cases were lawyers, fully capable of preparing their own answers, and that no pressing official duties interfered with their attention to that business; whereas the President, not being a lawyer, must rely on his counsel. The charges involve his acts, declarations, and intentions, as to all which his counsel must be fully advised upon consultation with him, step by step, in the preparation of his defense. It is seldom that a case requires such constant communication between client and counsel as this, and yet such communication can only be had at such intervals as are allowed to the President from the usual hours that must be devoted to his high official duties.

We further beg leave to suggest for the consideration of this honorable court that, as counsel careful as well of their own reputation as of the interests of their client in a case of such magnitude as this, so out of the ordinary range of professional experience, where so much responsibility is felt, they submit to the candid consideration of the court that they have a right to ask for themselves such opportunity to discharge their duty as seems to them to be absolutely necessary.

HENRY STANBERY,
B. R. CURTIS,
JEREMIAH S. BLACK,
WILLIAM M. EVARTS, } Per H. S.
THOMAS A. R. NELSON,
Of Counsel for the Respondent.

The above motion was denied, and the Senate adopted the following orders:

Ordered, That the respondent file answer to the articles of impeachment on or before Monday, the 23d day of March instant.

Ordered, That unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, for cause shown, the trial of the pending impeachment shall proceed immediately after replication shall be filed.

MONDAY, MARCH 23, 1868.

THE UNITED STATES *vs.* ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.

The answer of the respondent to the articles of impeachment was submitted by his counsel, as follows:

Senate of the United States, sitting as a court of impeachment for the trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

THE ANSWER OF THE SAID ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITED AGAINST HIM BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES.

Answer to Article I.—For answer to the first article he says that Edwin M. Stanton was appointed Secretary for the Department of War on the 15th day of January, A. D. 1862, by Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, during the first term of his Presidency, and was commissioned, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, to hold the said office during the pleasure of the President; that the office of Secretary for the Department of War was created by an act of the First Congress in its first session, passed on the 7th day of August, A. D. 1789, and in and by that act it was provided and enacted that the said Secretary for the Department of War shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on and

intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeably to the Constitution, relative to the subjects within the scope of the said Department; and, furthermore, that the said Secretary shall conduct the business of the said Department in such a manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order and instruct.

And this respondent, further answering, says that by force of the act aforesaid and by reason of his appointment aforesaid the said Stanton became the principal officer in one of the Executive Departments of the Government within the true intent and meaning of the second section of the second article of the Constitution of the United States and according to the true intent and meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United States; and, in accordance with the settled and uniform practice of each and every President of the United States, the said Stanton then became, and so long as he should continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War must continue to be, one of the advisers of the President of the United States, as well as the person intrusted to act for and represent the President in matters enjoined upon him or intrusted to him by the President touching the Department aforesaid, and for whose conduct in such capacity, subordinate to the President, the President is by the Constitution and laws of the United States made responsible.

And this respondent, further answering, says he succeeded to the office of President of the United States upon and by reason of the death of Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, on the 15th day of April, 1865, and the said Stanton was then holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War under and by reason of the appointment and commission aforesaid; and not having been removed from the said office by this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same under the appointment and commission aforesaid, at the pleasure of the President, until the time hereinafter particularly mentioned, and at no time received any appointment or commission save as above detailed.

And this respondent, further answering, says that on and prior to the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, this respondent, the President of the United States, responsible for the conduct of the Secretary for the Department of War, and having the constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the person holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, became satisfied that he could not allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary for the Department of War without hazard of the public interest; that the relations between the said Stanton and the President no longer permitted the President to resort to him for advice or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of War, as by law required, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the President; and thereupon, by force of the Constitution and laws of the United

States, which devolve on the President the power and the duty to control the conduct of the business of that Executive Department of the Government, and by reason of the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did necessarily consider and did determine that the said Stanton ought no longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. And this respondent, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him as President of the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to give effect to such his decision and determination, did, on the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note of which the following is a true copy:

SIR: Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

To which note the said Stanton made the following reply:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 5, 1867.

SIR: Your note of this day has been received, stating that "public considerations of a high character constrain" you "to say that" my "resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted."

In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress.

Very respectfully, yours,
EDWIN M. STANTON.

This respondent, as President of the Uuited States, was thereon of opinion that, having regard to the necessary official relations and duties of the Secretary for the Department of War to the President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and having regard to the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said Secretary, and having regard to the permanent executive authority of the office which the respondent holds under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was impossible, consistently with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War; and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as President of the United States, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was informed and verily believed that it was practically settled by the First Congress of the United States, and had been so considered and uniformly and in great numbers of instances acted on by each Congress and President of the United States, in succession, from President Washington to and including President Lincoln, and from the First Congress to the Thirty-ninth Congress; that the Constitution of the United States conferred on the President, as part of the executive power and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing

the executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of the Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the Executive Departments upon this question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that, consequently, it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States, and because in that capacity he was both enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question, did, in good faith and with an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinion, and did make the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States by a message dated on the 2d day of March, 1867 (a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A), that the power last mentioned was conferred and the duty of exercising it in fit cases was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power or relieved of this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole; and this has ever since remained and was the opinion of this respondent at the time when he was forced as aforesaid to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted as follows:

> That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: *Provided*, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was passed that the power to remove executive officers for cause might by law be taken from the President and vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still

retained the opinion above expressed, and verily believed, as he still believes, that the said first section of the last-mentioned act was and is wholly inoperative and void by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States, yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be proper to examine and decide whether the particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of the act, or, if within it, whether the President had not the power, according to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War; and having, in his capacity of President of the United States, so examined and considered, did form the opinion that the case of the said Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the first section of the last-named act.

And this respondent, further answering, says that although a case thus existed which, in his judgment, as President of the United States, called for the exercise of the executive power to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War; and although this respondent was of opinion, as is above shown, that under the Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said Stanton from the said office was vested in the President of the United States; and although this respondent was also of the opinion, as is above shown, that the case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first section of the last-named act; and although each of the said opinions had been formed by this respondent upon an actual case, requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States, to come to some judgment and determination thereon, yet this respondent, as President of the United States, desired and determined to avoid, if possible, any question of the construction and effect of the said first section of the last-named act, and also the broader question of the executive power conferred upon the President of the United States by the Constitution of the United States to remove one of the principal officers of one of the Executive Departments for cause seeming to him sufficient; and this respondent also desired and determined that if, from causes over which he could exert no control, it should become absolutely necessary to raise and have in some way determined either or both of the said last-named questions, it was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and was required of the President thereby, that questions of so much gravity and importance, upon which the legislative and executive departments of the Government had disagreed, which involved powers considered by all branches of the Government, during its entire history down to the year 1867, to have been confided by the Constitution of the United States to the President, and to be necessary for the complete and proper execution of his constitutional duties, should be in some proper way submitted to that judicial department of the Government intrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by it to the

duty, not only of determining finally the construction and effect of all acts of Congress, but of comparing them with the Constitution of the United States and pronouncing them inoperative when found in conflict with that fundamental law which the people have enacted for the government of all their servants. And to these ends, first, that through the action of the Senate of the United States the absolute duty of the President to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton as one of his advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer whose official conduct he was responsible for and had lawful right to control, might, if possible, be accomplished without the necessity of raising any one of the questions aforesaid; and, second, if this duty could not be so performed, then that these questions, or such of them as might necessarily arise, should be judicially determined in manner aforesaid, and for no other end or purpose, this respondent, as President of the United States, on the 12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the reception of the letter of the said Stanton of the 5th of August, hereinbefore stated, did issue to the said Stanton the order following, namely:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, August 12, 1867.

HON. EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.

You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and charge.

To which said order the said Stanton made the following reply:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, August 12, 1867.

THE PRESIDENT.

SIR: Your note of this date has been received, informing me that by virtue of the powers vested in you as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States I am suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same; and also directing me at once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my custody and charge.

Under a sense of public duty, I am compelled to deny your right under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War, or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary.

But inasmuch as the General Commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed *ad interim*, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force.

And this respondent, further answering, says that it is provided in and by the second section of "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices" that the President may suspend an officer from the performance

of the duties of the office held by him, for certain causes therein designated, until the next meeting of the Senate and until the case shall be acted on by the Senate; that this respondent, as President of the United States, was advised, and he verily believed, and still believes, that the executive power of removal from office confided to him by the Constitution as aforesaid includes the power of suspension from office at the pleasure of the President; and this respondent, by the order aforesaid, did suspend the said Stanton from office, not until the next meeting of the Senate or until the Senate should have acted upon the case, but, by force of the power and authority vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, indefinitely and at the pleasure of the President; and the order, in form aforesaid, was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be more fully hereinafter stated.

And this respondent, further answering, says that in and by the act of February 13, 1795, it was, among other things, provided and enacted that in case of vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War it shall be lawful for the President, in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person to perform the duties of that office until a successor be appointed or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding the term of six months; and this respondent, being advised and believing that such law was in full force and not repealed, by an order dated August 12, 1867, did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, General of the armies of the United States, to act as Secretary for the Department of War *ad interim*, in the form in which similar authority had theretofore been given, not until the next meeting of the Senate and until the Senate should act on the case, but at the pleasure of the President, subject only to the limitation of six months in the said last-mentioned act contained; and a copy of the last-named order was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be hereinafter more fully stated; and in pursuance of the design and intention aforesaid, if it should become necessary, to submit the said questions to a judicial determination, this respondent, at or near the date of the last-mentioned order, did make known such his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of the said questions, or such of them as might be necessary.

And this respondent, further answering, says that in further pursuance of his intention and design, if possible, to perform what he judged to be his imperative duty, to prevent the said Stanton from longer holding the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and at the same time avoiding, if possible, any question respecting the extent of the power of removal from executive office confided to the President by the Constitution of the United States, and any question respecting the construction and effect of the first section of the said "Act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," while he should not by any act of his abandon and relinquish either a power which he believed the Constitution had con-

ferred on the President of the United States to enable him to perform the duties of his office or a power designedly left to him by the first section of the act of Congress last aforesaid, this respondent did, on the 12th day of December, 1867, transmit to the Senate of the United States a message, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked B, wherein he made known the orders aforesaid and the reasons which had induced the same, so far as this respondent then considered it material and necessary that the same should be set forth, and reiterated his views concerning the constitutional power of removal vested in the President, and also expressed his views concerning the construction of the said first section of the last-mentioned act, as respected the power of the President to remove the said Stanton from the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, well hoping that this respondent could thus perform what he then believed, and still believes, to be his imperative duty in reference to the said Stanton without derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were confided to the President by the Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of raising judicially any questions respecting the same.

And this respondent, further answering, says that this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein contrary to the settled convictions of the President, formed as aforesaid, respecting the powers confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible for the said Stanton in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might in the judgment of the President be lawful and necessary to raise for a judicial decision the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo Thomas to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, in the said second article set forth.

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial allegation in the said first article, says: He denies that the said Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled

"An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices." He denies that the said order was a violation of the last-mentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that the said order was issued with an intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or this respondent's oath of office; and he respectfully but earnestly insists that not only was it issued by him in the performance of what he believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of what this honorable court will consider was, in point of fact, an imperative official duty. And he denies that any and all substantive matters in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and set forth, do by law constitute a high misdemeanor in office within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States.

Answer to Article II.—And for answer to the second article this respondent says that he admits he did issue and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth in said second article, bearing date at Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868, addressed to Brevet Major-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C., and he further admits that the same was so issued without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, then in session; but he denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United States or any law thereof, or that he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or the provisions of any act of Congress; and this respondent refers to his answer to said first article for a full statement of the purposes and intentions with which said order was issued, and adopts the same as part of his answer to this article; and he further denies that there was then and there no vacancy in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or that he did then and there commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and this respondent maintains and will insist—

1. That at the date and delivery of said writing there was a vacancy existing in the office of Secretary for the Department of War.

2. That notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then in session, it was lawful and according to long and well-established usage to empower and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*.

3. That if the said act regulating the tenure of civil offices be held to be a valid law, no provision of the same was violated by the issuing of said order or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*.

Answer to Article III.—And for answer to said third article this respondent says that he abides by his answer to said first and second articles in so far as the same are responsive to the allegations contained in the said third article, and, without here again repeating the same answer,

prays the same be taken as an answer to this third article as fully as if here again set out at length; and as to the new allegation contained in said third article, that this respondent did appoint the said Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War *ad interim*, this respondent denies that he gave any other authority to said Thomas than such as appears in said written authority, set out in said article, by which he authorized and empowered said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War *ad interim;* and he denies that the same amounts to an appointment, and insists that it is only a designation of an officer of that Department to act temporarily as Secretary for the Department of War *ad interim* until an appointment should be made. But whether the said written authority amounts to an appointment or to a temporary authority or designation, this respondent denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or that he thereby intended to give the said order the character or effect of an appointment in the constitutional or legal sense of that term. He further denies that there was no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said written authority.

Answer to Article IV.—And for answer to said fourth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Lorenzo Thomas, or with the said Thomas and any other person or persons, with intent, by intimidations and threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent the said Stanton from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the provisions of the said act of Congress in said article mentioned, or that he did then and there commit or was guilty of a high crime in office. On the contrary thereof, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there lawfully the Secretary for the Department of War, this respondent states that his sole purpose in authorizing the said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War *ad interim* was, as is fully stated in his answer to the said first article, to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to hold said office, notwithstanding his said suspension, and notwithstanding the said order of removal, and notwithstanding the said authority of the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*, to the test of a final decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in the earliest practicable mode by which the question could be brought before that tribunal.

This respondent did not conspire or agree with the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to use intimidation or threats to hinder or prevent the said Stanton from holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, nor did this respondent at any time command or advise the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to resort to or use either threats or intimidation for that purpose. The only means in the contemplation or purpose of respondent to be used are set forth fully in the said

orders of February 21, the first addressed to Mr. Stanton and the second to the said Thomas. By the first order the respondent notified Mr. Stanton that he was removed from the said office and that his functions as Secretary for the Department of War were to terminate upon the receipt of that order; and he also thereby notified the said Stanton that the said Thomas had been authorized to act as Secretary for the Department of War *ad interim*, and ordered the said Stanton to transfer to him all the records, books, papers, and other public property in his custody and charge; and by the second order this respondent notified the said Thomas of the removal from office of the said Stanton, and authorized him to act as Secretary for the Department of War *ad interim*, and directed him to immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office and to receive the transfer of all the records, books, papers, and other public property from Mr. Stanton then in his custody and charge.

Respondent gave no instructions to the said Thomas to use intimidation or threats to enforce obedience to these orders. He gave him no authority to call in the aid of the military or any other force to enable him to obtain possession of the office or of the books, papers, records, or property thereof. The only agency resorted to, or intended to be resorted to, was by means of the said Executive orders requiring obedience. But the Secretary for the Department of War refused to obey these orders, and still holds undisturbed possession and custody of that Department and of the records, books, papers, and other public property therein. Respondent further states that in execution of the orders so by this respondent given to the said Thomas he, the said Thomas, proceeded in a peaceful manner to demand of the said Stanton a surrender to him of the public property in the said Department, and to vacate the possession of the same, and to allow him, the said Thomas, peaceably to exercise the duties devolved upon him by authority of the President. That, as this respondent has been informed and believes, the said Stanton peremptorily refused obedience to the orders so issued. Upon such refusal no force or threat of force was used by the said Thomas, by authority of the President or otherwise, to enforce obedience, either then or at any subsequent time.

This respondent doth here except to the sufficiency of the allegations contained in said fourth article, and states for ground of exception that it is not stated that there was any agreement between this respondent and the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to use intimidation and threats, nor is there any allegation as to the nature of said intimidation and threats, or that there was any agreement to carry them into execution, or that any step was taken or agreed to be taken to carry them into execution; and that the allegation in said article that the intent of said conspiracy was to use intimidation and threats is wholly insufficient, inasmuch as it is not alleged that the said intent formed the basis or

became part of any agreement between the said alleged conspirators; and, furthermore, that there is no allegation of any conspiracy or agreement to use intimidation or threats.

Answer to Article V.—And for answer to the said fifth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, or at any other time or times in the same year before the said 2d day of March, 1868, or at any prior or subsequent time, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other place, this respondent did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas, or with any other person or persons, to prevent or hinder the execution of the said act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," or that, in pursuance of said alleged conspiracy, he did unlawfully attempt to prevent the said Edwin M. Stanton from holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or that he did thereby commit, or that he was thereby guilty of, a high misdemeanor in office. Respondent, protesting that said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, begs leave to refer to his answer given to the fourth article and to his answer to the first article as to his intent and purpose in issuing the orders for the removal of Mr. Stanton and the authority given to the said Thomas, and prays equal benefit therefrom as if the same were here again repeated and fully set forth.

And this respondent excepts to the sufficiency of the said fifth article, and states his ground for such exception that it is not alleged by what means or by what agreement the said alleged conspiracy was formed or agreed to be carried out, or in what way the same was attempted to be carried out, or what were the acts done in pursuance thereof.

Answer to Article VI.—And for answer to the said sixth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas by force to seize, take, or possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, contrary to the provisions of the said acts referred to in the said article, or either of them, or with intent to violate either of them. Respondent, protesting that said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, not only denies the said conspiracy as charged, but also denies any unlawful intent in reference to the custody and charge of the property of the United States in the said Department of War, and again refers to his former answers for a full statement of his intent and purpose in the premises.

Answer to Article VII.—And for answer to the said seventh article respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas with intent unlawfully to seize, take, or possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, with intent to violate or disregard the said act in the said seventh article referred to, or that he did then and there commit a high misdemeanor in

office. Respondent, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, again refers to his former answers, in so far as they are applicable, to show the intent with which he proceeded in the premises, and prays equal benefit therefrom as if the same were here again fully repeated. Respondent further takes exception to the sufficiency of the allegations of this article as to the conspiracy alleged upon the same grounds as stated in the exception set forth in his answer to said article fourth.

Answer to Article VIII.—And for answer to the said eighth article this respondent denies that on the 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did issue and deliver to the said Thomas the said letter of authority set forth in the said eighth article with the intent unlawfully to control the disbursements of the money appropriated for the military service and for the Department of War. This respondent, protesting that there was a vacancy in the office of Secretary of War, admits that he did issue the said letter of authority, and he denies that the same was with any unlawful intent whatever, either to violate the Constitution of the United States or any act of Congress. On the contrary, this respondent again affirms that his sole intent was to vindicate his authority as President of the United States, and by peaceful means to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary of War to a final decision before the Supreme Court of the United States, as has been hereinbefore set forth; and he prays the same benefit from his answer in the premises as if the same were here again repeated at length.

Answer to Article IX.—And for answer to the said ninth article the respondent states that on the said 22d day of February, 1868, the following note was addressed to the said Emory by the private secretary of the respondent:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
February 22, 1868.

GENERAL: The President directs me to say that he will be pleased to have you call upon him as early as practicable.

Respectfully and truly, yours,

WILLIAM G. MOORE,
United States Army.

General Emory called at the Executive Mansion according to this request. The object of respondent was to be advised by General Emory, as commander of the Department of Washington, what changes had been made in the military affairs of the department. Respondent had been informed that various changes had been made which in no wise had been brought to his notice or reported to him from the Department of War or from any other quarter, and desired to ascertain the facts. After the said Emory had explained in detail the changes which had taken

place, said Emory called the attention of respondent to a general order which he referred to, and which this respondent then sent for, when it was produced. It is as follows:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 17.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, March 14, 1867.

The following acts of Congress are published for the information and government of all concerned:

* * * * * * *

"II.—PUBLIC—No. 85.

"AN ACT making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes.

* * * * * * *

"SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That the headquarters of the General of the Army of the United States shall be at the city of Washington, and all orders and instructions relating to military operations issued by the President or Secretary of War shall be issued through the General of the Army, and in case of his inability through the next in rank. The General of the Army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters, except at his own request, without the previous approval of the Senate; and any orders or instructions relating to military operations issued contrary to the requirements of this section shall be null and void; and any officer who shall issue orders or instructions contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office; and any officer of the Army who shall transmit, convey, or obey any orders or instructions so issued contrary to the provisions of this section, knowing that such orders were so issued, shall be liable to imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty years upon conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction.

* * * * * * *

"Approved, March 2, 1867."

* * * * * * *

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official:

_____ _____,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Emory not only called the attention of respondent to this order, but to the fact that it was in conformity with a section contained in an appropriation act passed by Congress. Respondent, after reading the order, observed:

This is not in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, which makes me Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, or of the language of the commission which you hold.

General Emory then stated that this order had met the respondent's approval. Respondent then said in reply, in substance:

Am I to understand that the President of the United States can not give an order but through the General in Chief, or General Grant?

General Emory again reiterated the statement that it had met respondent's approval, and that it was the opinion of some of the leading lawyers of the country that this order was constitutional. With some further conversation, respondent then inquired the names of the lawyers who had given the opinion, and he mentioned the names of two. Respondent then said that the object of the law was very evident, referring to the clause in the appropriation act upon which the order pnrported to be based. This, according to respondent's recollection, was the substance of the conversation had with General Emory.

Respondent denies that any allegations in the said article of any instructions or declarations given to the said Emory then or at any other time contrary to or in addition to what is hereinbefore set forth are true. Respondent denies that in said conversation with said Emory he had any other intent than to express the opinion then given to the said Emory, nor did he then or at any time request or order the said Emory to disobey any law or any order issued in conformity with any law, or intend to offer any inducement to the said Emory to violate any law. What this respondent then said to General Emory was simply the expression of an opinion which he then fully believed to be sound, and which he yet believes to be so, and that is that by the express provisions of the Constitution this respondent, as President, is made the Commander in Chief of the armies of the United States, and as such he is to be respected, and that his orders, whether issued through the War Department, or through the General in Chief, or by any other channel of communication, are entitled to respect and obedience, and that such constitutional power can not be taken from him by virtue of any act of Congress. Respondent doth therefore deny that by the expression of such opinion he did commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and the respondent doth further say that the said Article IX lays no foundation whatever for the conclusion stated in the said article, that the respondent, by reason of the allegations therein contained, was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

In reference to the statement made by General Emory that this respondent had approved of said act of Congress containing the section referred to, the respondent admits that his formal approval was given to said act, but accompanied the same by the following message, addressed and sent with the act to the House of Representatives, in which House the said act originated, and from which it came to respondent:

To the House of Representatives: WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 2, 1867.*

The act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes," contains provisions to which I must call attention. These provisions are contained in the second section, which in certain cases virtually deprives the President of his constitutional functions as Commander in Chief of the Army, and in the sixth section, which denies to ten States of the Union their constitutional right to protect themselves in any emer-

gency by means of their own militia. These provisions are out of place in an appropriation act, but I am compelled to defeat these necessary appropriations if I withhold my signature from the act. Pressed by these considerations, I feel constrained to return the bill with my signature, but to accompany it with my earnest protest against the sections which I have indicated.

Respondent, therefore, did no more than to express to said Emory the same opinion which he had so expressed to the House of Representatives.

Answer to Article X.—And in answer to the tenth article and specifications thereof the respondent says that on the 14th and 15th days of August, in the year 1866, a political convention of delegates from all or most of the States and Territories of the Union was held in the city of Philadelphia, under the name and style of the National Union Convention, for the purpose of maintaining and advancing certain political views and opinions before the people of the United States, and for their support and adoption in the exercise of the constitutional suffrage in the elections of Representatives and Delegates in Congress which were soon to occur in many of the States and Territories of the Union; which said convention, in the course of its proceedings, and in furtherance of the objects of the same, adopted a "Declaration of principles" and "An address to the people of the United States," and appointed a committee of two of its members from each State and of one from each Territory and one from the District of Columbia to wait upon the President of the United States and present to him a copy of the proceedings of the convention; that on the 18th day of said month of August this committee waited upon the President of the United States at the Executive Mansion, and was received by him in one of the rooms thereof, and by their chairman, Hon. Reverdy Johnson, then and now a Senator of the United States, acting and speaking in their behalf, presented a copy of the proceedings of the convention and addressed the President of the United States in a speech of which a copy (according to a published report of the same, and, as the respondent believes, substantially a correct report) is hereto annexed as a part of this answer, and marked Exhibit C.

That thereupon, and in reply to the address of said committee by their chairman, this respondent addressed the said committee so waiting upon him in one of the rooms of the Executive Mansion; and this respondent believes that this his address to said committee is the occasion referred to in the first specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech or address of this respondent upon said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion, but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said first specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof

shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, and on the 3d day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a large assemblage of his fellow-citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the second specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion, but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said second specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and on the 8th day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a numerous assemblage of his fellow-citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the third specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion, but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said third specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that the said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article, protesting that he has not been unmindful of the high duties of his office or of the harmony or courtesies which ought to exist and be maintained between the executive and legislative branches of the Government of the United States, denies that he has ever intended or designed to set aside the right-

ful authority or powers of Congress, or attempted to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, or reproach the Congress of the United States, or either branch thereof, or to impair or destroy the regard or respect of all or any of the good people of the United States for the Congress or the rightful legislative power thereof, or to excite the odium or resentment of all or any of the good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by it duly and constitutionally enacted. This respondent further says that at all times he has, in his official acts as President, recognized the authority of the several Congresses of the United States as constituted and organized during his administration of the office of President of the United States.

And this respondent, further answering, says that he has from time to time, under his constitutional right and duty as President of the United States, communicated to Congress his views and opinions in regard to such acts or resolutions thereof as, being submitted to him as President of the United States in pursuance of the Constitution, seemed to this respondent to require such communications; and he has from time to time, in the exercise of that freedom of speech which belongs to him as a citizen of the United States, and, in his political relations as President of the United States to the people of the United States, is upon fit occasions a duty of the highest obligation, expressed to his fellow-citizens his views and opinions respecting the measures and proceedings of Congress; and that in such addresses to his fellow-citizens and in such his communications to Congress he has expressed his views, opinions, and judgment of and concerning the actual constitution of the two Houses of Congress, without representation therein of certain States of the Union, and of the effect that in wisdom and justice, in the opinion and judgment of this respondent, Congress in its legislation and proceedings should give to this political circumstance; and whatsoever he has thus communicated to Congress or addressed to his fellow-citizens or any assemblage thereof this respondent says was and is within and according to his right and privilege as an American citizen and his right and duty as President of the United States.

And this respondent, not waiving or at all disparaging his right of freedom of opinion and of freedom of speech, as hereinbefore or hereinafter more particularly set forth, but claiming and insisting upon the same, further answering the said tenth article, says that the views and opinions expressed by this respondent in his said addresses to the assemblages of his fellow-citizens, as in said articles or in this answer thereto mentioned, are not and were not intended to be other or different from those expressed by him in his communications to Congress—that the eleven States lately in insurrection never had ceased to be States of the Union, and that they were then entitled to representation in Congress by loyal Representatives and Senators as fully as the other States of the Union, and that consequently the Congress as then constituted was not in

fact a Congress of all the States, but a Congress of only a part of the States. This respondent, always protesting against the unauthorized exclusion therefrom of the said eleven States, nevertheless gave his assent to all laws passed by said Congress which did not, in his opinion and judgment, violate the Constitution, exercising his constitutional authority of returning bills to said Congress with his objections when they appeared to him to be unconstitutional or inexpedient.

And further, this respondent has also expressed the opinion, both in his communications to Congress and in his addresses to the people, that the policy adopted by Congress in reference to the States lately in insurrection did not tend to peace, harmony, and union, but, on the contrary, did tend to disunion and the permanent disruption of the States, and that in following its said policy laws had been passed by Congress in violation of the fundamental principles of the Government, and which tended to consolidation and despotism; and such being his deliberate opinions, he would have felt himself unmindful of the high duties of his office if he had failed to express them in his communications to Congress or in his addresses to the people when called upon by them to express his opinions on matters of public and political consideration.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article, says that he has always claimed and insisted, and now claims and insists, that both in the personal and private capacity of a citizen of the United States and in the political relations of the President of the United States to the people of the United States, whose servant, under the duties and responsibilities of the Constitution of the United States, the President of the United States is and should always remain, this respondent had and has the full right, and in his office of President of the United States is held to the high duty, of forming, and on fit occasions expressing, opinions of and concerning the legislation of Congress, proposed or completed, in respect of its wisdom, expediency, justice, worthiness, objects, purposes, and public and political motives and tendencies, and within and as a part of such right and duty to form, and on fit occasions to express, opinions of and concerning the public character and conduct, views, purposes, objects, motives, and tendencies of all men engaged in the public service, as well in Congress as otherwise, and under no other rules or limits upon this right of freedom of opinion and of freedom of speech, or of responsibility and amenability for the actual exercise of such freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, than attend upon such rights and their exercise on the part of all other citizens of the United States and on the part of all their public servants.

And this respondent, further answering said tenth article, says that the several occasions on which, as is alleged in the several specifications of said article, this respondent addressed his fellow-citizens on subjects of public and political considerations were not, nor was any one of them, sought or planned by this respondent, but, on the contrary, each of said occasions arose upon the exercise of a lawful and accustomed right of the

people of the United States to call upon their public servants and express to them their opinions, wishes, and feelings upon matters of public and political consideration, and to invite from such their public servants an expression of their opinions, views, and feelings on matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent claims and insists before this honorable court, and before all the people of the United States, that of or concerning this his right of freedom of opinion and of freedom of speech, and this his exercise of such rights on all matters of public and political consideration, and in respect of all public servants or persons whatsoever engaged in or connected therewith, this respondent, as a citizen or as President of the United States, is not subject to question, inquisition, impeachment, or inculpation in any form or manner whatsoever.

And this respondent says that neither the said tenth article nor any specification thereof nor any allegation therein contained touches or relates to any official act or doing of this respondent in the office of President of the United States or in the discharge of any of its constitutional or legal duties or responsibilities; but said article and the specifications and allegations thereof, wholly and in every part thereof, question only the discretion or propriety of freedom of opinion or freedom of speech as exercised by this respondent as a citizen of the United States in his personal right and capacity, and without allegation or imputation against this respondent of the violation of any law of the United States touching or relating to freedom of speech or its exercise by the citizens of the United States or by this respondent as one of the said citizens or otherwise; and he denies that by reason of any matter in said article or its specifications alleged he has said or done anything indecent or unbecoming in the Chief Magistrate of the United States, or that he has brought the high office of President of the United States into contempt, ridicule, or disgrace, or that he has committed or has been guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

Answer to Article XI.—And in answer to the eleventh article this respondent denies that on the 18th day of August, in the year 1866, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, he did, by public speech or otherwise, declare or affirm, in substance or at all, that the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the Constitution to exercise legislative power under the same, or that he did then and there declare or affirm that the said Thirty-ninth Congress was a Congress of only part of the States in any sense or meaning other than that ten States of the Union were denied representation therein, or that he made any or either of the declarations or affirmations in this behalf in the said article alleged as denying or intending to deny that the legislation of said Thirty-ninth Congress was valid or obligatory upon this respondent except so far as this respondent saw fit to approve the same; and as to the allegation in said article that he did thereby intend or mean to be understood that the said Congress had not power to propose amendments to the Constitution, this respondent

says that in said address he said nothing in reference to the subject of amendments of the Constitution, nor was the question of the competency of the said Congress to propose such amendments, without the participation of said excluded States, at the time of said address in any way mentioned or considered or referred to by this respondent, nor in what he did say had he any intent regarding the same; and he denies the allegations so made to the contrary thereof. But this respondent, in further answer to and in respect of the said allegations of the said eleventh article hereinbefore traversed and denied, claims and insists upon his personal and official right of freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, and his duty in his political relations as President of the United States to the people of the United States in the exercise of such freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, in the same manner, form, and effect as he has in this behalf stated the same in his answer to the said tenth article, and with the same effect as if he here repeated the same; and he further claims and insists, as in said answer to said tenth article he has claimed and insisted, that he is not subject to question, inquisition, impeachment or inculpation, in any form or manner, of or concerning such rights of freedom of opinion or freedom of speech, or his said alleged exercise thereof.

And this respondent further denies that on the 21st day of February, in the year 1868, or at any other time, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, in pursuance of any such declaration as in that behalf in said eleventh article alleged, or otherwise, he did unlawfully, and in disregard of the requirement of the Constitution that he should take care that the laws should be faithfully executed, attempt to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising or contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive, means by which he should prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of Secretary for the Department of War, or by unlawfully devising or contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive, means to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes," approved March 2, 1867, or to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article, says that he has in his answer to the first article set forth in detail the acts, steps, and proceedings done and taken by this respondent to and toward or in the matter of the suspension or removal of the said Edwin M. Stanton in or from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, with the times, modes, circumstances, intents, views, purposes, and opinions of official obligations and duty under and with which such acts, steps, and proceedings were done and taken; and he makes answer to this

eleventh article of the matters in his answer to the first article pertaining to the suspension or removal of said Edwin M. Stanton, to the same intent and effect as if they were here repeated and set forth.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article, denies that by means or reason of anything in said article alleged this respondent, as President of the United States, did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, or at any other day or time, commit or that he was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article, says that the same and the matters therein contained do not charge or allege the commission of any act whatever by this respondent in his office of President of the United States, nor the omission by this respondent of any act of official obligation or duty in his office of President of the United States; nor does the said article nor the matters therein contained name, designate, describe, or define any act or mode or form of attempt, device, contrivance, or means, or of attempt at device, contrivance, or means, whereby this respondent can know or understand what act or mode or form of attempt, device, contrivance, or means, or of attempt at device, contrivance, or means, are imputed to or charged against this respondent in his office of President of the United States, or intended so to be, or whereby this respondent can more fully or definitely make answer unto the said article than he hereby does.

And this respondent, in submitting to this honorable court this his answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him, respectfully reserves leave to amend and add to the same from time to time, as may become necessary or proper, and when and as such necessity and propriety shall appear.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

HENRY STANBERY,
B. R. CURTIS,
THOMAS A. R. NELSON,
WILLIAM M. EVARTS,
W. S. GROESBECK,
Of Counsel.

[For Exhibits A and B see veto message of March 2, 1867, pp. 492–498, and special message of December 12, 1867, pp. 583–594.]

EXHIBIT C.

ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT BY HON. REVERDY JOHNSON, AUGUST, 18, 1866.

Mr. PRESIDENT: We are before you as a committee of the National Union Convention, which met in Philadelphia on Tuesday, the 14th instant, charged with the duty of presenting you with an authentic copy of its proceedings.

Before placing it in your hands you will permit us to congratulate you that in the object for which the convention was called, in the enthusiasm with which in every State and Territory the call was responded to, in the unbroken harmony of its deliberations, in the unanimity with which the principles it has declared were adopted, and more especially in the patriotic and constitutional character of the principles themselves, we are confident that you and the country will find gratifying and cheering evidence that there exists among the people a public sentiment which renders an early and complete restoration of the Union as established by the Constitution certain and inevitable. Party faction, seeking the continuance of its misrule, may momentarily delay it, but the principles of political liberty for which our fathers successfully contended, and to secure which they adopted the Constitution, are so glaringly inconsistent with the condition in which the country has been placed by such misrule that it will not be permitted a much longer duration.

We wish, Mr. President, you could have witnessed the spirit of concord and brotherly affection which animated every member of the convention. Great as your confidence has ever been in the intelligence and patriotism of your fellow-citizens, in their deep devotion to the Union and their present determination to reinstate and maintain it, that confidence would have become a positive conviction could you have seen and heard all that was done and said upon the occasion. Every heart was evidently full of joy; every eye beamed with patriotic animation; despondency gave place to the assurance that, our late dreadful civil strife ended, the blissful reign of peace, under the protection, not of arms, but of the Constitution and laws, would have sway, and be in every part of our land cheerfully acknowledged and in perfect good faith obeyed. You would not have doubted that the recurrence of dangerous domestic insurrections in the future is not to be apprehended.

If you could have seen the men of Massachusetts and South Carolina coming into the convention on the first day of its meeting hand in hand, amid the rapturous applause of the whole body, awakened by heartfelt gratification at the event, filling the eyes of thousands with tears of joy, which they neither could nor desired to repress, you would have felt, as every person present felt, that the time had arrived when all sectional or other perilous dissensions had ceased, and that nothing should be heard in the future but the voice of harmony proclaiming devotion to a common country, of pride in being bound together by a common Union, existing and protected by forms of government proved by experience to be eminently fitted for the exigencies of either war or peace.

In the principles announced by the convention and in the feeling there manifested we have every assurance that harmony throughout our entire land will soon prevail. We know that as in former days, as was eloquently declared by Webster, the nation's most gifted statesman, Massachusetts and South Carolina went "shoulder to shoulder through the

Revolution'' and stood hand in hand ''around the Administration of Washington and felt his own great arm lean on them for support,'' so will they again, with like magnanimity, devotion, and power, stand round your Administration and cause you to feel that you may also lean on them for support.

In the proceedings, Mr. President, which we are to place in your hands you will find that the convention performed the grateful duty imposed upon them by their knowledge of your ''devotion to the Constitution and laws and interests of your country,'' as illustrated by your entire Presidential career, of declaring that in you they ''recognize a Chief Magistrate worthy of the nation and equal to the great crisis upon which your lot is cast;'' and in this declaration it gives us marked pleasure to add we are confident that the convention has but spoken the intelligent and patriotic sentiment of the country. Ever inaccessible to the low influences which often control the mere partisan, governed alone by an honest opinion of constitutional obligations and rights and of the duty of looking solely to the true interests, safety, and honor of the nation, such a class is incapable of resorting to any bait for popularity at the expense of the public good.

In the measures which you have adopted for the restoration of the Union the convention saw only a continuance of the policy which for the same purpose was inaugurated by your immediate predecessor. In his reelection by the people, after that policy had been fully indicated and had been made one of the issues of the contest, those of his political friends who are now assailing you for sternly pursuing it are forgetful or regardless of the opinions which their support of his reelection necessarily involved. Being upon the same ticket with that much-lamented public servant, whose foul assassination touched the heart of the civilized world with grief and horror, you would have been false to obvious duty if you had not endeavored to carry out the same policy; and, judging now by the opposite one which Congress has pursued, its wisdom and patriotism are indicated by the fact that that of Congress has but continued a broken Union by keeping ten of the States in which at one time the insurrection existed (as far as they could accomplish it) in the condition of subjugated provinces, denying to them the right to be represented, while subjecting their people to every species of legislation, including that of taxation. That such a state of things is at war with the very genius of our Government, inconsistent with every idea of political freedom, and most perilous to the peace and safety of the country no reflecting man can fail to believe.

We hope, sir, that the proceedings of the convention will cause you to adhere, if possible, with even greater firmness to the course which you are pursuing, by satisfying you that the people are with you, and that the wish which lies nearest to their heart is that a perfect restoration of our Union at the earliest moment be attained, and a conviction that the

result can only be accomplished by the measures which you are pursuing. And in the discharge of the duties which these impose upon you we, as did every member of the convention, again for ourselves individually tender to you our profound respect and assurance of our cordial and sincere support.

With a reunited Union, with no foot but that of a freeman treading or permitted to tread our soil, with a nation's faith pledged forever to a strict observance of all its obligations, with kindness and fraternal love everywhere prevailing, the desolations of war will soon be removed; its sacrifices of life, sad as they have been, will, with Christian resignation, be referred to a providential purpose of fixing our beloved country on a firm and enduring basis, which will forever place our liberty and happiness beyond the reach of human peril.

Then, too, and forever, will our Government challenge the admiration and receive the respect of the nations of the world, and be in no danger of any efforts to impeach our honor.

And permit me, sir, in conclusion, to add that, great as is your solicitude for the restoration of our domestic peace and your labors to that end, you have also a watchful eye to the rights of the nation, and that any attempt by an assumed or actual foreign power to enforce an illegal blockade against the Government or citizens of the United States, to use your own mild but expressive words, "will be disallowed." In this determination I am sure you will receive the unanimous approval of your fellow-citizens.

Now, sir, as the chairman of this committee, and in behalf of the convention, I have the honor to present you with an authentic copy of its proceedings.

Counsel for the respondent submitted the following motion:

To the Senate of the United States sitting as a court of impeachment:

And now, on this 23d day of March, in the year 1868, the counsel for the President of the United States, upon reading and filing his answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him, respectfully represent to the honorable court that after the replication shall have been filed to the said answer the due and proper preparation of and for the trial of the cause will require, in the opinion and judgment of such counsel, that a period of not less than thirty days should be allowed to the President of the United States and his counsel for such preparation, and before the said trial should proceed.

HENRY STANBERY,
B. R. CURTIS,
THOMAS A. R. NELSON,
WM. M. EVARTS,
W. S. GROESBECK,
Of Counsel.

TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 1868.

THE UNITED STATES *vs.* ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.

REPLICATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE ANSWER OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITED AGAINST HIM BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The House of Representatives of the United States have considered the several answers of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, to the several articles of impeachment against him, by them exhibited in the name of themselves and of all the people of the United States, and reserving to themselves all advantage of exception to the insufficiency of his answer to each and all of the several articles of impeachment exhibited against said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do deny each and every averment in said several answers, or either of them, which denies or traverses the acts, intents, crimes, or misdemeanors charged against said Andrew Johnson in the said articles of impeachment, or either of them, and for replication to the said answer do say that said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, is guilty of the high crimes and misdemeanors mentioned in said articles, and that the House of Representatives are ready to prove the same.

SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
EDW'D MCPHERSON,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.

The motion of the counsel for the respondent, submitted on March 23, "that a period of not less than thirty days should be allowed to the President of the United States and his counsel for such preparation and before the said trial should proceed," was denied, and it was

Ordered, That the Senate will commence the trial of the President upon the articles of impeachment exhibited against him on Monday, the 30th of March instant, and proceed therein with all convenient dispatch under the rules of the Senate sitting upon the trial of an impeachment.

MONDAY, MAY 11, 1868.

THE UNITED STATES *vs.* ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.

The Chief Justice stated that in compliance with the desire of the Senate he had prepared the question to be addressed to Senators upon each article of impeachment, and that he had reduced his views thereon to writing, which he read, as follows:

SENATORS: In conformity with what seemed to be the general wish of the Senate when it adjourned last Thursday, the Chief Justice, in taking

the vote on the articles of impeachment, will adopt the mode sanctioned by the practice in the cases of Chase, Peck, and Humphreys.

He will direct the Secretary to read the several articles successively, and after the reading of each article will put the question of guilty or not guilty to each Senator, rising in his place, in the form used in the case of Judge Chase:

Mr. Senator ———, how say you? Is the respondent, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, guilty or not guilty of a high misdemeanor, as charged in this article?

In putting the question on Articles IV and VI, each of which charges a crime, the word "crime" will be substituted for the word "misdemeanor."

The Chief Justice has carefully considered the suggestion of the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Hendricks), which appeared to meet the approval of the Senate, that in taking the vote on the eleventh article the question should be put on each clause, and has found himself unable to divide the article as suggested. The article charges several facts, but they are so connected that they make but one allegation and they are charged as constituting one misdemeanor.

The first fact charged is, in substance, that the President publicly declared in August, 1866, that the Thirty-ninth Congress was a Congress of only part of the States and not a constitutional Congress, intending thereby to deny its constitutional competency to enact laws or propose amendments of the Constitution; and this charge seems to have been made as introductory, and as qualifying that which follows, namely, that the President, in pursuance of this declaration, attempted to prevent the execution of the tenure-of-office act by contriving and attempting to contrive means to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming the functions of Secretary of War after the refusal of the Senate to concur in his suspension, and also by contriving and attempting to contrive means to prevent the execution of the appropriation act of March 2, 1867, and also to prevent the execution of the rebel States governments act of the same date.

The gravamen of the article seems to be that the President attempted to defeat the execution of the tenure-of-office act, and that he did this in pursuance of a declaration which was intended to deny the constitutional competency of Congress to enact laws or propose constitutional amendments, and by contriving means to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming his office of Secretary, and also to prevent the execution of the appropriation act and the rebel States governments act.

The single substantive matter charged is the attempt to prevent the execution of the tenure-of-office act, and the other facts are alleged either as introductory and exhibiting this general purpose or as showing the means contrived in furtherance of that attempt.

This single matter, connected with the other matters previously and

subsequently alleged, is charged as the high misdemeanor of which the President is alleged to have been guilty.

The general question, guilty or not guilty of a high misdemeanor as charged, seems fully to cover the whole charge, and will be put as to this article as well as to the others, unless the Senate direct some mode of division.

In the tenth article the division suggested by the Senator from New York (Mr. Conkling) may be more easily made. It contains a general allegation to the effect that on the 18th of August and on other days the President, with intent to set aside the rightful authority of Congress and bring it into contempt, delivered certain scandalous harangues, and therein uttered loud threats and bitter menaces against Congress and the laws of the United States enacted by Congress, thereby bringing the office of President into disgrace, to the great scandal of all good citizens, and sets forth in three distinct specifications the harangues, threats, and menaces complained of.

In respect to this article, if the Senate sees fit so to direct, the question of guilty or not guilty of the facts charged may be taken in respect to the several specifications, and then the question of guilty or not guilty of a high misdemeanor, as charged in the article, can also be taken.

The Chief Justice, however, sees no objection to putting the general question on this article in the same manner as on the others; for, whether particular questions be put on the specifications or not, the answer to the final question must be determined by the judgment of the Senate whether or not the facts alleged in the specifications have been sufficiently proved, and whether, if sufficiently proved, they amount to a high misdemeanor within the meaning of the Constitution.

On the whole, therefore, the Chief Justice thinks that the better practice will be to put the general question on each article without attempting to make any subdivision, and will pursue this course if no objection is made. He will, however, be pleased to conform to such directions as the Senate may see fit to give in this respect.

Whereupon it was

Ordered, That the question be put as proposed by the Presiding Officer of the Senate, and each Senator shall rise in his place and answer "guilty" or "not guilty" only.

SATURDAY, MAY 16, 1868.

THE UNITED STATES *vs.* ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.

The Chief Justice stated that, in pursuance of the order of the Senate, he would first proceed to take the judgment of the Senate on the eleventh article. The roll of the Senate was called, with the following result:

The Senators who voted "guilty" are Messrs. Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds,

Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Wade, Williams, Willey, Wilson, and Yates—35.

The Senators who voted "not guilty" are Messrs. Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Van Winkle, and Vickers—19.

The Chief Justice announced that upon this article thirty-five Senators had voted "guilty" and nineteen Senators "not guilty," and declared that two-thirds of the Senators present not having pronounced him guilty, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, stood acquitted of the charges contained in the eleventh article of impeachment.

TUESDAY, MAY 26, 1868.

THE UNITED STATES *vs.* ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT.

The Senate ordered that the vote be taken upon the second article of impeachment. The roll of the Senate was called, with the following result:

The Senators who voted "guilty" are Messrs. Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Wade, Willey, Williams, Wilson, and Yates—35.

The Senators who voted "not guilty" are Messrs. Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Van Winkle, and Vickers—19.

The Chief Justice announced that upon this article thirty-five Senators had voted "guilty" and nineteen Senators had voted "not guilty," and declared that two-thirds of the Senators present not having pronounced him guilty, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, stood acquitted of the charges contained in the second article of impeachment.

The Senate ordered that the vote be taken upon the third article of impeachment. The roll of the Senate was called, with the following result:

The Senators who voted "guilty" are Messrs. Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Wade, Willey, Williams, Wilson, and Yates—35.

The Senators who voted "not guilty" are Messrs. Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Fowler, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Van Winkle, and Vickers—19.

The Chief Justice announced that upon this article thirty-five Senators had voted "guilty" and nineteen Senators had voted "not guilty," and declared that two-thirds of the Senators present not having pronounced him guilty, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, stood acquitted of the charges contained in the third article.

No objection being made, the secretary, by direction of the Chief Justice, entered the judgment of the Senate upon the second, third, and eleventh articles, as follows:

The Senate having tried Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, upon articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senators present not having found him guilty of the charges contained in the second, third, and eleventh articles of impeachment, it is therefore

Ordered and adjudged, That the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be, and he is, acquitted of the charges in said articles made and set forth.

A motion "that the Senate sitting for the trial of the President upon articles of impeachment do now adjourn without day" was adopted by a vote of 34 yeas to 16 nays.

Those who voted in the affirmative are Messrs. Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Van Winkle, Wade, Willey, Williams, Wilson, and Yates.

Those who voted in the negative are Messrs. Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fowler, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, and Vickers.

The Chief Justice declared the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment for the trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, upon articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, adjourned without day.

ADDENDA.

[An injunction of secrecy having been placed upon the following messages by the Senate, they were not printed in the Executive Journal covering their period, but were found in the unprinted Executive Journal of the Forty-first Congress while searching for copy for Volume VII, and consequently too late for insertion in their proper places in this volume.]

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1869.*

To the Senate:

Referring to the three Executive communications of the 15th instant, with which were transmitted to the Senate, respectively, a copy of a convention between the United States and Great Britain upon the subject of claims, a copy of a convention between the same parties in relation to the question of boundary, and a protocol of a treaty between the same parties concerning the rights of naturalized citizens and subjects of the respective parties, I now transmit a copy of such correspondence upon those subjects as has not been heretofore communicated to the Senate.

In the progress of the negotiation the three subjects became to such a degree associated with each other that it would be difficult to present separately the correspondence upon each. The papers are therefore transmitted in the order in which they are mentioned in the accompanying list.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

Referring to the Executive communication of the 15th instant, which was accompanied by a copy of a convention between the United States and Great Britain for the settlement of all outstanding claims, I now transmit to the Senate the original of that instrument, and a report of the Secretary of State pointing out the differences between the copy as submitted to the Senate and the original as signed by the plenipotentiaries.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1869.*

To the Senate of the United States:

Referring to the Executive communication of the 15th instant, which was accompanied by a copy of a convention between the United States and Great Britain providing for the reference to an arbiter of the question of difference between the United States and Great Britain concerning the northwest line of water boundary between the United States and the British possessions in North America, I now transmit to the Senate the original of that instrument, and a report of the Secretary of State pointing out the differences between the copy as submitted to the Senate and the original as signed by the plenipotentiaries.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

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